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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Engel, Dirk; Rothgang, Michael; Eckl, Verena |
| Abstract: | The paper analyses how context and time dependent factors determine the impulse of R&D subsidies on firm behavior with respect to private R&D expenditures. Based on data from the German R&D survey, we combine propensity-score matching with a difference-in-difference-estimator in order to measure the causal influence of public direct R&D project funding on firm behavior. Our results indicate that (i) repeated participation in R&D projects on average leads to a higher increase in R&D expenditures than one-time funding; (ii) the aggregate effect of R&D funding on R&D expenditures of business firms is somewhat higher for business and business collaboration projects than for science and business collaboration projects; (iii) R&D expenditures of business firms that cooperate with science show a higher share of external R&D spending. Results of one particular cluster programme indicate that at least the short-term development of R&D does not so much depend on which programme direct R&D project funding is applied to. |
| Keywords: | R&D,public subsidies,collaboration,policy evaluation |
| JEL: | C14 C25 H50 O38 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:587&r=ppm |
| By: | NORIHIRO KAWASAKI (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)) |
| Abstract: | There is a growing momentum to set ambitious infrastructure development targets across member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). With the aim of mobilising private resources, ASEAN member states have begun to put in a great deal of efforts to upgrade their enabling frameworks for public-private partnership (PPP). Yet, evidence suggests that implementation of PPP projects on the ground has fallen far behind expectations. This policy brief emphasises the importance of realistic and consistent project planning, preparation, and offering in streamlining the implementation process to accelerate PPP market development in ASEAN. |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:era:wpaper:pb-2015-03&r=ppm |
| By: | Kaitlyn R. Harger (Florida Gulf Coast University, Department of Economics); Amanda Ross (West Virginia University, Department of Economics); Heather M. Stephens (West Virginia University, Agricultural and Resource Economics) |
| Abstract: | Governments try to attract entrepreneurs to specific areas by providing incentives to new businesses that locate within their jurisdiction. However, there is a debate over how best to allocate these funds. Using establishment-level data from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) database for California, and data on the location of disbursements from the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) and New Market Tax Credit (NMTC) programs, we consider the effectiveness of these two programs in attracting new businesses to disadvantaged areas. Investors are eligible to receive funding through these programs if the census tract where they are located has a median family income less than or equal to 80% of the state’s median family income. Using this plausibly exogenous eligibility threshold, we find that higher levels of funding per project through the NMTC program result in an increase in the number of new establishments in that area. However, we find that the number of NMTC projects funded has no effect on attracting new firms to eligible tracts, and there is little evidence of a consistent effect of the CDFI program. The amounts of funding through the CDFI program are relatively small, though more projects were funded through this program than the NMTC. Thus, our findings suggest that the amount of funding allocated to these areas matters more for economic development than does the number of projects funded. In addition, we find that there are heterogenous effects with regard to the impact of these programs, specifically across different firm sizes and industries, suggesting that these policies may cause firms to reallocate and sort across census tracts. |
| Keywords: | economic development, funding, projects, community development, financial investment fund |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-51&r=ppm |
| By: | Antonio A. Bellofatto; Martín Besfamille |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federation. In our environment, regional governments are characterized by two dimensions of state capacity; namely, administrative and fiscal. These gauge the ability to deliver public goods and to raise tax revenues, respectively. Two regimes are compared: partial and full decentralization. Under partial decentralization, regional governments have no tax powers and rely on central bailouts to refinance incomplete projects. Under full decentralization, regional governments refinance incomplete projects through capital taxes, in a context of tax competition. We provide a normative comparison between partial and full decentralization and show how the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization hinges on the relative magnitudes of each type of capacity. Specifically, for sufficiently low levels of fiscal capacity bailing out regional governments is optimal, regardless of the level of administrative ability. However, a combination of low levels of administrative capacity and high levels of fiscal capacity calls for fully decentralizing tax powers. |
| JEL: | D82 H77 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ioe:doctra:460&r=ppm |
| By: | Per-Olov Johansson; Ginés de Rus |
