nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2013‒10‒18
eight papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Moving MPAC Forward: Strengthening Public-Private Partnership, Improving Project Portfolio and in Search of Practical Financing Schemes By Hisanobu SHISHIDO; Shintaro SUGIYAMA; Fauziah ZEN
  2. Do Expiring Budgets Lead to Wasteful Year-End Spending? Evidence from Federal Procurement By Liebman, Jeffrey B.; Mahoney, Neale
  3. Politiques publiques et pauvreté : trois études de cas d'évaluation des performances de ciblage et d'analyse d'impact. By Backiny Yetna, Prosper Romuald
  4. Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs By Axel Dreher; Silvia Marchesi
  5. Roads or Schools? Political Budget Cycles with different types of voters. By Lopez Uribe, Maria del Pilar
  6. Pitfalls in estimating “wider economic benefits” of transportation projects By Yoshitsugu Kanemoto
  7. Do Research Joint Ventures Serve a Collusive Function? By Sovinsky, Michelle; Eric Helland
  8. Land Value Capture in Urban DRM Programs By Soumya Dharmavaram

  1. By: Hisanobu SHISHIDO (Tokyo Women's Christian University); Shintaro SUGIYAMA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia); Fauziah ZEN (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia)
    Abstract: Infrastructure investment has high economic returns, especially in ASEAN economies where enhanced connectivity is critical for their continued prosperity. Each member government needs to ensure infrastructure gaps are narrowed through both the government’s own funding and public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements. With regard to PPP projects, the best way to attract private participants is to make projects commercially viable through: (i) careful project development carried out (or advised) by high caliber experts; (ii) adequate spending on project development; and (iii) improvements in the PPP-readiness of member countries in terms of legal, regulatory and institutional environment. We propose that a center of excellence for PPP-related investments be established advising each government and its PPP-units on project selection and development—and carrying out project development for cross-border PPP projects. The center should be staffed with private sector experts or those with private business experience and consider ASEAN regional priorities. Donors should help substantially—given the high growth and poverty reduction impact that infrastructure development has. Too much focus on the funding aspect alone could be counterproductive. However, recognizing the increased risk aversion of the capital markets around the world as a result of the international financial crisis of 2008-09 and the introduction of Basel III, we propose that a new financial instrument be considered that reduces the perceived risk of PPP projects. There should be some lessons to be learnt from the initiatives of project bond credit enhancement started by the European Investment Bank (EIB), which has been received positively by the market.
    Keywords: Private participation in infrastructure development, Public Private Partnership (PPP), PPP Center of Excellence, PPP project development, and risk allocation
    JEL: G11 H43 H54 H63 R10 R40
    Date: 2013–10
  2. By: Liebman, Jeffrey B. (Harvard University); Mahoney, Neale (University of Chicago)
    Abstract: Many organizations have budgets that expire at the end of the fiscal year. Faced with uncertainty over future spending demands, these organizations have an incentive to build up a rainy day fund over the first part of the year. If demand does not materialize, they must rush to spend these resources on low quality projects at the end of the year. We test these predictions using data on procurement spending by the U.S. federal government. Using contract-level data on a near-universe of federal contracts, we document that spending in the last week of the year is 4.9 times higher than the rest-of-the-year weekly average. Using a newly available dataset that tracks the quality of $130 billion in information technology (I.T.) projects, we show that quality scores for year-end projects are 2.2 to 5.6 times more likely to be below the central value. Allowing agencies to roll over unused funding into the subsequent year can improve efficiency. We calibrate a dynamic model of spending and show that allowing rollover leads to welfare gains of up to 13 percent, and that intermediate policies can achieve a large portion of these gains. We document that the one federal agency that has the ability to roll over unused funding for I.T. projects does not exhibit a year-end spike in spending or drop-off in quality in this category of spending.
    JEL: H00 H50 H56 H57 H61 L00 L20 L24
    Date: 2013–10
  3. By: Backiny Yetna, Prosper Romuald
    Abstract: Ce travail est consacré à l’évaluation des performances de ciblage et à l’analyse d’impact de trois projets. La première étude porte sur l’accès à l’eau courante en République du Congo ; et l’auto-ciblage pratiqué à travers une tarification spécifique ne bénéficie qu’aux ménages connectés qui sont plutôt non pauvres. L’auto-ciblage fonctionne mieux pour le projet des travaux publics au Libéria ; la proportion de pauvres qui participent à ces travaux est élevée. En fait ce projet n’a aucune barrière à l’entrée, ce qui explique en partie ce bon résultat. Le ciblage du programme de modernisation agricole en RDC n’est pas très efficace non plus, les bénéficiaires n’étant souvent pas pauvres. L’impact en termes de réduction de la pauvreté est important dans les deux projets concernés par ce type d’analyse (modernisation agricole en RDC et travaux publics au Libéria), tout au moins pour les populations bénéficiaires. Le cas du projet de modernisation agricole en RDC montre néanmoins qu’il est important de prendre en compte d’autres facteurs pour obtenir un impact important, comme lever les contraintes liées au marché du crédit et à l’accès aux infrastructures
    Abstract: This work analyses the targeting performance and the impact evaluation of three projects. The first paper is about the water subsidies in the Republic of Congo. The study shows that the self-targeting scheme, using an Inverse Block Tariff structure has poor performance, indeed only those households who are connected can benefit from it, and they are usually non-poor. The self-targeting mechanism used in the Public Work program in Liberia works better since the proportion of poor involved in the program is high. This project has no entry barrier which partly explains the good result. The targeting performance of the Modernization of Agriculture project in the DRC is also poor, most of the beneficiaries being non-poor. The impact in terms of poverty reduction is important in both projects involved in this type of analysis (Modernization of Agriculture in the DRC and Public Work in Liberia), at least for the beneficiaries. The case of the DRC project, however, shows that it is important to lift some other constraints like access to credit and infrastructures in order to improve the impact of the program.
