nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2017‒08‒06
five papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. The Geography of Civic Crowdfunding: Implications for Social Inequality and Donor-Project Dynamics By Daniel A. Brent; Katie Lorah
  2. Optimal Procurement of Distributed Energy Resources By Brown, David P.; Sappington, David E. M.
  3. Rural renewable energy investments and their impact on employment By Renner, Michael,
  4. Efficient Public Good Provision in Networks : Revisiting the Lindahl Solution By Anil K. Jain
  5. Towards a new role of the institution of waqf By Elasrag, Hussein

  1. By: Daniel A. Brent; Katie Lorah
    Abstract: Civic crowdfunding combines the power of private crowdfunding with grassroots organization to directly fund local public projects. This article analyzes fine scale geographic data on 18,000 donations to roughly 800 campaigns from a leading civic crowdfunding platform to examine the implications of civic crowdfunding for inequality and the link between donors and projects. The neighborhood characteristics of projects, including median household income, do not impact the ability to raise capital, which addresses a common concern that civic crowdfunding will exacerbate inequality in neighborhood amenities. The average distance of a donor to a project is over 300 miles and the median distance is 8 miles, indicating that while projects elicit donations from outside their community local donations are very important. Donors' income does not influence whether donors contribute to projects in low income or high income neighborhoods. The findings serve as a guide to future research on civic crowdfunding and inform how the expansion of this new funding mechanism can integrate into local government policy.
    Date: 2017–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2017-09&r=ppm
  2. By: Brown, David P. (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Sappington, David E. M. (University of Florida, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: We analyze the optimal design of policies to motivate electricity distribution companies to adopt efficient distributed energy resources (DER) and manage associated project costs. The optimal policy often entails a bias against new DER projects and implements considerable cost sharing when DER projects are undertaken in order to limit the utility's rent. Failure to adequately tailor the degree of cost sharing to the prevailing environment can raise procurement costs substantially. It can be optimal to reward a distribution company with more than the cost saving it achieves.
    Keywords: distributed energy resources; procurement; regulation
    JEL: L51 L94
    Date: 2017–08–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2017_005&r=ppm
  3. By: Renner, Michael,
    Abstract: This series of project publications aims to capture the tools, methods, and processes developed under the EC and ILO joint project entitled “Strengthening the Impact on Employment of Sector and Trade Policies", as well as the findings from implementing these in the ten partner countries. The literature on access to rural energy through renewable energy is expanding rapidly, as are manifold initiatives to achieve universal access. However, much of the literature is concerned with technical aspects, financing, and the policies needed to generate an enabling environment. Only a minor portion addresses the employment aspects in more than a cursory manner. This report marshals relevant information in an effort to assess existing and potential employment impacts.
    Keywords: renewable resources, energy source, rural development
    Date: 2017
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ilo:ilowps:994960192102676&r=ppm
  4. By: Anil K. Jain
    Abstract: The provision of public goods in developing countries is a central challenge. This paper studies a model where each agent’s effort provides heterogeneous benefits to the others, inducing a network of opportunities for favor-trading. We focus on a classical efficient benchmark – the Lindahl solution – that can be derived from a bargaining game. Does the optimistic assumption that agents use an efficient mechanism (rather than succumbing to the tragedy of the commons) imply incentives for efficient investment in the technology that is used to produce the public goods? To show that the answer is no in general, we give comparative statics of the Lindahl solution which have natural network interpretations. We then suggest some welfare-improving interventions.
    Keywords: Networks ; Public goods ; β-core ; Repeated games ; Coalitional deviations ; Institutions ; Centrality ; Lindahl equilibrium
    JEL: H41 O43 D60
    Date: 2017–07–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgif:1210&r=ppm
  5. By: Elasrag, Hussein
    Abstract: Awqaf can be used not only to provide immediate necessities to the poor, but also to create or strengthen business support institutions that can lower the cost of doing business for the poor. Awqaf can also be used to support and build infrastructure institutions that can improve corporate governance and reduce the cost of doing business. For example, information bureaus, market regulatory bodies, the provision of accountancy services, and other such shared services for a group or for the entire society can be funded through waqf. Thus, this paper focuses on the application of these concepts and some possible roles that waqf may play in the socio-economic development of the Muslim societies.
    Keywords: waqf, Awqaf , Muslim societies, Islamic endowment
    JEL: D6 F5 O16
    Date: 2017–07–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80513&r=ppm

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