nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2015‒02‒16
six papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. HORIZON: A Development Methodology for Collaborative Projects By Tiziana Catarci; Shah Rukh Humayoun; Francesco Leotta; Andrea Marrella; Massimo Mecella; Antonella Poggi
  2. The Governance Of Economic Resilience: 20 Years Of Urban Adaptation Projects In Brussels By Stephan Kampelmann; Sarah V.S. Van Hollebeke; Paula Vandergert
  3. Ex-post Optimal Knapsack Procurement By Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent
  4. Anatomy of a Public-Private Partnership: Hold-up and regulatory risk in an NGN PPP By Howell, Bronwyn; Sadowski, Bert
  5. From fixed to state-dependent duration in public-private contracts partnerships By Daniel Danau; Annalisa Vinella
  6. Pipeline Power: A Case Study of Strategic Network Investments By Cobanli, Onur; Hubert, Franz

  1. By: Tiziana Catarci (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Shah Rukh Humayoun (Technische UniversitŠt Kaiserslautern); Francesco Leotta (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Andrea Marrella (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Massimo Mecella (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Antonella Poggi (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")
    Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a methodology to be employed for collaborative projects. This methodology, called HORIZON, has been successfully employed in the past for FP6 and FP7 EU projects, but we strongly believe it can be fruitfully employed for H2020 projects as well, guaranteeing quality requirements to be met.
    Keywords: Collaborative project ; development methodology ; EU project ; user-centered design ; agile methods
    Date: 2015
  2. By: Stephan Kampelmann; Sarah V.S. Van Hollebeke; Paula Vandergert
    Abstract: This paper is an empirical investigation on how cities use urban renovation projects to adapt to structural economic change. We use methodological triangulation with case study evidence from Brussels to investigate causal links between the governance and the implementation of a large ongoing urban renovation programme that started in 1993. Having classified all investments in our database according to a list of urban adaptation tools, we are able to document how the governance of the programme influenced a) the allocation of funds to different adaptation tools; b) the content of intangible investments; c) the link between tangible and intangible investments. We conclude that urban renovation in Brussels is similar to policies in other cities in that it invested substantial resources both at the top and the bottom of adaptation governance, but that a disconnection between bottom-up and top-down strategies risks foregoing potential complementarities and synergies.
    JEL: R11 R38 R58
    Date: 2015–02–03
  3. By: Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent
    Abstract: We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who wants to select an optimal subset of projects to maximize her utility. Project costs are private information and the value the designer derives from their provision may vary. In this allocation problem the choice of projects - both which and how many - is endogenously determined by the mechanism. The designer faces hard ex-post constraints: The participation and budget constraint must hold for each possible outcome while the mechanism must be implementable in dominant strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms that are characterized by cutoff functions. These cutoff functions exhibit properties that allow an implementation through a descending clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects price clocks descend synchronously such that always the cheapest projects are executed. However, the asymmetric case, where values or costs are asymmetrically distributed, features a novel tradeoff between quantity and quality. Interestingly, this tradeoff mitigates the distortion due to the informational asymmetry compared to environments where quantity is exogenous.
    Keywords: Mechanism Design , Knapsack , Budget, Procurement , Auction
    JEL: D02 D44 D45 D87 H57
    Date: 2015
  4. By: Howell, Bronwyn; Sadowski, Bert
    Abstract: In recent years, the preference for purely private funding and ownership of telecommunications networks has given way to a 'new wisdom' that some form of public funding is now necessary if faster and more capacious Next Generation Networks (NGNs) are to be constructed in a timely fashion. The relevant question for policymakers is how that public investment will take place. The preferred approach in most cases appears to be to by way of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) where public and private actors collaborate in NGN investment, construction and operation. However, the body of analysis of NGN PPPs to guide policy-makers is scant. This paper addresses the gap by applying the learnings from classic, more mature PPPs (e.g. roading) and applying them to the NGN context. We use a case study of New Zealand's Ultrafast Broadband Initiative PPPs - one of the first nationwide partnerships undertaken - to illustrate the relevance of the insights. We find that NGN PPPs reverse the typical direction of financing and ownership observed in roading PPPs. The bundling of design, financing construction and operation of classic PPPs is 'undone' in NGN PPPs, as financing and asset ownership are separated, increasing the potential for misalignment of incentives and the likelihood that the public party can hold up the private party once existing network assets are sunk in the partnership by altering regulatory settings. Whilst the government instigating the PPP may not be inclined to act opportunistically, a successive government facing different political priorities does not face the same incentives. To the extent that the private party can anticipate this risk, it should endeavour to include terms in the initial agreement ensuring that the public party is penalised if such an event occurs (i.e. an automatic right to favourable renegotiation or payment of compensation) so that such opportunism is discouraged and the project benefits from time-consistent alignment of incentives and objectives. Had such provisions been in place in the New Zealand PPPs, costly consequences of regulatory change threatening the completion of the NGN would have been avoided.
    Date: 2014
  5. By: Daniel Danau (University of Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM CNRS UMR 6211, France); Annalisa Vinella (Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy)
    Abstract: A government delegates a build-operate-transfer project to a private fi…rm. At the contracting stage, the operating cost is unknown. The fi…rm can increase the likelihood of facing a low cost (the good state), rather than a high cost (the bad state), by exerting costly e¤ort when building the infrastructure. Once this is in place, the …firm learns the true cost and begins to operate. If some partner reneges on the contract thereafter, the court of justice has a limited ability to enforce penalties. Break-up of the partnership occasions a replacement cost for the government that is higher the earlier the contract is terminated. We show that the contract is self-enforcing, entailing no distortions away from e¢ ciency, only if the …firm is instructed to invest both own and borrowed funds in the project, and the duration of the contract is set longer in the good state than in the bad state. The …firms investment should not be massive. The debt payment to the lender, which ultimately lies on the government, should be conditioned on the …firm not defaulting on the project. The result that the contract should have a longer duration in the good state is at odds with the prescription of the literature on "exible-term" contracts, which recommends a longer duration when the operating conditions are unfavourable.
    Keywords: Public-private partnerships; state-dependent duration; …fixed-term contract;limited enforcement; renegotiation; break-up
    JEL: D82 H57 H81
    Date: 2015–01
  6. By: Cobanli, Onur; Hubert, Franz
    Abstract: We use the Shapley value and the nucleolus to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two pipelines, `Nord Stream' and `South Stream', allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. The third project, `Nabucco', aims at diversifying Europe's gas imports by accessing producers in Middle East and Central Asia. For the Shapley Value we obtain a clear ranking of the projects which corresponds to the observed investment patterns. Nord Stream's strategic value is huge, easily justifying the high investment cost for Germany and Russia. The additional leverage obtained through South Stream is much smaller and Nabucco is not viable. For the nucleolus in contrast, none of the pipelines has any strategic relevance at all, which appears to be at odds with the empirical evidence.
    JEL: C71 L50 L95
    Date: 2014

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