    Keywords: Pauvreté; Ciblage; Performance; Impact; Evaluation; Poverty; Targeting; Impact; Evaluation; Performance;
    JEL: I32 I38
    Date: 2013–02
  4. By: Axel Dreher; Silvia Marchesi
    Abstract: This paper explores the role of information transmission in explaining donors' choice between project aid and budget support. Budget support increases the involvement of recipient governments in the decision-making process and can thus be an example of a "delegation-scheme". Conversely, project aid represents a more "centralized" type of aid. According to the theory, when countries' local knowledge is more important than donors' information, recipient countries' discretion in the choice of policies should be increased (delegation). Conversely, there should be less freedom in designing policies when donors' information is more relevant (centralization). The empirical analysis conrms that the importance of donors' private information influences the amount of project aid, while recipients' local knowledge is positively correlated with the amount of budget support.
    Keywords: Delegation, communication, ownership, foreign aid
    JEL: C23 D82 F33 O1
    Date: 2013–10
  5. By: Lopez Uribe, Maria del Pilar
    Abstract: Using a new Colombian data set (1830-2000), we analyze how changes in the electoral legislation with regard to the characteristics of voters (in terms of education and income levels) has affected fiscal policy in electoral times. In line with economic theory, we show that after the law was reformed in 1936 the composition of the expenditure shifted towards social spending (like education, health, and welfare benefits) but there was decreased spending on infrastructure and investment projects (like roads). Consistent with the literature, we also find: 1.The timing and the size of the political budget cycles changed after 1936 and 2.After 1936 there was a shift in the funding mechanisms from indirect tax revenues to more debt.
    Keywords: Political Budget Cycles, Expenditure composition, Revenue composition, Elections, Colombia
    JEL: D72 D78 E62 H61
    Date: 2013
  6. By: Yoshitsugu Kanemoto (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)
    Abstract: The Department for Transport in the United Kingdom has been a pioneer in including indirect benefits in the cost–benefit analysis of a transport project. They identify three types of wider impacts, i.e., (1) agglomeration, (2) increased or decreased output in imperfectly competitive markets, and (3) labor market impacts, and provide detailed guidelines on how to estimate them. Extending a differentiated product model that provides the microfoundations of urban agglomeration economies to include all three types of the wider impacts, this paper examines whether the British methodology of estimating the wider benefits can be justified theoretically.
    Date: 2013–10
  7. By: Sovinsky, Michelle (Department of Economics, University of Warwick & The University of Zurich); Eric Helland (Claremont McKenna College)
    Abstract: Every year thousands of firms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where all knowledge gained through R&D is shared among members. Most of the empirical literature assumes members are non-cooperative in the product market. But many RJV members are rivals leaving open the possibility that firms may form RJVs to facilitate collusion. We examine this by exploiting variation in RJV formation generated by a policy change that affects the collusive benefits but not the research synergies associated with a RJV. We use data on RJVs formed between 1986 and 2001 together with firm-level information from Compustat to estimate a RJV participation equation. After correcting for the endogeneity of R&D and controlling for RJV characteristics and firm attributes, we find the decision to join is impacted by the policy change. We also find the magnitude is significant: the policy change resulted in an average drop in the probability of joining a RJV of 34% among telecommunications firms, 33% among computer and semiconductor manufacturers, and 27% among petroleum refining firms. Our results are consistent with research joint ventures serving a collusive function. JEL classification: research and development ; research joint ventures ; antitrust policy ; collusion JEL codes: L24 ; L44 ; K21 ; O32
    Date: 2013
  8. By: Soumya Dharmavaram
    Keywords: Banks and Banking Reform Public Sector Economics Urban Development - Municipal Financial Management Public Sector Management and Reform Urban Development - Urban Housing Finance and Financial Sector Development Public Sector Development
    Date: 2013–07

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