nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2016‒06‒25
six papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. Alleviating Managerial Dilemmas in Human-Capital-Intensive Firms Through Incentives: Evidence from M&A Legal Advisors By Chatain, Olivier; Meyer-Doyle, Philipp
  2. The Clean Development Mechanism and Dynamic Capabilities of Implementing Firms: Evidence from India By Aradhna Aggarwal
  3. Holding an Auction for the Wrong Project By De Chiara, Alessandro
  4. Delegation and worker training By Christos Bilanakos; John S. Heywood; John Sessions; Nikolaos Theodoropoulos
  5. The Role of the Mediator in Complex Capital Projects By Shastitko. Andrey; Golovanova, S. V.
  6. OpenCases: Case Studies on Openness in Education By Manuel Souto-Otero; Andreia Inamorato dos Santos; Robin Shields; Predrag Lazetic; Jonatan Castaño Muñoz; Axelle Devaux; Stephanie Oberheidt; Yves Punie

  1. By: Chatain, Olivier; Meyer-Doyle, Philipp
    Abstract: Research summary We examine how human-capital-intensive firms deploy their human assets and how firm-specific human capital interacts with incentives to influence this deployment. Our empirical context is the UK M&A legal market, where micro-data enable us to observe the allocation of lawyers to M&A mandates under different incentive regimes. We find that law firms actively equalize the workload among their lawyers to seek efficiency gains while ‘stretching’ lawyers with high firmspecific capital to a greater extent. However, lawyers with high firm-specific capital also appear to influence the staffing process in their favor, leading to unbalanced allocations and less sharing of projects and clients. Paradoxically, law firms may adopt a seniority-based rent-sharing system that weakens individual incentives to mitigate the impact of incentive conflicts on resource deployment. Managerial summary The study highlights the dilemmas when professional service firms allocate their key individuals to incoming projects and the role that monetary incentives play in aggravating or alleviating these dilemmas. In the context of UK M&A law firms we find that partners have a tendency to be attached to too many projects and not to share enough work, which is exacerbated when individual monetary incentives are stronger. Firms adopting a seniority based incentive system (lockstep system) are able to alleviate this effect. This implies that there is a tradeoff between rewarding personal performance versus balancing workloads and fostering collaboration among professionals.
    Keywords: Human-Capital-Intensive Firms; Human Capital; Managerial Dilemmas; Incentives; Capabilities; Micro-foundations; Mergers and Acquisitions; Law firms
    Date: 2015–09–27
  2. By: Aradhna Aggarwal
    Abstract: This study assesses the impact of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) on the dynamic capabilities of implementing firms in India. While doing so, it uses three indicators of firms' dynamic capabilities: R&D expenditures to sales ratio, fuel consumption to sales ratio and total factor productivity growth. It moves away from the analysis of technology transfer claims made in either Project Development Documents or primary surveys to use actual information on firms' performance for the analysis. A difference-in-difference design is used by defining CDM-implementing firms as the treatment group and non-CDM firms as the control group for the pre- and post-CDM implementation periods. We control for unobserved fixed effects of firms and time periods and observed characteristics of firms and CDM projects. The analysis draws on the balance sheet data of 612 firms from India between 2001 and 2012 from the PROWESS database. Our results reveal that the CDM implementation does not have significant outcome effects on the dynamic capabilities of firms. Much depends on the type and size of the project, and size of the firm.
    Keywords: CDM, Dynamic capability, R&D, Fuel efficiency, Total factor productivity, India
  3. By: De Chiara, Alessandro
    Abstract: How does the probability of being involved in a renegotiation during the execution of a procurement contract affect the behavior of the interested contractors? What are its implications for the optimal contractual choice made by the buyer? We investigate these issues in a context characterized by uncertainty about the adequateness of the project initially specified by the buyer. We determine under which circumstances the buyer may find it profitable to hold an auction for a project design which ex-ante does not have the highest probability of being adequate.
    Keywords: Asymmetric Auctions, Procurement, Renegotiation.
    JEL: D44 D86 H57
    Date: 2015–06–04
  4. By: Christos Bilanakos; John S. Heywood; John Sessions; Nikolaos Theodoropoulos
    Abstract: This paper models a principal-firm offering training to its agent-worker under alternative organizational structures: integration, where the principal retains authority to overrule the investment project recommended by the worker; and delegation, where the principal cannot overrule the worker’s preferred investment project. We identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit-maximizing training intensity. Empirical estimates from matched employer-employee data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training. This result persists in two cross sections, in panel fixed effect estimates and across many robustness checks including an instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects.
    Keywords: Agency Theory; Delegation of Worker Authority; Training
    JEL: D21 D22 D23 M53 M54
    Date: 2016–06
  5. By: Shastitko. Andrey (Lomonossov Moscow State University, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)); Golovanova, S. V. (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))
    Abstract: The paper analyzes the range of issues that are in the organization's area of ??responsibility - the manager of a complex capital-intensive project. This work is an illustration of the danger of underestimating the role of "mediator" in the implementation of complex projects in the framework of anti-monopoly investigation, - no analysis of the subject of economic activity it can lead to erroneous conclusions regulations. The analysis shows that at least two functions - the mediator and the financial guarantor - it is impossible to pass on one of the communicating parties without showing the negative aspects in terms of efficiency. In this regard, it recommended the elimination of the antimonopoly body of the contractual relationship intermediary companies not only ensures reduction in the price to the buyer for the rest of the broker fees, but can lead to the opposite effect.
    Keywords: mediator, Project Manager, Economic Policy, inhospitable tradition avtotraste
    Date: 2016–04–14
  6. By: Manuel Souto-Otero (University of Bath); Andreia Inamorato dos Santos (European Commission – JRC - IPTS); Robin Shields (University of Bath); Predrag Lazetic (University of Bath); Jonatan Castaño Muñoz (European Commission – JRC - IPTS); Axelle Devaux (ICF International); Stephanie Oberheidt (ICF International); Yves Punie (European Commission – JRC - IPTS)
    Abstract: OpenCases is a study which is part of the OpenEdu Project. It is a qualitative study consisting of a review of literature on open education and nine in-depth case studies of higher education institutions, a consortium of universities, a private organisation and a national initiative. It analysed the rationale and enabling conditions for involvement in open education, open education activities, strategies, impact, challenges and prospects. The main outcome of this study is evidence that a large number of OER have reached a large group of learners. However, completion rates of MOOCs are low. Accreditation is not formalised and in general its impact on employability is not measured.
    Keywords: open education, openness, higher education, open science, open research, OER, MOOC, open educational resources, universities
    Date: 2016–05

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