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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Ting Liu (Stony Brook University); Ching-To Albert Ma (Boston University); Henry Y. Mak (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis) |
| Abstract: | A Principal would like low-benefit projects to be serviced by a low-cost-low-productivity expert and high- benefit projects, by a high-cost-high-productivity expert. Experts derive intrinsic or extrinsic motivational benefits from providing services, but must earn minimum profits. The Principal lacks information about project benefits and experts' motivations, which are both known to experts. Experts form a Partnership, which sets up a gatekeeping-referral protocol and a corresponding sharing rule. We show that the Principal can implement the first best by a single contract with the Partnership. The contract is quasi-linear, consisting of a lump sum, and a partial reimbursement of experts' incurred costs. |
| Keywords: | Motivated Experts, Principal, Multiagent, Partnership, Referral |
| JEL: | D00 D02 D80 D83 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2015-007&r=ppm |
| By: | Johansson, Per-Olov (Stockholm School of Economics & CERE) |
| Abstract: | There is no consensus with respect to handling of tradable permits in cost–benefit analysis. The leading (organizational/governmental) manuals in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia handle permits in different ways or ignore them. This paper offers a brief discussion of the properties of cap-and-trade systems, and contrast these to the properties of emission charges. The paper then turns to cost–benefit rules for projects using fossil fuels in a cap-and-trade system. The focus is on small projects but the paper also briefly addresses the case where a project significantly affect prices. As a service to the reader the small project rules are contrasted to the much more familiar and standardized ways of handling emission charges in cost–benefit analysis. Finally, the consequences of market power in cap-and-trade markets are briefly addressed. |
| Keywords: | Cost–benefit analysis; greenhouse gases; tradable permits; emission charges; market power. |
| JEL: | H21 H23 H41 H43 I30 L13 |
| Date: | 2015–11–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:slucer:2015_011&r=ppm |
| By: | Morgan Bazilian and Debabrata Chattopadhyay |
| Abstract: | Abstract Traditional methods of energy planning are likely to provide results that may be inappropriate in fragile and conflict-prone countries. The risks of violence and damage, or significant delays and cancellations in infrastructure development, are rife in these states. Thus, least-cost planning processes must explicitly address the inherent risks. While there are numerous statistical methods for dealing with decision making under uncertainty, few of them have been applied to power system planning and tailored for these situations. We present a general theoretical framing of the issue, and illustrate application of a very simple method to a case study of the Republic of South Sudan. We find that, in general, the resilience aspects, combined with modular and incremental benefits of distributed generation technologies and systems emerge as attractive options if the various risks of infrastructure development are included in modelling techniques. |
| Keywords: | Fragile and conflict states; Energy Planning; Power systems |
| JEL: | C6 O2 Q4 |
| Date: | 2015–11–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1530&r=ppm |
| By: | Martin Koudstaal (VU University Amsterdam); Randolph Sloof (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands); Mirjam van Praag (Copenhagen Business School, Denmark) |
| Abstract: | Empirical evidence supports the conventional wisdom that entrepreneurs are more optimistic and overconfident than others. However, the same holds true for top managers. In this lab-in-the-field experiment we directly compare the scores of entrepreneurs, managers and employees on a comprehensive set of measures of optimism and overconfidence (n = 2,058). The results show that on average entrepreneurs are more optimistic than others in their dispositional optimism and attributional style when bad events occur. For incentivized measures of overconfidence we find no difference between entrepreneurs and managers, although both are more prone to it than employees. Finally, exploration of within-group heterogeneities shows that optimism and success are more strongly related for managers than for entrepreneurs and that an average entrepreneur is not more optimistic than successful managers. We conclude that optimism and overconfidence are indeed characteristics of entrepreneurs, but they are not unique when compared to (top) managers. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurs; managers; dispositional optimism; attributional style; overestimation; overconfidence; behavioral economics |
| JEL: | L26 C93 D03 M13 |
| Date: | 2015–11–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150124&r=ppm |