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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Nabila JAWADI |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the effects of communication behaviors on trust in virtual teams. Communications behaviors of virtual team members are evaluated through the characteristics of their exchanges (frequency, rhythm, nature and style). Our purpose is to identify communication factors that enable virtual team members to build and maintain trusty relationships. The interest of such question may be explained by the importance of trust to enhance team performance of virtual project teams. A longitudinal qualitative study based on the observation of 10 virtual teams was conducted and enabled us to draw up different dynamics of trust and communication behaviors associated to them. Analysis of e-mails exchanged between team members and their interviews show that frequent interaction is not sufficient to build trust in virtual teams. Exchanges have to be regular, positives and constructive. |
| Keywords: | virtual teams, swift trust, interaction frequency, communication nature, longitudinal qualitative study. |
| Date: | 2014–06–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-344&r=ppm |
| By: | Marielle Brunette (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière, INRA - AgroParisTech); Philippe Delacote (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière, INRA - AgroParisTech; Climate Economic Chair); Serge Garcia (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière, INRA - AgroParisTech); Jean-Marc Rousselle (INRA, UMR 1135 LAMETA) |
| Abstract: | The impact of the safety-net use of Common-pool resources (CPR) on the individual investment into and extraction from the commons is analyzed in this paper. Agents of the community first choose to invest in their private project and in the CPR; second, they choose how much to extract from their private project and the commons. The model compares two types of risk management tool: CPR as risk-coping and risk-diversification mechanisms. It also compares two types of risk: risk on a private project and risk on CPR investment by other community members. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested with experimental economics. In this view, we propose an original CPR game composed of two periods, an investment one and an extraction one. Our result clearly shows that risk reduction in the private project unambiguously decreases investment in the CPR, while it does not impact CPR extraction. We also show that a risk-coping strategy is well understood as more flexible and influenced by the outcome in terms of private project yield. |
| Keywords: | Common-pool resource, Common-pool resource game, deforestation, experimental economics. |
| JEL: | Q15 Q23 D71 D81 |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lef:wpaper:2014-06&r=ppm |
| By: | Küpper, Patrick; Kundolf, Stefan; Margarian, Anne |
| Abstract: | In diesem Bericht werden die Zwischenergebnisse der Begleitforschung 2012 bis 2013 zum Modellvorhaben LandZukunft des Bundesministeriums für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (BMEL) vorgestellt. Das Modellvorhaben läuft von 2012 bis Ende 2014 in vier aus ursprünglich 17 Landkreisen ausgewählten peripheren Regionen und verfolgt drei Kernziele: Erstens die Aktivierung sogenannter unternehmerischer Menschen für die Regionalentwicklung, zweitens die Erprobung des Instrumentes des Regionalbudgets und anderer neuer Finanzierungsinstrumente und drittens das Austesten der politischen Steuerung über individuell vereinbarte und vertraglich festgeschriebene Ziele. Darüber hinaus erhofft sich das BMEL von dem Modellvorhaben neue Erkenntnisse und Ideen, die auch in anderen Regionen übernommen werden können. Die Begleitforschung konzentriert sich in der ersten Phase auf die angestoßenen Beteiligungsprozesse und ihre Steuerung. Untersucht wird vor allem, wie sich der Wettbewerbsansatz sowie der Ansatz des 'Steuerns über Ziele' und die damit verbundene Stärkung regionaler Entscheidungsfreiheit auf die ländlichen Entwicklungsprozesse auswirken. Ein weiterer Schwerpunkt liegt zu diesem frühen Zeitpunkt der Umsetzung auf der Frage, inwiefern es gelingt, neue Akteure zu mobilisieren, welche individuellen und institutionellen Faktoren dabei eine Rolle spielen und welche Auswirkungen die Beteiligung auf ausgewählte Ziele und Projekte hat. Die Untersuchung beruht auf insgesamt 184 leitfadengestützten Interviews mit den Kreisverwaltungen und den begleitenden Büros in den 17 Wettbewerbsregionen und mit den meisten an LandZukunft beteiligten Akteuren in den vier ausgewählten Regionen. Ergänzend werden Dokumente zur Strategie der Regionen und zu den neu geschaffenen Organisationsstrukturen sowie Protokolle eigener teilnehmender Beobachtungen bei Sitzungen und anderen Treffen ausgewertet. [...] -- In this report the interim results of the accompanying research for the model project LandZukunft of the German Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL) are presented for the years 2012 to 2013. The model project runs from 2012 to the end of 2014 in four of an original 17 German counties in selected peripheral regions and follows three core goals: first the activation of so-called entrepreneurial people for regional development, second the testing of regional budgets and other new financing instruments, and third testing of governance by individually agreed upon, and contractually binding, objectives. In addition, the BMEL hopes to gain new knowledge and ideas from the model project, which could be adopted in other regions. The accompanying research in the first phase was concentrated on the initialised participatory processes and their steering. The competition approach and the approach 'Governing by objectives' were primarily studied, and the related strengthening of regional decision-making discretion on the rural development processes assessed. A further emphasis at this early point in time was how successful efforts to mobilize new actors were, which individual and institutional factors played a role here and which impacts the participation had on selected goals and projects. The study was based on a total of 184 structured interviews with the county administrations and related offices in the 17 competition regions and with most participating actors from LandZukunft in the four selected regions. Supplementary documents on the strategy of the regions and the newly created organizational structures, as well as protocols of own participatory observation in conferences and other meetings were evaluated. [...] |
