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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | James Cunningham (Whitaker Institute for Innovation and Societal Change - J.E. Cairnes School of Business and Economic); Paul O'reilly (College of Business - Dublin Institute of Technology); Conor O'kane (Department of Management - University of Otago); Vincent Mangematin (MTS - Management Technologique et Strategique - Grenoble École de Management (GEM)) |
| Abstract: | Securing public funding to conduct research and leading it by being a principal investigator (PI) is seen as significant career development step. Such a role brings professional prestige but also new responsibilities beyond research leadership to research management. If public funding brings financial and infrastructure support, little is understood about the inhibiting factors that publicly funded PIs face given the research autonomy offered by publicly funded research. Our study finds that there are three key PI inhibiting factors 1) political and environmental, 2) institutional and 3) project based. Traditional knowledge, skills and technical know-how of publicly funded PIs are insufficient to deal with the increasing managerial demands and expectations i.e. growing external bureaucracy of public funding agencies. Public funding is no longer the 'freest form of support' as suggested by Hackett (1990) and the inhibiting factors experienced by publicly funded PIs limits their research autonomy. We also argue that PIs have little influence in overcoming these inhibiting factors despite their central role in conducting publicly funded research. |
| Keywords: | Publicly Funded Research; Principal Investigators; Inhibiting Factors; Research Leadership; Research Management; Research Autonomy |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00756228&r=ppm |
| By: | Eleftheria Vasileiadou; Boukje Huijben; Rob Raven |
| Abstract: | TThere is a huge gap between demand and supply of finance for energy transitions, and the financial and economic crisis have had a negative impact in the already meagre funds for transforming the energy system towards renewable resources. In this paper we explore whether crowdfunding can provide an adequate business model for the creation, nurturing and upscaling of renewable energy niches. We empirically investigate crowdfunding initiatives and platforms linked to renewable electricity projects in the Netherlands. The main conclusion is that the volume of crowdfunding today is low, but the dynamic of these projects holds potential. There is limited indication of learning processes until now, as well as limited support from regime actors, pointing at a low level of niche stabilization and break-through potential, which may however be related to the early stage of development of crowdfunding in the Netherlands. On the other hand, the heterogeneity of crowdfunders is very promising. Platforms dedicated to renewable electricity exclusively, and with an investment based business model seem to be the most successful. We show how governmental market regulation and support mechanisms are shaping crowdfunding as a business model, and discuss the implications for other countries. |
| Keywords: | renewable energy, crowdfunding, sustainability transitions, business models, up-scaling |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ein:tuecis:1410&r=ppm |
| By: | William R. Kerr; Ramana Nanda |
| Abstract: | We review the recent literature on the financing of innovation, inclusive of large companies and new startups. This research strand has been very active over the past five years, generating important new findings, questioning some long-held beliefs, and creating its own puzzles. Our review outlines the growing body of work that documents a role for debt financing related to innovation. We highlight the new literature on learning and experimentation across multi-stage innovation projects and how this impacts optimal financing design. We further highlight the strong interaction between financing choices for innovation and changing external conditions, especially reduced experimentation costs. |
| JEL: | G21 G24 L26 M13 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20676&r=ppm |
| By: | Verteramo Chiu, Leslie J.; Gómez, Miguel I.; Kaiser, Harry M.; Yan, Jubo |
| Abstract: | We study consumer preferences for socially-responsible certified coffee based on alternative ways to distribute the price premium of the product. We use Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (BDM) auctions in an experimental setting to elicit consumer willingness to pay for two socially-responsible certified coffee systems: the existing Fair Trade and a hypothetical certification called Sustainable Trade. These certification schemes differ in the way the price premium is given to producers. In the Fair Trade certifications growers receive a cash transfer whereas in the Sustainable Trade certification a portion of the premium is allocated to a social project in the grower’s community. We segment consumers as donors and non-donors and show that individuals who donate have strong preferences for certification systems that support social projects relative no non-donors. We also find that consumer attitudes toward donating have a strong effect on their willingness to pay for certified coffee. This effect is higher for consumers that donate a higher part of their income to charities. |
| Keywords: | Social Certifications, Fair Trade, Altruism, Consumer Demand, Experimental Auctions., Consumer/Household Economics, Demand and Price Analysis, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Marketing, |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea14:170551&r=ppm |
| By: | Alex Barrachina (University Carlos III, Madrid, Spain); Yair Tauman (IDC Herzliya, Israel, and Stony Brook University, USA); Amparo Urbano Salvador (ERI-CES, University of Valencia) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on limit-pricing models. We consider an incumbent monopolist engaged in R&D trying to reduce his cost of production and deter a potential entrant from entering the market. The R&D project may be successful or not and its outcome is a private information of the incumbent. The entrant has an access to an Intelligence System (IS hereafter) of a certain precision that generates a noisy signal on the outcome of the R&D project, and she decides whether to enter the market based on two signals: the price charged by the incumbent and the signal sent by the IS. It is assumed that the precision of the IS is exogenous and common knowledge. Our fundamental result is that for intermediate values of the IS precision, the set of pooling equilibria is non-empty even with profitable entry and the entrant enters if the IS tells her the R&D project was not successful. Since in the classical limit-pricing models the entrant never enters in a pooling equilibrium, the use of the IS by the entrant increases competition in pooling equilibrium with high probability. Moreover, the incumbent can deter profitable entry with positive probability. |
| Keywords: | Espionage, Entry deterrence, Asymmetric information, Pooling equilibria. |
| JEL: | C72 D82 L10 L12 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0714&r=ppm |