nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2013‒09‒26
six papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Time-To-Plan Lags for Commercial Construction Projects By Jonathan N. Millar; Stephen D. Oliner; Daniel E. Sichel
  2. Financial vs. Strategic Buyers By Marc Martos-Vila; Matthew Rhodes-Kropf; Jarrad Harford
  3. Togo: Technical Assistance Report—Launch of the Project for Strengthening Public Financial Management By International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept.
  4. Profit Sharing and Debt Contracts in Presence of Moral Hazard By Nabi, Mahmoud Sami
  5. The Relative Importance of Human Resource Management Practices for a Firm’s Innovation Performance By Spyros Arvanitis; Tobias Stucki; Florian Seliger
  6. North Caucasus in 2012: Results and Risks By Konstantin Kazenin

  1. By: Jonathan N. Millar; Stephen D. Oliner; Daniel E. Sichel
    Abstract: We use a large project-level dataset to estimate the length of the planning period for commercial construction projects in the United States. We find that these time-to-plan lags are long, averaging about 17 months when we aggregate the projects without regard to size and more than 28 months when we weight the projects by their construction cost. The full distribution of time-to-plan lags is very wide, and we relate this variation to the characteristics of the project and its location. In addition, we show that time-to-plan lags lengthened by 3 to 4 months, on average, over our sample period (1999 to 2010). Regulatory factors are associated with the variation in planning lags across locations, and we present anecdotal evidence that links at least some of the lengthening over time to heightened regulatory scrutiny.
    JEL: E22 E32 L50 L74 R52
    Date: 2013–09
  2. By: Marc Martos-Vila; Matthew Rhodes-Kropf; Jarrad Harford
    Abstract: This paper introduces the impact of debt misvaluation on merger and acquisition activity. Debt misvaluation helps explain the shifting dominance of financial acquirers (private equity firms) relative to strategic acquirers (operating companies). The effects of overvalued debt might seem limited since both acquirer types and target firms can access the debt markets. However, fundamental differences in governance and project co-insurance between the two types of acquirer interact with debt misvaluation, resulting in variation in how assets are owned that depends on debt market conditions. We find support for our theory in merger data using a novel measure of debt misvaluation.
    JEL: G24 G34
    Date: 2013–08
  3. By: International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept.
    Keywords: Public finance;Payment systems;Financial management;Accounting;Technical assistance missions;West African Economic and Monetary Union;Togo;
    Date: 2013–04–12
  4. By: Nabi, Mahmoud Sami
    Abstract: This paper compares profit sharing and debt contracts in presence of moral hazard. Its originality relatively to the existing studies consists in performing the comparison between the two contracts in a more general context. Firstly, the internal funds of the agent (entrepreneur) are enabled to vary between 0% and 99%. Secondly, an incentive mechanism is incorporated to the sharing contract in the context of a two-period relationship. Both contracts are shown to be feasible for sufficiently high internal funds of the entrepreneur. The debt contract is shown to be characterized by larger financial access than the profit sharing contract. In addition, the extension of the financial-relationship to two periods reduces moral hazard and enhances financial access for both contracts, in case of sufficiently foresighted agent and fulfillment of two distinct conditions. For the sharing contract, the additional condition stated an upper bound on the size of the project. For the debt contract, the condition is related to the threat of non-renewal of the financing in case of first-period failure. It is interestingly shown that a more restrictive threat of financing non-renewal improves financial access but lowers the second-period investment. Finally, the paper suggests policy recommendations to enhance financial access without impeding investment through taxation and subsidizing policies.
    Keywords: Profit sharing, debt contract, moral hazard
    JEL: D82 D86
    Date: 2013–03
  5. By: Spyros Arvanitis (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Tobias Stucki (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Florian Seliger (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
    Abstract: Human resource management (HRM) practices are generally expected to stimulate a firm’s innovation performance. However, which of these practices do really pay off? Based on a unique dataset that includes detailed information for both a firm’s innovation activities and different types of HRM practices we find that primarily new workplace organization practices seem to enhance a firm’s innovation activities. Flexible practices of working time management and incentive payment schemes show only small effects on both innovation propensity and innovation success. Further training does only affect innovation success, but not innovation propensity. Overall, we find a stronger linkage between innovative HRM practices and innovation propensity than with innovation success.
    Keywords: human resource management, workplace organization, innovation performance
    JEL: O31
    Date: 2013–09
  6. By: Konstantin Kazenin (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)
    Abstract: The author deals with the a wide scope of issues related to the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. He provides an in depth analysis of the national movement as well as investment projects and local communities interest.
    Keywords: Russian economy, North Caucasus
    JEL: R10 R11 R12 R13 R14
    Date: 2013

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