| Keywords: | Struktur, Umfang und Effizienz der Staatstätigkeit,Gesamtstaat und kommunale Ebene,Beziehungen zwischen den Gebietskörperschaften,Unternehmertum,Gemeinnützige Organisationen und öffentliche Unternehmen,Unternehmenskultur, Unternehmensethik und gesellschaftliche Verantwortung,Humankapital, Personalentwicklung, Einkommensverteilung, Migration,Projektanalyse,Soziale Innovation,Regierungspolitik,Regionale Entwicklungspolitik,Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government,State and Local Government,Intergovernmental Relations,Entrepreneurship,Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise,Corporate Culture, Diversity, Social Responsibility,Human Resources, Human Development, Income Distribution, Migration,Project Analysis,Social Innovation,Government Policy,Regional Development Planning and Policy |
| JEL: | H11 H70 L26 L30 M14 O15 O22 O38 R58 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:jhtire:18&r=ppm |
| By: | Oscar M. Valencia |
| Abstract: | R&D intensity for small firms is high and persistent over time. At the same time, small firms are often financially constrained. This paper proposes a theoretical model that explains the coexistence of these two stylized facts. It is shown that self-financed R&D investment can distort the effort allocated to different projects in a firm. In a dynamic environment, it is optimal for the firm to invest in R&D projects despite the borrowing constraints. In addition, this paper shows that beyond a certain threshold, effort substitution between R&D and production appears. When transfers from investor to entrepreneur are large enough, R&D intensity decreases with respect to financial resources. Conditional on survival, the more innovative and financially constrained firms are, faster they grow and exhibit higher volatility. Classification JEL: O41, 031, D86 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdr:borrec:828&r=ppm |
| By: | Tri Vi Dang (Department of Economics, Columbia University); Gary Gorton (Department of Economics, Yale University); Beng Holmstrom (Department of Economics, MIT and NBER); Guillermo Ordonez (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania) |
| Abstract: | Banks are optimally opaque institutions. They produce debt for use as a transaction medium (bank money), which requires that information about the backing assets – loans – not be revealed, so that bank money does not fluctuate in value, reducing the efficiency of trade. This need for opacity conflicts with the production of information about investment projects, needed for allocative efficiency. Intermediaries exist to hide such information, so banks select portfolios of information-insensitive assets. For the economy as a whole, firms endogenously separate into bank finance and capital market/stock market finance depending on the cost of producing information about their projects. |
| Keywords: | Banks vs. Capital Markets, Financial Intermediation, Information and Opacity, Optimal Portfolio, Private Money |
| JEL: | G21 D82 G11 G14 E44 |
| Date: | 2014–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:14-022&r=ppm |
| By: | Marco Buso (University of Padova) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the benet coming from bundling two sequential activities in a context of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Differently from previous literature, I introduce a source of asymmetric information in the form of an externality parameter linking the building stage with subsequent operational activity. Within this framework, PPPs allow the government to extract private information about the sign and magnitude of the externality parameter and to to minimize the informational rents needed to incentivize the builder's effort. Our results suggest how PPPs can become those commitment devices that force governments to define more coherent and informed plans that optimize the first period welfare, improving investment to reduce unexpected ex post costs (cost overruns). |
| Keywords: | agency theory; information externality; sequential investment; bundling. |
| JEL: | D86 L33 H11 H57 C61 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0176&r=ppm |
| By: | Dwyer, Janet; Powell, John |
| Abstract: | Transaction Cost (TC) economics is highly relevant to public policy issues, enabling exploration of the influence of institutional and organisational arrangements upon policy performance. As policies evolve, often becoming more multifaceted as they grow, so the associated transactions costs increase and this affects policy outcomes in multiple ways. We consider this phenomenon in the case of rural development (RD) programming under Pillar 2 of the CAP. Expectations of what RD funding should deliver are both broad and significant. However, performance frequently falls short of goals. From detailed analysis of the experience of RDP review and planning in Malta, we aim to analyse how transaction costs, in both private and public spheres, may distort and undermine RDP performance in ways which are largely unrecognized at EU level. At the same time, we identify potential ‘transaction benefits’, when exchange processes are designed in ways that generate positive returns going beyond those of the immediate transaction. We suggest that more attention to these aspects of policy design is warranted. |
| Keywords: | rural development programmes, transaction costs and benefits, policy performance, Community/Rural/Urban Development, International Relations/Trade, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Q180, B520, H540, |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aesc14:169758&r=ppm |
| By: | Jak\v{s}a Cvitani\'c; Dylan Possama\"i; Nizar Touzi |
| Abstract: | We consider a contracting problem in which a principal hires an agent to manage a risky project. When the agent chooses volatility components of the output process and the principal observes the output continuously, the principal can compute the quadratic variation of the output, but not the individual components. This leads to moral hazard with respect to the risk choices of the agent. Using a recent theory of singular changes of measures for Ito processes, we formulate a principal-agent problem in this context, and solve it in the case of CARA preferences. In that case, the optimal contract is linear in these factors: the contractible sources of risk, including the output, the quadratic variation of the output and the cross-variations between the output and the contractible risk sources. Thus, like sample Sharpe ratios used in practice, path-dependent contracts naturally arise when there is moral hazard with respect to risk management. We also provide comparative statistics via numerical examples, showing that the optimal contract is sensitive to the values of risk premia and the initial values of the risk exposures. |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1406.5852&r=ppm |