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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | KANI Masayo; MOTOHASHI Kazuyuki |
| Abstract: | This paper provides empirical analyses to understand the management of external technology sourcing using a novel dataset of new product development (NPD) projects in Japanese firms and focusing on the difference between bilateral and unilateral contract-based alliances. External technology sourcing takes various forms that can be divided into two categories: bilateral alliances, such as joint research and development (R&D), and unilateral alliances, such as licensing and commissioned R&D. The former style involves the dynamic process of joint R&D with a partner, whereas the latter involves the straightforward process of technology acquisition from a partner. In the first analysis in this paper, the determinants of the sourcing strategy for each contract type are investigated, and we find that bilateral contracts are more often used for exploratory projects, whereas in-house development is more often used for exploitation projects. Unilateral contracts are more relevant for projects mitigating contractual hazards. The second analysis looks into the relationship between the type of technology sourcing and its performance. We find that bilateral contract-based technology sourcing is more likely to lead to novel innovation than in-house development, but this difference in performance disappears when controlling for the type of NPD project and the firm's managerial resources. |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:16104&r=ppm |
| By: | Nicolas CARAYOL; Marianne LANOË |
| Abstract: | Competitive allocation of funds to research proposals is a mechanism widely used by government agencies to sustain the projects of researchers in universities and other research institutions. However, little is known about how efficient this mechanism is in practice, how it affects the recipients’ behaviors and how it would be possible to improve the precise design of such funding allocation mechanisms. This article provides new answers to those questions, relying on empirical evidence stemming from the creation of a French generalist and nationwide research funding agency in 2005. The impact of receiving a grant on the research outputs as well as on the collaborations of the grantees is precisely quantified. Moreover, the impact on citations turns out to be more than double when funds are distributed in the more competitive non-thematic programs and to be significantly larger when allocated to younger recipients. |
| Keywords: | project-based funding, competitive grants, early-career scientists, scientific productivity, conditional difference-in-differences |
| JEL: | H5 D04 O3 O38 C31 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2017-04&r=ppm |
| By: | Vecci, Joseph (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Zelinsky, Tomas (Faculty of Economics, Technical University of Kosice, Kosice, Slovakia) |
| Abstract: | We use a Spatial Durbin Model to examine the relationship between civil society aid projects and measures of civil society including membership and participation in community groups and satisfaction with democracy in Nigeria and Uganda. We then study the effect of civil society aid programs on corruption, a proxy for elite capture. The spatial model allows us to estimate the effects of project spillovers that may indirectly impact non project areas. We find that civil society aid projects are associated with a decrease in the creation of community groups and attendance at community meetings in Nigeria. In Uganda, we find that civil society aid projects have a negative effect on the membership of community groups in neighboring areas. We also find that civil society projects have a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy, but they reduce satisfaction in neighbouring areas in both Nigeria and Uganda. Our corruption measures reveal that corruption has a positive direct correlation with civil society aid projects in Uganda. A number of robustness measures are used to account for selection. |
| Keywords: | Foreign Aid; civil society; corruption; Africa; development |
| JEL: | D72 D73 F35 O10 |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0688&r=ppm |
| By: | Juan-José Ganuza (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE); Gerard Llobet (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros) |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that the concession model discourages firms from acquiring information about the future profitability of a project. Uniformed contractors carry out good and bad projects because they are profitable in expected terms even though it would have been optimal to invest in screening them out according to their value. White elephants are identified as avoidable negative net present-value projects that are nevertheless undertaken. Institutional arrangements that limit the losses that firms can bear exacerbate this distortion. We characterize the optimal concession contract which fosters the acquisition of information and achieves the first best by conditioning the duration of the concession to the realization of the demand and includes payments for not carrying out some projects. |
| Keywords: | Concession contracts, information acquisition, flexible-term concessions. |
| JEL: | D82 D86 H21 L51 |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2017_1701&r=ppm |
| By: | Ronaldo Fiani |
| Abstract: | O trabalho contribui com uma base teórico-analítica para a análise das parcerias público-privadas (PPPs), como arranjo institucional particular do ponto de vista dos seus custos de transação, uma abordagem que frequentemente vem sendo negligenciada, e muitas vezes tem comprometido as possibilidades de implementação desse arranjo particular em investimentos em infraestrutura. Nesse sentido, será discutida a aplicação do conceito de arranjos híbridos às PPPs em infraestrutura, tentando identificar as fontes de custos de transação intrínsecos a este tipo de PPPs. This paper aims to contribute to a theoretic and analytical basis to analyze Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a particular institutional arrangement from the point of view of its transaction costs, an approach that still has been neglected. That negligence has frequently jeopardized the implementation of PPPs in infrastructure projects. In order to achieve that end, it is discussed the application of the concept of hybrid institutional arrangements to PPPs in infrastructure sectors, making an effort to identify the sources of transaction costs intrinsic to that sort of PPPs. |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipe:ipetds:2261&r=ppm |
| By: | Tewari, Rachna; Luitel, Kishor; Mehlhorn, Joey; Pruitt, J. Ross; Parrott, Scott; Crews Garcia, Jessica |
| Abstract: | A clear majority of agribusiness programs require their graduates to successfully complete relevant coursework in both quantitative and theoretical areas. Instructors often make use of group projects to promote student participation, inculcate team working skills, and to enhance students’ soft skills for service related jobs in the agricultural industry. In these projects, student groups work on project milestones followed by instructor feedback for improvement. Project completion is marked by student teams’ engagement in interactive group activities such as presentations, debates, and sales pitches. The objective of this study is to evaluate the use of group projects for enhancing student learning in various agribusiness courses using an online survey tool. It is observed that students’ performance and the overall learning experience is enhanced using group work in agribusiness courses. Results indicate that students find value in these interactive projects, which facilitates a higher level of learning. Students also feel confident about their soft skills, and can better enunciate and express their viewpoints among an audience. |
| Keywords: | agribusiness, group projects, student learning, survey data, Agribusiness, Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession, A22, |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saea17:252765&r=ppm |