| Abstract: | How to evaluate the benefits and costs of foreign consumers, foreign producers, and local firms owned by foreigners, seems to cause confusion among cost–benefit practitioners. The screening of the literature and an informal search of the most influential cost–benefit guidelines found no evidence that this issue has been addressed previously, consisting the standard approach in overlooking the benefits of foreigners, with some minor qualifications. Sometimes the practitioner gives standing to non-nationals, though the implicit reason of their inclusion is the practical difficulties of disentangling the surpluses of nationals and foreigners. Usually, there is not an explicit discussion of the question. This paper addresses the issue on standing in cost–benefit analysis. The distinction between the indirect utility function of national and non-national allows the consideration of some relevant cases for the economic evaluation of projects. These are the polar case of zero weights to foreign consumers and foreign companies shipping their producer surpluses abroad, the case of local firms owned by foreigners, the altruist local household case, the consequence of fixed factors for the evaluation of foreign surpluses and the case of transnational projects with asymmetrical distribution of costs and benefits. |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2015-13&r=ppm |
| By: | Lindbeck, Assar (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Weibull, Jörgen (Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The paper provides a framework for analysis of remuneration to agents whose task is to make well-informed decisions on behalf of a principal, with managers in large corporations as the most prominent example. The principal and agent initially bargain over the pay scheme to the latter. The bargaining outcome depends both on competition for agents and on the relative bargaining power of the two parties, given their outside options, thus allowing for the possibility that the agent may be the current CEO who may have considerable power. Having signed a contract, the agent chooses how much effort to make to acquire information about the project at hand. This information is private and the agent uses it in his subsequent decision whether or not to invest in a given project. In model A the agent’s effort to acquire information is exogenous, whereas in model E it is endogenous. Model A lends no support for other payment schemes than flat salaries is weak. Model E contains a double moral hazard problem; how much information to acquire and what investment decision to make. As a consequence, the equilibrium contracts in model E involve both bonuses and penalties. We identify lower and upper bounds on these, and study how the bonus and bonus rate depend on competition and bargaining power. We also analyze the nature of contracts when the agent is overconfident. |
| Keywords: | Principal-agent; Investment; Endogenous uncertainty; Contract; Bonus; Penalty |
| JEL: | D01 D82 D86 G11 G23 G30 |
| Date: | 2015–12–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1100&r=ppm |
| By: | Angela Coulter (University of Oxford (UK) - University of Oxford [Oxford]); Martin Härter (University of Hamburg - university of Hamburg); Nora Moumjid-Ferdjaoui (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Centre Léon Bérard - CRLCC Léon Bérard); Lilisbeth Perestelo-Perez (Canary Islands Health Service); Trudy Van Der Weijden (Maastricht University [Maastricht]) |
| Abstract: | Background: Shared decision making (SDM) is frequently advocated but not yet widely implemented in European countries. Experience suggests that various incentives must be in alignment to encourage wider uptake. Objectives: To assess readiness for mainstream implementation of SDM in five European countries. Methods: Qualitative assessment of clinical policies and the availability of various SDM support services in Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK. Results: All five countries have research groups working on SDM, patient groups calling for its wider use, and ethical and professional standards indicating its desirability, but apart from a small number of demonstration projects, there is no evidence of a systematic approach to implementation in any of the countries as yet. Conclusions: Greater attention will need to be given to the provision of effective leadership, training and practical support if SDM is to become a regular feature of clinical practice in these countries. |
| Keywords: | shared decision making, France, Germany, Spain, Net herlands, UK |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01247699&r=ppm |
| By: | Chris Ball |
| Abstract: | This working paper examines the local initiatives in Neath, Port Talbot and Swansea in South West Wales to re-integrate elderly economically inactive workers into the local labour market. The core initiative analysed is the Life Skills for Older People Project, which works with local and regional governments to provide customised education and training for job seekers and the long-term unemployed aged 50 or above. The analysis of the economic impact and the achievements of the project found that custom support and personal development were effective in empowering older workers to re-enter work in the private and voluntary sector. The role of South West Wales’ industrial past in shaping the education and skills profile of older workers is also examined. |
| Date: | 2015–12–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:cfeaaa:2015/2-en&r=ppm |
| By: | Peter Hicks |
| Abstract: | This working paper examines the impacts of the Canadian employment strategy, the Targeted Initiative for Older Workers, in the Fort St. James community in north-central British Columbia. The paper notes that older workers are generally well employed at the aggregate level in Canada, but may face specific challenges in local and vulnerable communities. An examination of the design of this project highlights the need for clear objectives, eligibility criteria, local sponsors and group-based support. In the context of the Fort St. James Community, participants and administrators highlighted the efficacy of custom and individual support in creating better outcomes for older workers. |
| Date: | 2015–12–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:cfeaaa:2015/3-en&r=ppm |