nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2016‒02‒23
nine papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. Exploring Cost-Benefit Analysis of Research, Development and Innovation Infrastructures: An Evaluation Framework By Massimo Florio; Chiara Pancotti; Emanuela Sirtori; Silvia Vignetti; Stefano Forte
  2. Motivation, Regulation And Actor Constellations - Experiences From A Multidisciplinary Research Project On Health And Wellbeing As Part Of The Internet Of Things By Laya, Andrés; Sundquist, Mårten; Markendahl, Jan
  3. Public procurement for innovation: lessons from the procurement of a navigable storm surge barrier By Wesseling , Joeri H.; Edquist, Charles
  4. Evaluating Minimum-Traffic Guarantees for PPPs in Turkey by Real-Option Pricing By Ilker Ersegun Kayhan; Glenn P. Jenkins
  5. Technology transfer with search intensity and project advertising. By Giorgio Calcagnini; Germana Giombini; Paolo Liberati; Giuseppe Travaglini
  6. Nonhumans in the Practice of Development: Material Agency and Friction in a Small-Scale Energy Program in Indonesia By Yuti Ariani Fatimah; Saurabh Arora
  7. Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch By Yuanyuan Li; Bertrand Wigniolle
  8. Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico By Rosa, Benjamin
  9. Towards a managerial engineering of coopetition By Mourad Hannachi; Francois-Christophe Coleno

  1. By: Massimo Florio (DEAS, Universita' di Milano); Chiara Pancotti (CSIL Centre for Industrial Studies); Emanuela Sirtori (CSIL Centre for Industrial Studies); Silvia Vignetti (CSIL Centre for Industrial Studies); Stefano Forte
    Abstract: Governments, funding agencies and policy makers have high expectations on research, development and innovation (RDI) infrastructures in the context of science and innovation policies aimed at sustaining economic growth in the long term. The stakes associated with their selection and evaluation are therefore high. Cost-benefit analysis of RDI infrastructures is a new field. The intangible nature of some benefits and the uncertainty associated to the achievement of research results have often discouraged the use of a proper CBA for RDI infrastructures. Recently, some attempts to develop a CBA theoretical framework for RDI infrastructures have been made in the context of the use of Structural Funds by the Czech government and JASPERS. Moreover, the new Guide for the CBA of investment projects in the context of Cohesion Policy, recently adopted by the European Commission (2014) provides guidelines to appraise RDI projects, but also admits that – due to lack of experience and best practices – further steps are needed to improve the evaluation framework. This paper presents the results and the lessons learned on how to apply ex-ante CBA for major RDI infrastructures by a team of economists and scientists at the University of Milan and CSIL during a three-year research project supported by a EIBURS grant of the European Investment Bank Institute. Albeit the comprehensive conceptual framework presented in the paper builds on principles firmly rooted in CBA tradition, their application to the RDI sector is still in its infancy. So far, the model has been applied on two cases in physics involving particle accelerators (the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN and the National Centre for Oncological Treatment (CNAO) in Italy)). In a nutshell, the model presented break down benefits into two broad classes: i) use benefits, held by different categories of infrastructure’s users such as scientists, firms, students and general public visitors, and ii) non-use benefits, denoting the social value for the discovery potential of the RDI infrastructure regardless of its actual or future use. We argue that the social value of discovery can be estimated with contingent valuation techniques. Another significant feature of our approach is the stochastic nature of the CBA model, intended to deal with the uncertainty and risk of optimism bias in the estimates
    Keywords: Research infrastructures, Cost-benefit analysis, Public good, Knowledge
    JEL: D61 D81 I23 O32
    Date: 2016–02–01
  2. By: Laya, Andrés; Sundquist, Mårten; Markendahl, Jan
    Abstract: Internet of Things is an inherently multi-disciplinary area, as mobile connectivity, sensor device technologies and cloud solutions make strong impact in a multitude of applications in diverse sectors. In this paper we study some technical solutions, business models and behavior aspects of IoT in a Health and Wellbeing context. The work is based on an ongoing research project initiated by a wireless research center. This project includes two startup-up companies that are developing services based on connected devices. As part of the evaluation activities, the project counts with the collaboration of the largest nonprofit training organization in Sweden. As part of the research project, a prototype application is developed for training. Leveraging on the insights related to the individual motivational aspects, collected from an end-user study on motivational and adoptability aspects of Internet of Things in a workout context. In order to better understand the context on which services are provided, an ecosystem analysis is elaborated in order to highlight the differences between the healthcare and wellbeing contexts.
