nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2015‒01‒26
seven papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Tartu Ülikool

  1. Financing LNG Projects and the Role of Long-Term Sales-and-Purchase Agreements By Sophia Rüster
  2. Crowdfunding: determinants of success and funding dynamics By Crosetto, P.; Regner, T.
  3. Capital-Labor Distortions in Project Finance By Peitz, Martin; Shin, Dongsoo
  4. Impact evaluation helps deliver development projects By Legovini, Arianna; Di Maro, Vincenzo; Piza, Caio
  5. Managerial vision bias and cooperative governance By Deng, Wendong; Hendrikse, George
  6. Synergies between EU R&I Funding Programmes. Proceedings from the Launching Event of the Stairway to Excellence Project By Susana Elena Pérez; Andrea Conte; Nicholas Harrap
  7. Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Cocoa Livelihoods Program in Sub-Saharan Africa By Tisboe, Francis; Nalley, Lanier; Dixon, Bruce; Popp, Jennie; Luckstead, Jeff

  1. By: Sophia Rüster
    Abstract: The financing of infrastructures is a major topic in recent energy policy debates. Project finance, as a specialized form of debt finance, thereby has become a well-established financing tool. This paper contributes a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the determinants of the debt ratio in project finance, using data on 26 liquefied natural gas (LNG) export and import projects. We argue that lenders will make their decision on how much to lend dependent on the risk profile of the project. In this vein, a project’s off-take agreements serve as a security for financial contracts. We empirically show that the debt ratio of an LNG project decreases with increasing risks associated to future cash flows. Estimation results confirmthat leverage increases with higher shares of a project’s capacity sold under long-term sales-and-purchase agreements, with a lower capital outlay of the project, and with a lower risk index of the country where the project is located.
    Keywords: Project finance, debt ratio, long-term contracts, liquefied natural gas
    JEL: C21 G32 L22 L95
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1441&r=ppm
  2. By: Crosetto, P.; Regner, T.
    Abstract: Over the past years crowdfunding emerged as an alternative funding channel for entrepreneurs. In contrast to traditional financiers (banks, venture capital firms or angel investors), crowdfunding allows individuals to fund entrepreneurs directly even with small amounts. We received individual-level data from Startnext, the biggest crowdfunding platform in Germany, enabling us to investigate funding dynamics, explore pledgers’ motivations and analyse projects’ success determinants. We find substantial heterogeneity of how success (about half of the 2,252 projects in our dataset get funded) is reached. When two thirds of the funding duration has passed, the majority of projects (59%) that eventually get funded are not on a successful track. However, pledges in the final phase can only partially be explained by a rush to get still unfunded projects succeed. Overall, 18.7% of pledges are made to projects that already reached their funding target and our analysis shows that the increased funding towards the deadline is due to pledges to projects that already made it, particularly pre-selling pledges.
    Keywords: CROWDFUNDING;ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE;DONATION;PRE-SELLING
    JEL: D03 G32
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2015-02&r=ppm
  3. By: Peitz, Martin; Shin, Dongsoo
    Abstract: An entrepreneur needs a lender`s capital input to finance a project. The entrepreneur, who is privately informed about the project environment, provides a labor input (effort). Capital and labor are perfect complements. We show that the entrepreneur may optimally distort the project`s capital-labor ratio. The direction of the distortion in capital-labor ratio depends on contractibility of the entrepreneur`s labor input. If the entrepreneur`s labor input is contractible, in the optimal contract, the entrepreneur may provide an excessive amount of labor for the amount of capital funded by the lender. If, by contrast, the entrepreneur`s labor input is non-contractible, part of the physical asset funded by the lender may remain idle.
    Keywords: Agency , Project Finance , Capital-Labor Ratio , Contractibility
    JEL: D82 D86 G31
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:37388&r=ppm
  4. By: Legovini, Arianna; Di Maro, Vincenzo; Piza, Caio
