|
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Raphael Boleslavsky (University of Miami); Christopher Cotton (Queen's University) |
| Abstract: | An organization must decide which proposals to fund. In evaluating the proposals, the organization may rely on those applying for funding to produce evidence about the merits of their own proposals. We consider the role of a capacity constraint preventing the organization from funding all projects. Agents produce more (Blackwell) informative evidence about the merits of their proposals when there are capacity constraints. In a two agent model, we fully characterize the equilibrium under unlimited and limited capacity. Unless the prior strongly favors accepting both proposals, the funding organization is better off when its capacity is limited. |
| Keywords: | strategic search, evidence production, persuasion, lobbying, all-pay auction, Bayesian persuasion |
| JEL: | D72 D78 D83 L15 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1343&r=ppm |
| By: | Elena Merle-Beral; Katharina Gassner |
| Keywords: | Science and Technology Development - Engineering Environment - Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases Environment - Environment and Energy Efficiency Energy - Energy Production and Transportation Energy - Energy and Environment |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:22113&r=ppm |
| By: | Samuel Oguah; Debabrata Chattopadhyay; Morgan Bazilian |
| Keywords: | Environment - Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases Environment - Environment and Energy Efficiency Energy - Energy Production and Transportation Energy - Energy and Environment Energy - Power & Energy Conversion |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:22112&r=ppm |
| By: | Clara Alvarez; Teuta Kacaniku |
| Keywords: | Finance and Financial Sector Development - Access to Finance Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures Finance and Financial Sector Development - Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress Finance and Financial Sector Development - Debt Markets Energy - Energy Production and Transportation Public Sector Development |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:21762&r=ppm |
| By: | Dreher, Axel; Fuchs, Andreas; Hodler, Roland; Parks, Bradley C.; Raschky, Paul A.; Tierney, Michael J. |
| Abstract: | This article investigates whether China's foreign aid is particularly prone to political capture by political leaders of aid-receiving countries. Specifically, we examine whether more Chinese aid is allocated to the political leaders' birth regions and regions populated by the ethnic group to which the leader belongs, controlling for indicators of need and various fixed effects. We have collected data on 117 African leaders' birthplaces and ethnic groups and geocoded 1,650 Chinese development finance projects across 3,097 physical locations committed to Africa over the 2000-2012 period. Our econometric results show that current political leaders' birth regions receive substantially larger financial flows from China than other regions. On the contrary, when we replicate the analysis for the World Bank, our regressions with region-fixed effects show no evidence of such favoritism. For Chinese and World Bank aid alike, we also find no evidence that African leaders direct more aid to areas populated by groups who share their ethnicity, when controlling for region-fixed effects. |
| Keywords: | Africa; aid allocation; China; favoritism; foreign aid; georeferenced data; official development assistance; spatial analysis |
| JEL: | D73 F35 P33 R11 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10704&r=ppm |
| By: | Ester Manna (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa; Universitat de Barcelona (UB)) |
| Abstract: | I develop a principal-agent model where a profit-maximizing principal employs two agents to undertake a project. The employees differ in terms of their intrinsic motivation towards the project and this is their private information. I analyze the impact of individual and team incentives on the screening problem of employees with different degrees of motivation within teams. If the principal conditions each agent's wage on his own level of effort (individual incentives), an increase of the rents paid to the motivated agents results in a lower level of effort exerted by all agents in the second-best. In this case, reversal incentives occur. Conversely, reversal incentives do not arise if the principal uses team-incentives. If the principal conditions each agent's wage on the effort of both agents and the agent's performance on the effort of his colleague (team-incentives), motivated agents exert the same level of effort as in the first-best. |
| Keywords: | Intrinsically Motivated Agents, Team Production, Adverse Selection, Individual and team incentives, Reversal Incentives. |
| JEL: | D03 D82 M54 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ewp:wpaper:326web&r=ppm |
| By: | Kushlin, Valery (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)); Ustenko, Viktoria (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)) |
| Abstract: | According to the new challenges Russia needs to provide access to the path of sustainable economic growth n the medium term period, which involves the activation of investment policy, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, so to go to the innovation-oriented and high-performance economy. The paper analyzes three possible scientific innovation inve-vestment policy of Russia in the conditions of high uncertainty, heated global crisis: 1) Local Leadership "; 2) "The rapid pursuit"; 3) "Adaptation to the off-season." It is shown how should combine all three at the same time the above script. Proposals aimed at improving the strategic-agency and program-oriented planning of scientific and innovative development of the mechanism of stimulation of innovative activity of Russian business, improving state management of innovative projects. Reasonable measures for the development of venture financing of innovative projects, use of mechanisms, "technology platforms" as a bridge between science, government and manufacturing business, the use of modern public-private partnerships, and more effective harnessing of innovation in order to modernize the economy of the human factor. |
| Keywords: | venture capital investment, public-private partnerships, investment policy, innovative modernization, intellectual resources, national innovation system, technology platforms, human potential |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rnp:ppaper:mn42&r=ppm |