nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2015‒10‒25
six papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. Governance and Performance of Publicly Funded R&D Consortia By OKAMURO, Hiroyuki; NISHIMURA, Junichi
  2. La performance des lieux de co-création de connaissances : le cas des FabLab By Rapahël Suire
  3. Breaking Free From the Bell Curve: An Alternate Proposition for Performance Management By Shrihari S. Sohani; Varkkey, Biju
  4. An Empirical Analysis of a Crowdfunding Platform By Jin-Hyuk Kim; Peter Newberry; Calvin Qiu
  5. On the delegation of aid implementation to multilateral agencies By Annen,Kurt; Knack,Stephen
  6. The effect of metro expansions on air pollution in Delhi By Goel,Deepti; Gupta,Sonam

  1. By: OKAMURO, Hiroyuki; NISHIMURA, Junichi
    Abstract: R&D consortia have been regarded as an effective means of promoting innovation, and several R&D consortia obtain public financial support, which may affect its governance structure and performance. This study investigates the governance mechanisms of publicly funded R&D consortia and their effects on innovation. Regarding R&D consortia, few studies have empirically addressed the effect of project monitoring by the government. Moreover, the role of project leadership in R&D consortia remains poorly explored. Focusing on a major support program for R&D consortia in Japan and using a sample of 315 firms that participated in publicly funded R&D consortia from 2004 to 2009, we empirically confirm that project leadership by a private firm, especially its coordination capability, significantly increases the probability of project success (early commercialization of innovation outcomes). We also find that project performance is positively affected by the strictness of project monitoring and evaluation by the government. Finally, we find no complementarity between project leadership and government monitoring with regard to the effects on project performance.
    Keywords: R&D consortia, public subsidy, leadership, monitoring, commercialization
    JEL: O31 O32 O38
    Date: 2015–10
  2. By: Rapahël Suire (CREM, UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France)
    Abstract: If FabLab (Fabrication Laboratory) is nowadays a huge phenomenon their performance based on their socio-economic embeddedness is still an open research question. From an original world database (N=48), we show that production of documented projects and transformation of those projects into new company is a function of interactions between FabLab and its innovative eco-system. In particular, everything remains equal, interactions with peripheral and explorative actors lead to higher level of creativity and documented projects. New company creation appears to be significantly higher when FabLab is an intermediary platform or a middleground between these peripheral actors and a core of bigger companies more oriented in exploitation and seeming harvesting FabLab’s creativity.
    Keywords: FabLab, platform, middleground, networks, knowledge
    JEL: D20 L10 O32 R11
    Date: 2015–10
  3. By: Shrihari S. Sohani; Varkkey, Biju
    Abstract: Performance management processes that follow a Gaussian distribution (bell curve) and focus on past performance rather than a future promise have come under critical focus. Such systems have been found to foster short-term focus among the employees that does not augur well for the competitiveness of the firm. Also, utilising the same rating for determination of rewards as well as finding suitability for the role and vertical mobility has been found to be myopic. Off late, many organisations have done away with the bell curve but the move has raised questions about the alternatives. In this manuscript, we have suggested alternate mechanisms of appraisal that handles reward determination and suitability for promotion through two distinct levers. We also present a case study that enumerates a novel approach to performance management that allows accrual of value for the firm along with incrementing employee motivation and engagement.
  4. By: Jin-Hyuk Kim (University of Colorado at Boulder, Department of Economics, 256 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309, USA); Peter Newberry (Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics, 510 Kern Building, University Park, PA 16802); Calvin Qiu (ICF International, 19/F Heng Shan Centre, 145 Queen's Road East, Wan Chai, Hong Kong)
    Abstract: Crowdfunding, a fundraising mechanism in which monetary contributions are raised from a large number of people, is booming and impacting government policy. We study two features of a well-known crowdfunding platform, First, we study the role of observable information in determining whether or not a donor contributes to the project. Second, we study the effect of the all-or-nothing nature of donations. Our counterfactual analyses indicate that the observability of donor information increases the expected quality of funded projects while the conditionality of pledges decreases it.
    Keywords: Crowdfunding; Social learning; Value of information; Free-riding; Voluntary contribution
    JEL: D82 D83 G11 G14 L26 L81
    Date: 2015–09
  5. By: Annen,Kurt; Knack,Stephen
    Abstract: Some multilateral agencies implement aid projects in a broad range of sectors, with aid disbursements showing a strong overlap with those of bilateral donors. The question then arises of why do bilateral donors delegate sizable shares of their aid to non-specialized agencies for implementation? This paper develops a game theoretic model to explain this puzzle. Donors delegate aid implementation to the multilateral agency (ML) to strengthen the policy selectivity of aid, incentivizing policy improvements in recipient countries, in turn improving aid?s development effectiveness. Bilateral donors are better off delegating aid to ML even when they are purely altruistic but disagree on how aid should be distributed across recipients. Key for our result to hold is that ML searches some middle ground among disagreeing donors. Aid selectivity?in terms of both policy and poverty?emerges endogenously and is credible, as it is the solution to ML?s optimization problem. Moreover, the model shows that if one sufficiently large donor is policy selective in its aid allocations, there is no need for other donors to be policy selective. The World Bank?s aid program for lower-income countries, the International Development Administration (IDA), is shown to fit the assumptions and predictions of the model. Specifically, IDA is a dominant donor in most of its recipient countries and is much more policy and poverty selective than bilateral aid. Donors view it as a public good, and contribution more to it when bilateral aid is less selective. Potential threats to IDA?s role as a dominant, policy-selective donor include the emergence of nontraditional donors, changes in voting shares, and traditional donors? increasing use of earmarked contributions.
    Keywords: Gender and Health,Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness,Microfinance,Coastal and Marine Environment,Disability
    Date: 2015–10–22
  6. By: Goel,Deepti; Gupta,Sonam
    Abstract: The Delhi Metro (DM) is a mass rapid transit system serving the National Capital Region of India. It is also the world?s first rail project to earn carbon credits under the Clean Development Mechanism of the United Nations for reductions in CO2 emissions. Did the DM also lead to localized reduction in three transportation source pollutants? Looking at the period 2004?2006, one of the larger rail extensions of the DM led to a 34 percent reduction in localized CO at a major traffic intersection in the city. Results for NO2 are also suggestive of a decline, while those for PM25 are inconclusive due to missing data. These impacts of pollutant reductions are for the short run. A complete accounting of all long run costs and benefits should be done before building capital intensive metro rail projects.
    Keywords: Air Quality&Clean Air,Pollution Management&Control,Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Brown Issues and Health
    Date: 2015–10–19

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