    Date: 2015
  3. By: Wesseling , Joeri H. (CIRCLE, Lund University); Edquist, Charles (CIRCLE, Lund University)
    Abstract: Public Procurement for Innovation (PPI) is a powerful, underutilized demand-side innovation policy instrument that can be used to stimulate innovation, meet sectoral policy goals and mitigate grand challenges. Further research is required to analyze how PPI contributes to these goals and how it operates in practice; more case studies are needed to achieve this. We analyze a case of direct developmental PPI, the procurement of a navigable storm surge barrier in the Netherlands. Data from policy documents, reports and interviews were used in an event history analysis which serves to capture dynamic patterns of innovation activities. We interpret our findings in relation to the tentative lessons on PPI available in the literature. We also draw policy conclusions with respect to dealing with multiple policy goals and user needs; specifying functional requirements; levels of expertise within governments; balancing competition and cooperation; and taking risks.
    Keywords: innovation policy; demand-side policy; large infrastructural project; tender; water construction sector
    JEL: H54 H57 O30 O31 O32 O33 O38
    Date: 2016–02–05
  4. By: Ilker Ersegun Kayhan (Chevening/Abdullah Gül Research Fellow, Oxford Center for Islamic Studies, University of Oxford); Glenn P. Jenkins (Queen’s University, Canada and Eastern Mediterranean University, North Cyprus)
    Abstract: Minimum-traffic guarantees for build-operate-transfer toll-road projects are contingent liabilities that expose government to fiscal risk. Therefore, public authorities must value guarantees, thereby enabling informed decision-making about the level and type of guarantee provision. This study demonstrates the use of financial modeling and risk analysis in a toll-road project in Turkey, contributing to the narrowing of a capacity gap in the field. We present three types of guarantee, modeled as real options and evaluated by Monte Carlo simulation. We identify one criterion to determine the optimum level of guarantee for a given project, and one criterion to measure the extent to which a guarantee will reduce risk. Based on these and other complementary criteria, it is proposed that the guarantee with income ceiling is the most appropriate for the project considered here. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the findings.
    Keywords: Contingent liabilities, government guarantees, real options, cost-benefit analysis, public-private partnerships, infrastructure, Turkey.
    JEL: G13 D61 H54 L33
    Date: 2016–02
  5. By: Giorgio Calcagnini (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo" and Mo.Fi.R., Ancona, Italy); Germana Giombini (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo" and Mo.Fi.R., Ancona, Italy); Paolo Liberati (Department of Economics, Università degli Studi di Roma Tre, Rome, Italy.); Giuseppe Travaglini (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo")
    Abstract: TIn this paper we present a model where technology transfer is embedded into a competitive model of utility and profit maximization and is the result of a matching process between heterogeneous Knowledge Transfer Offices (KTOs) and innovative firmrms. Our model improves on previous literature by endogenizing the process that drives the dynamics of university researchers in search and firm vacant projects. We are able to show that the KTOs' reservation fee rate must be greater than the ratio between the marginal researcher cost and the marginal utility of matched projects, and that technology transfer strictly depends on the efficiency units of searching researchers and vacant projects. Further, we show that firm technological progress might be too low when KTOs too much intensively search for project matches. This occurs because both sides of the market ignore the externalities of their decisions. Finally, behavioral complementarity, substitutability, and free riding are all potential equilibrium outcomes.
    Keywords: Technology transfer, Matching, Externalities
    JEL: O31 O32
    Date: 2015
  6. By: Yuti Ariani Fatimah (Eindhoven University of Technology); Saurabh Arora (SPRU, University of Sussex)
    Abstract: We develop the outlines of a new approach to study the role of nonhumans in constituting ‘implementation’ and calculative-discursive practices in development projects and programs. Developing a conceptual framework built on the concept of friction (material resistance or recalcitrance encountered in processes of transformation), we analyze an Energy Self-sufficient Village program in Indonesia. Focusing on specific projects and episodes within this program, we identify multiple distinctive instances of friction. These were driven by nonhumans’ (and humans’) resistance, as remolding of development beneficiaries’ practices was attempted by project administrators, government officials, entrepreneurs and by the (scientific) calculations embedded inside their policies, strategies and models. In concluding, we distill four ways in which nonhumans shape development practices: a) by resisting representations and calculations produced by human actors, b) by re-directing planned/expected courses of action, c) through biophysical change to their weight or textures as they move in space and time, and d) by mediating competition for resources. Overall, nonhumans play a central role in making and unmaking asymmetric relations of power. Their diverse material and discursive agency, which manifests differently in different relational settings, also highlights the importance of broadening the range of spokespersons who speak on behalf of nonhumans and whose voices can be considered reliable and true. Our study thus provides support to calls for pluralizing and democratizing development ‘expertise’ beyond the usual suspects in science, government and civil society.
