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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Albert Banal-Estañol; Marco Ottaviani; Andrew Winton |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the determinants of the optimal scope of incorporation in the presence of default (or bankruptcy) costs. Contrary to accepted wisdom, default costs alone generate a non- trivial tradeoff between the bene?fit of coinsurance and the cost of risk contamination associated with ?financing projects jointly through debt. Separate fi?nancing is optimal for a larger set of parameters when the fraction of returns lost under default increases and when projects have lower mean returns, higher variability, more positive correlation, and more negative skewness. These predictions are broadly consistent with existing empirical evidence on conglomerate mergers, spin- offs, project ?finance, and securitization. Journal of Economic Literature Classi?cation Codes: G32, G34. Keywords: Default costs, conglomeration, mergers, spin-offs, project ?nance, risk contamination, coinsurance. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:475&r=ppm |
| By: | Lionel Garreau (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS : UMR7088 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine); Cédric Hardy (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS : UMR7088 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine) |
| Abstract: | Cette communication s'entend comme une co-construction, un dialogue entre un chercheur en science de gestion et un technicien de l'action publique territoriale. L'objet est de voir dans quelle mesure l'instauration de pratiques de développement durable peut avoir un impact sur le sens donné par les agents de l'action publique territoriale. En nous fondant sur trois projets distincts, nous montrons que le sens donné au travail par les individus peut être modifié par l'inclusion de pratiques de développement durable. Des contributions pour le management public sont avancées selon ces résultats. |
| Keywords: | sens, développement durable, administration publique |
| Date: | 2013–02–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00800721&r=ppm |
| By: | Viral Acharya (New York University); Marco Pagano (University of Naples "Federico II" and EIEF); Paolo Volpin (London Business School) |
| Abstract: | We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent (“alpha”). When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co-insurance among employees. In anticipation, risk-averse managers may churn across firms or undertake aggregate risks in order to delay the revelation of their true quality. The result is excessive risk-taking with pay for short-term performance and an accumulation of long-term risks. We conclude with a discussion of policies to address the inefficiency in compensation. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eie:wpaper:1303&r=ppm |
| By: | Erzo G.J. Luttmer |
| Abstract: | Consider an economy in which various types of labor are used to produce consumption, but not all types of labor are useful for upgrading the stock of organization capital–that is, for replacing old projects with more productive new projects. When news induces consumers to want to save more, low-quality projects are destroyed across all sectors of the economy, even though the economy is set to increase its stock of new projects. Labor that can be used to create new projects becomes more expensive and labor that cannot becomes cheap. Average wages may not change at all, and the employment of workers who cannot invest in new projects will decline. If physical capital complements the inputs of these workers, investment in physical capital tends to move together with their employment. These results are derived analytically for a prototype economy that has the essential ingredients of empirically relevant equilibrium models of firm heterogeneity. |
| Keywords: | Consumption (Economics) |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedmwp:703&r=ppm |