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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Madureira , Ana Mafalda (CIRCLE, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | Recent research has argued that urban policy has turned towards entrepreneurial forms of urban governance, resulting in a more fragmented and decentralized setting within which public policy is formulated and implemented. This implies that the context for public sector urban planning is also influenced by this “turn”. This paper questions this “turn” by arguing that, in Sweden and in practice, forms of fragmentation and decentralization coexist with remnants of coherence and centralization. It focuses on two planning projects, one in Malmö and one in Lund. A case study approach is followed, using official documentation and expert interviews. The paper indicates that public authorities and planners remain crucial in urban development projects as initiators of projects, when they bring in financial incentives or lease out the plots for development, or when they add to the project’s political legitimacy and bring to the table different actors that would otherwise be less likely to join forces. It concludes by discussing how public sector urban planning is adjusting to the changes brought forward by entrepreneurial urban governance. The paper contributes to the literature on how urban planning is adapting to changes in the context for urban governance. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurial Urban Governance; Physical Planning; Bo01; Brunnshög |
| JEL: | O21 |
| Date: | 2013–11–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lucirc:2013_025&r=ppm |
| By: | Bakker, Gerben |
| Abstract: | We investigate the long-run historical pattern of R&D-outlays by reviewing aggregate growth rates and historical cases of particular R&D projects, following the historical-institutional approach of Alfred Chandler (1962), Douglass North (1981) and Oliver Williamson (1985). We find that even the earliest R&D-projects used non-insignificant cash outlays and that until the 1970s aggregate R&D outlays grew far faster than GDP, despite five well-known challenges that implied that R&D could only be financed with cash, for which no perfect market existed: the presence of sunk costs, real uncertainty, long time lags, adverse selection, and moral hazard. We then review a wide variety of organisational forms and institutional instruments that firms historically have used to overcome these financing obstacles, and without which the enormous growth of R&D outlays since the nineteenth century would not have been possible. |
| Keywords: | R&D-project financing–-history; R&D-financing institutions; sunk costs; historical R&D-project cost case studies Britain; United States |
| JEL: | F3 G3 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:wpaper:54518&r=ppm |
| By: | Inderst, Georg |
| Abstract: | This study discusses the structure and development of private infrastructure finance in Europe in a global context. It examines the contribution of private capital to the financing of infrastructure investment needs. A 'big picture' is created by putting the various financing instruments and investment vehicles into a simple frame, i.e. percentages of GDP. There is scope for the development of alternative financing arrangements (such as public-private partnerships) and investment vehicles (such as project bonds and suitable investment funds). However, the traditional ways of corporate (and public) capital expenditure as well bank lending, need to keep working in Europe. Institutional investors can play a bigger role as a source of finance but expectations should be realistic. There are a number of barriers in place, regulatory and otherwise, that need to be worked on. -- |
| JEL: | E22 G23 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:eibwps:201302&r=ppm |
| By: | Salvatore Russo (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice) |
| Abstract: | After more than a decade since the PPPÕs diffusion in Italy, inspired by foreign experiences, the empirical experiences have highlighted several gaps of the instrument with financial and managerial implications for the public sector. In particular the paper focuses attention on the diffusion and utilization of PPP for building and operating hospital infrastructure. With reference to the value for money, risks and accounting treatment, the initial uncertainty about appropriate measures for evaluating the projects, now, should induce a more accurate reflection. By a comparative analysis of two case studies the paper draws attention to the critical areas that now are leading towards a sort of ÒswingÓ use of PPP. |
| Keywords: | public-private partnership, healthcare management, hospital infrastructure,value for money |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpdman:57&r=ppm |
| By: | Michael Amior (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Rowena Crawford (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Gemma Tetlow (Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | This working paper describes how the IFS’s model of the UK’s long-run public finances (and those of its constituent nations) is constructed. Our model projects tax revenues, public spending and hence public borrowing and debt up to 2062–63. This is done for the UK as a whole and also separately for Scotland and the rest of the UK. The type of model we have built seeks to answer questions of the type ‘is current fiscal policy sustainable without additional taxes needing to be raised or cuts to public spending imposed either now or in the future?’. |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:13/29&r=ppm |
| By: | Saori Chiba (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice); Kaiwen Leong (Nanyang Technological University) |
| Abstract: | Consider an uninformed decision maker (DM) who communicates with a partially informed speaker (S) through cheap talk. DM can choose a project to implement or the outside option of no project. We show that if the agentsÕ ex-ante rankings over projects do not coincide, then this conflict of interest can reduce SÕs incentive to pander and hence facilitate information transmission. Intuitively, SÕs ex-ante bias and the incentive to pander affect SÕs information revelation in opposite directions and hence offset each other. We also explore the relationship between information transmission and managerial issues such as delegation, disclosure, and interpersonal authority. |
| Keywords: | Cheap Talk, Delegation, Disclosure, Interpersonal Authority, Pandering |
| JEL: | D82 D83 M10 |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpdman:60&r=ppm |