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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Alexander Coad (European Commission – JRC); Sara Amoroso (European Commission – JRC); Nicola Grassano (European Commission – JRC) |
| Abstract: | Although diversity between team members may bring benefits of new perspectives, nevertheless, what holds a team together is similarity. We theorise that diversity in one dimension is traded off against diversity in another. Our analysis of collaborative research teams that received FP7 funding presents robust results that indicators of diversity in several dimensions (diversity of organizational form (universities, firms, etc.), diversity in nationality, and inequality in project funding share) are negatively correlated with each other. |
| Keywords: | diversity, collaborative teams, FP7 research funding |
| JEL: | O30 M14 O19 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:wpaper:201604&r=ppm |
| By: | Sofia Moroni |
| Abstract: | I consider a moral hazard problem in which a principal provides incentives to a team of agents towork on a risky project. The project consists of two milestones of unknown feasibility. While workingunsuccessfully, the agents’ private beliefs regarding the feasibility of the project decline. This learningrequires the principal to provide rents to prevent the agents from procrastinating and free-riding onothers’ discoveries. To reduce these rents the principal stops the project inefficiently early and givesidentical agents asymmetric experimentation assignments. The principal prefers to reward agents withbetter contract terms or task assignments rather than monetary bonuses. |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:5876&r=ppm |
| By: | Ahmed, Ovais; Mashkoor, Aasim |
| Abstract: | This research study is demonstrated the methods of systematic financial forecasting to eradicating the corruption barriers in public and private projects which directly impact on diversify economy. The purpose of this study is to investigate the key factors of financial forecasting methods to diminish a corruption abnormality in public projects which are improbable and unavoidable factors in current business world. In order to determine the feasibility of the project there are many different methods to identify the projects evaluation. But these evaluations are manipulated in a manner that the weak areas of the project in many ways never even discussed. We have discussed some methods of project evaluation in this paper. With the help of qualitative comparative study, we try to find out the feasibility of motorways project in Pakistan. Those projects evaluation which are triangle basis external and internal third party. In this study, we have put light on financial methods of measuring public or private projects systematically. There is no irrelevant upturn and downturn in assessment that how to project evaluation selection methods which can positive impact on economic growth. |
| Keywords: | Economic Development, Financial Development, Corruption |
| JEL: | C9 G3 O1 |
| Date: | 2016–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:72622&r=ppm |
| By: | Blaseg, Daniel; Koetter, Michael |
| Abstract: | Does bank instability push borrowers to use crowdfunding as a source of external finance? We identify stressed banks and link them to a unique, manually constructed sample of 157 new ventures seeking equity crowdfunding. The sample comprises projects from all German equity crowdfunding platforms since 2011, which we compare with 200 ventures that do not use crowdfunding. Crowdfunding is significantly more likely for new ventures that interact with stressed banks. Innovative funding is thus particularly relevant when conventional financiers are facing crises. But crowdfunded ventures are generally also more opaque and risky than new ventures that do not use crowdfunding. |
| Keywords: | equity crowdfunding,credit crunch,bank stress |
| JEL: | G01 G21 G30 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:iwh-8-15&r=ppm |
| By: | Szekeres, Szabolcs |
| Abstract: | Despite the fact that the “Weitzman-Gollier Puzzle” arose in the context of risk neutrality, Gollier and Weitzman (2009) claimed to have solved the puzzle by showing that, in case of risk aversion, discounting and compounding approaches yield the same result, and that these can be expressed in ways that are morphologically similar to the conflicting formulations of the original risk neutral model. This paper replicates their analysis with a simple numerical example and shows that the equality of results obtained is due to discount and compound factors being each other’s reciprocals in the risk averse model, while the inequality of the puzzle is due to this condition not being met in the risk neutral case. Their claim to have solved the puzzle is not sustained. It is shown that the source of the puzzle is Weitzman’s incorrect specification of the present value factor and that, correcting for this, the right conclusion under his assumptions is that certainty equivalent discount rates are growing functions of time. Gollier and Weitzman (2009) also claimed that “the ‘effective’ discount rate must decline over time toward its lowest possible value.” This paper finds that when long term market yields are a growing function of time, it makes no sense to invest in projects of similar risk but lesser yield, irrespective of one’s degree of risk aversion. |
| Keywords: | Discounting, uncertainty, "Weitzman-Gollier Puzzle" |
| JEL: | D61 H43 |
| Date: | 2016–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:72593&r=ppm |
| By: | Nicolas Lambert (Stanford University); George Georgiadis (Northwestern University, Kellogg School); Renee Bowen (Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | Two heterogeneous agents exert effort over time to complete a project and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. To study the scope under collective choice, we derive the agents' preferences over scopes. The efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient agent's preferred scope shrinks, whereas the inefficient agent's preferred scope expands. In equilibrium without commitment, the efficient agent obtains his ideal project scope with either agent as dictator and under unanimity. In this sense, the efficient agent always has real authority. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed016:197&r=ppm |
| By: | Emilie Bagby; Anca Dumitrescu; Cara Orfield; Matt Sloan |
| Abstract: | The IMAGINE project, an effort to improve school infrastructure in Niger, helped strengthen academic performance, particularly among girls. |
| Keywords: | international, education, girls, infrastructure, literacy, Niger |
| JEL: | F Z I |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:a6deb8328fcc41ee8ed007d3e0bff452&r=ppm |