nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2017‒03‒12
five papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. Following the Code: Spillovers and Knowledge Transfer By Gandal, Neil; Naftaliev, Peter; Stettner, Uriel
  2. Flip a coin or vote: An Experiment on Choosing Group Decision Rules By Hoffmann, Timo; Renes, Sander
  3. Political Connections and Public Procurement in Turkey: Evidence from Construction Work Contracts By Esra Çeviker Gürakar; Tuba Bircan Ildiri
  4. Optimización estocástica de un portafolio para proyectos del sector de hidrocarburos. By Juan Fernando Subirana
  5. The Doing Business project: how it started: correspondence By Simeon Djankov

  1. By: Gandal, Neil; Naftaliev, Peter; Stettner, Uriel
    Abstract: It is believed that there are significant knowledge spillovers in Open Source Software (OSS). If such spillovers exist, it is likely they occur via two channels: In the first channel, programmers take knowledge, expertise, and experience gained from one OSS project they work on and employ it in another OSS project they work on. In the second, programmers reuse software code by taking code from one OSS project and employing it in another OSS project. In previous work, we found knowledge spillovers via the first channel. In this paper we develop a methodology to measure software reuse at the micro-micro level in a large OSS network. We find that projects that reuse code from other projects have higher success. Controlling for code reuse, we also find knowledge spillovers from projects connected via common programmers. Thus, our empirical work suggests that knowledge spillovers occur via both channels.
    Keywords: Knowledge Spillovers; Open Source; Reuse of Software Code; Social Network
    Date: 2017–02
  2. By: Hoffmann, Timo; Renes, Sander
    Abstract: Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available alternatives on individuals’ mechanism choices in such group choice situations. While efficient mechanisms are desirable, we experimentally show that participation constraints can prevent their implementation. We find strong indications that individual preferences for choice rules are sensitive to individual expected payoffs. Our results highlight the importance of considering participation constraints when designing choice institutions.
    JEL: C91 D70 D82
    Date: 2016
  3. By: Esra Çeviker Gürakar (Okan University); Tuba Bircan Ildiri
    Abstract: Using a unique dataset of 17,937 high value public work construction procurements made between 2004 and 2011, this paper provides systematic evidence on favoritism in public procurement in Turkey. While the yearly total of high value construction procurements has tripled in eight years, the share of procurements that are made through less competitive procurement methods increased due to various legal amendments that increased the use of less competitive procurement methods and hence state discretion in public procurement contract award processes. We find that the politically connected firms enjoyed high levels of government discretion and higher contract prices in public procurements compared to the nonconnected other firms. The probability of a politically connected firm winning a procurement contract increases, among other things, when less competitive award procedures are used. Procurements that are conducted through less competitive methods, cost more towards public. The use of public procurement for rent creation and distribution was extensive particularly for projects that cost more than TL 10 million, and the TOKI projects.
    Date: 2016–10–16
  4. By: Juan Fernando Subirana (YPFB Andina)
    Abstract: This paper presents a methodological propose in order to apply classical portfolio theory into a potential assets portfolio, to achieve a proper exposure a study case is shown. The study case considers an upstream enterprise in Bolivia with a twelve projects portfolio and capital and physical execution capacity constraints. A review of the regulatory framework and technical characteristics of each project is performed by adding the factor of the volatility of input variables to the model. Therefore the value generation of project portfolio is analyzed thru three objective functions. Finally, results with stochastic optimization and portfolio of projects selected are presented.
    Keywords: Portfolio theory, project portfolio, Hydrocarbons sector.
    JEL: C10 O10
    Date: 2015–06
  5. By: Simeon Djankov
    JEL: G38 K22 L21 L51 M13 O14
    Date: 2016–11

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