    Abstract: Does research add value to aid? Specifically, does impact evaluation research help or hinder the delivery of development projects? This paper analyzes the question by constructing a new data set of 100 impact evaluations and 1,135 projects approved by the World Bank between 2005 and 2011. The analysis finds that the delivery of projects with impact evaluation is significantly timelier: common delays are avoided and the gap between planned and actual disbursements is reduced by half. Evidence-based mid-course corrections, a clearer implementation road map, strengthened capacity on the ground, and observer effects are possible channels to explain the results. Hopefully, this analysis will stimulate discussion over the optimal balance between project financing and the impact evaluation research needed to deliver development outcomes.
    Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform,Housing&Human Habitats,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness,Rural Portfolio Improvement
    Date: 2015–01–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7157&r=ppm
  5. By: Deng, Wendong; Hendrikse, George
    Abstract: Member and professional CEOs of cooperatives differ regarding their managerial vision toward upstream and downstream projects. We show that the managerial vision bias will cause inefficiency in the project implementation. Cooperatives with member CEOs are extremely upstream-focused because of the cascaded negative vision bias toward the downstream projects. When the downstream activities become more important, cooperatives need to replace the member CEOs by professional CEOs. However, a cooperative with a professional CEO may still be less efficient than an IOF (investor owned firm) if the member-dominated Board of Directors’ negative bias toward the downstream projects is too large. To solve this problem, the cooperative must include outside directors in the board to ease the negative bias of the Board of Directors toward the downstream projects.
    Keywords: Vision Bias, Cooperatives, Governance, Institutional and Behavioral Economics,
    Date: 2014–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaae14:182924&r=ppm
  6. By: Susana Elena Pérez (European Commission – JRC - IPTS); Andrea Conte (European Commission – JRC - IPTS); Nicholas Harrap (European Commission – JRC - IPTS)
    Abstract: This Policy Brief addresses the concept of synergies arising from the two major EU funding sources (The European Structural and Investment Funds and Horizon 2020) in the context of the new Stairway to Excellence Project. This project is centred on the provision of assistance to Member States who joined in 2004, 2007 and 2013 in using innovation funding under ESIFs via the early and effective implementation of RIS3 with the aim of closing the innovation gap and promote scientific and technological excellence. This Policy Brief summarises the discussion and case studies presented at the launching conference of the Stairway to Excellence Project held in Prague in October 2014. This event offered a first opportunity to identify the key elements for building successful synergies and gave a useful insight into how synergies could be achieved in practice. A diverse set of experiences from five EU countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Spain, and the UK) and an international organisation were presented. In turn, this could be a source of inspiration for other regional and national managing authorities and the research community.
    Keywords: Synergies, Research & Development, Innovation, Excellence, Horizon 2020, Framework Programmes, European Structural and Investment Funds, Smart Specialization
    Date: 2014–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc92829&r=ppm
  7. By: Tisboe, Francis; Nalley, Lanier; Dixon, Bruce; Popp, Jennie; Luckstead, Jeff
    Abstract: Billions of dollars flow into low-income countries each year to help alleviate poverty. Assessing the effectiveness of these dollars is necessary to measure program success and to allocate such funds among competing projects. This study measures the impact of the first phase of the Cocoa Livelihood Program (CLPI), a current World Cocoa Foundation project sponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The project seeks to improve the livelihood of over 200,000 small cocoa producers in Sub-Saharan Africa via training, crop diversification and farmer based organizations. Using data collected from 2,048 pre and post CLPI interviews of cocoa producers in Ghana, Cote D’ivoire, Nigeria and Cameroon, the economic impact of the CLPI program can be estimated. The results show that yield enhancements attributable to CLPI are 36%, 38%, 49% and 24% in Ghana, Côte D’Ivoire, Nigeria and Cameroon, respectively. Using a total program cost of $158-$200 per beneficiary and estimated annual benefits of $86-$152 per beneficiary over 25 years, the benefit- cost ratios were estimated to range from $13 to $22 for every dollar spent on human capital development.
    Keywords: Cocoa, International Development, Farmer Field Schools, Africa, Farm Management, Food Security and Poverty, Production Economics, Productivity Analysis, F20, Q16,
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saea15:195713&r=ppm

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