    Keywords: actor-network theory, practices, relational agency, development policy, sustainable development, agrofuels, bioenergy, Indonesia
    Date: 2016–04
  7. By: Yuanyuan Li (University of Bielefeld and Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne); Bertrand Wigniolle (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: In this paper, we propose a new mechanism able to explain the occurrence of credit crunches. Considering a credit market with an asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders, we assume that borrowers have to pay a cost to reveal information on the quality of their project. They decide to be transparent if it is necessary for getting a loan or for paying a lower interest rate. Two types of competitive equilibria may exist: an opaque equilibrium in which all projects receive funding without revealing information; a transparent one in which only the best projects reval information and receive funding. It is also possible to get multiple equilibria. Incorporating this microeconomic mechanism in an OLG model, the economy may experience fluctuations due to the change of regime, and indeterminacy may occur
    Keywords: Credit crunch; endogenous information revelation
    JEL: D82 D9 G14 O16 O41
    Date: 2016–01
  8. By: Rosa, Benjamin
    Abstract: In public procurement auctions, governments typically offer preferences to qualified businesses in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies that examine how these bid preferences affect auction outcomes fail to address affiliation -- a particular type of correlation among costs that can be generated in a public procurement setting. This paper addresses that issue by studying the joint effect of bid preferences and affiliation in project-completion costs on procurement auctions using novel data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation's Resident Preference Program. Bidders, heterogeneous in residency status, compete in an auction with endogenous entry and affiliated project-completion costs for the opportunity to complete a construction project. Here affiliation is modeled using copulas, and an empirical model is developed to disentangle a bidder's participation and bidding decisions. I find that accounting for affiliation in project-completion costs considerably changes the evaluation of how offering preferences to resident bidders affects the cost of procurement and the number of resident bidders who ultimately win these preference auctions. The estimates indicate that the New Mexico Department of Transportation can increase the current level of preference to increase the number of winning resident bidders without a major change in the cost of procurement.
    Keywords: Affiliation, procurement auctions, bid preferences
    JEL: D44 H11 H57 H76 R42
    Date: 2016–01–10
  9. By: Mourad Hannachi (SADAPT - Sciences pour l'Action et le Développement : Activités, Produits, Territoires - AgroParisTech - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)); Francois-Christophe Coleno (SADAPT - Sciences pour l'Action et le Développement : Activités, Produits, Territoires - AgroParisTech - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA))
    Abstract: Even if academics and practitioners identify coopetition as a winning strategy, a coopetition relationship appear to be difficult to sustain. Coopetition is relied to be a paradoxical and unstable interfirm relationship related with tensions. Academic works begun to study the causes and nature of tension in coopetition relationship but little is known about the way those tension is managed. The aim of this paper is to investigate, via in depth case studies, the management tools used to manage coopetition at the inter-organizational level. Through multiples case studies in the same industry (the French grain merchants industry), we reveal the existence of differing management tools of the coopetition relationships. Some tools found by our research (tacit conventions, mediation arenas, coopetition inducers) seem particularly novel in the coopetition literature. The use of tacit convention and social pressure epitomize the embeddedness and the social construction of the coopetition relationship. It shows that inter-firm coordination can exist in a direct and informal way, without being locked into a rigid structure and without collusion. Moreover, we found that an external party can induce the coopetition and bring rival firms to consider a coopetitive relationship. This finding reveals that some tools can change inter-firms dynamics and rationalities giving rise to coopetition. Those findings lead us to reveal the perspective of a managerial engineering of coopetition and to suggest some embryonic basis to open the way for its development.
    Keywords: biotechnology,coopetition,collective strategies,Inter-organizational relationships,Management tools,gmo
    Date: 2016

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