nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2016‒09‒04
two papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. Firm Innovation and Financial Analysis: How Do They Interact? By Joel Peress; jim goldman
  2. Институты догоняющего развития By Polterovich, Victor

  1. By: Joel Peress (INSEAD); jim goldman (insead)
    Abstract: Entrepreneurs innovate more when financiers are better informed about their projects because they expect to receive more funding should their projects be successful. Conversely, financiers collect more information about projects when entrepreneurs innovate more because the opportunity cost of misinvesting, i.e. of missing out on successful projects, is higher. Thus, technological knowledge and knowledge about technologies are mutually reinforcing. We report evidence consistent with this interaction using two quasi-natural experiments that changed, respectively, the innovation incentives and the information environment for U.S. listed firms. A calibration suggests that its contribution to income growth represents more than one third of the total contributions of information collection and innovation. We also estimate that a policy designed to stimulate innovation has an indirect effect through investors’ learning incentives that accounts for a third of the total effect of the policy on firms’ innovation incentives.
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed016:531&r=ppm
  2. By: Polterovich, Victor
    Abstract: It is shown that the institutional trajectories of catching-up development in successful countries contained similar interim institutions; this similarity is explained by common technological, institutional and cultural constraints that should be taken into account and to overcome. Corporatism, indicative planning, the presence of the "main" development agencies with broad powers, maintaining an undervalued exchange rate - due to these and a number of other mechanisms, countries of economic miracle were able to initiate and maintain rapid growth, despite low level of human capital, underdevelopment of civic culture, and market failures. Institutes of catching-up development contributed to the formation of collaborative relationships between the government, business and society. They softened the existed constraints, and they itself were gradually modified to ensure the transition to modern democracy with effective market economy. The analysis allows to outline а plan of institutional reform , taking into account the institutional particularities of Russia. The principles of the administrative reform are considered. The problem of the formation of a hybrid national planning system is formulated, which includes indicative planning and program budgeting. To finance the planned projects, it is offered a mix of public-private partnership and project financing. It is proposed to use the Japanese experience of stimulating temporary association of companies for the development of modernization projects. The principles of reforming of the state property governance, as well as education and science sectors are discussed.
    Keywords: interim institution, social values, democratization, indicative planning, national innovation system, imitation, public-private ownership
    JEL: A13 B52 D02 L52 O21 O25 P11 P21
    Date: 2016–08–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:73447&r=ppm

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