nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2013‒03‒09
eight papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Do administrators have the same priorities for risk reductions as the general public? By Carlsson, Fredrik; Daruvala, Dinky; Jaldell, Henrik
  2. Market failures and the additionality effects of public support to private R&D: Theory and empirical implications By Takalo, Tuomas; Tanayama , Tanja; Toivanen , Otto
  3. Financing Development Cooperation in Northeast Asia By Kawai, Masahiro
  4. Cooperation in teams: the role of identity, punishment and endowment distribution By Weng, Qian; Carlsson, Fredrik
  5. Economics of Prioritising Environmental Research: An Expected Value of Partial Perfect Information (EVPPI) Framework By Jeffrey, Scott R.; Pannell, David J.
  6. Corporate taxation and the quality of research and development By Ernst, Christof; Richter, Katharina; Riedel, Nadine
  7. Impact evaluation of a large-scale rural sanitation project in Indonesia By Cameron, Lisa; Shah, Manisha; Olivia, Susan
  8. Collaborative Research as a Source of Innovation By Porath, Amiram

  1. By: Carlsson, Fredrik (University of Gothenburg); Daruvala, Dinky (Dept. of Economics); Jaldell, Henrik (Dept. of Economics)
    Abstract: A stated preference survey was used to investigate the potential discrepancy between the priorities of public administrators and the general public regarding risk reductions. Both groups of respondents were asked to assume the role of a public policy-maker and choose between different public safety projects. We investigate differences in three areas: (i) large vs. small accidents, (ii) actual vs. subjective risk, and (iii) the trade-off between avoiding fatalities and serious injuries for different age groups and accidents. We find only minor differences between the responses of administrators and the general public, the most important of which is the difference in priorities between reducing the risk of many small or one large accident. In this area the most common response from the general public is that they prefer avoiding many small accidents rather than one large accident while among the administrators there is almost an equal split between the two options.
    Keywords: accidents; risk; policy making; stated preference
    JEL: D61 I18
    Date: 2013–02–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:kaunek:0007&r=ppm
  2. By: Takalo, Tuomas (Bank of Finland and KU Leuven); Tanayama , Tanja (National Audit Office of Finland); Toivanen , Otto (KU Leuven & CEPR)
    Abstract: We extend the theoretical basis of the empirical literature on the effects of R&D subsidies by providing an estimable model of strategic interaction among subsidy applicants, and public and private sector R&D financiers. Our model incorporates fixed R&D costs and a cost of external finance. We derive the optimal support rule. At the intensive (extensive) margin the costs of external funding reduce (increase) the optimal subsidy rate. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of additionality. It turns out that additionality at the intensive margin is less likely with large spillovers. Our results suggest that the relationship between additionality and welfare may not be straightforward.
    Keywords: R&D; entrepreneurial finance; R&D subsidies; innovation policy
    JEL: G28 H25 L32 O38
    Date: 2013–02–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bofrdp:2013_002&r=ppm
  3. By: Kawai, Masahiro (Asian Development Bank Institute)
    Abstract: Infrastructure connectivity in Northeast Asia—comprising the northeastern People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and the Russian Far East—has been hindered by limited intergovernmental cooperation. The paper finds that total infrastructure investment needs for Northeast Asia excluding Japan and the Republic of Korea (in transport, energy, information and communication technology, and the environment) could be $63 billion per year over the next 10 years. Of this total, $13 billion would have to be mobilized every year from external sources. The paper considers three options to fund these needs in addition to traditional financing by bilateral and multilateral agencies: (i) special and/or trust funds newly set up in existing multilateral development banks (MDBs), (ii) a structured infrastructure investment fund supported by MDBs, and (iii) a new subregional multilateral development bank. It suggests that the first two have potential, but recommends against establishing a new development bank.
    Keywords: infrastructure development and connectivity; subregional cooperation programs in asia; northeast asian infrastructure forum; northeast asian infrastructure fund
    JEL: F15 F36 F55 O19 Q01
    Date: 2013–02–17
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbiwp:0407&r=ppm
  4. By: Weng, Qian (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)
    Abstract: Common identity and peer punishment have been identified as important means to reduce free riding and to promote cooperation in teamwork settings. This paper examines the relative importance of these two mechanisms, as well as the importance of income distribution in team cooperation. In a repeated public good experiment, conditions vary among different combinations of homogenous or heterogeneous endowment, strong or weak identity, and absence or presence of peer punishment. We find that without punishment, strong identity can counteract the negative impact of endowment heterogeneity on cooperation. Moreover, punishment increases cooperation irrespective of income distribution and identity strength, and cooperation is similar across all treatments with punishment. These findings provide important implications for management policy makers in organizations: implementing ex ante income heterogeneity within teams should be done with caution, and a very strong peer punishment mechanism is more effective in enhancing cooperation over common identity when both are viable.<p>
    Keywords: Endowment distribution; identity; punishment; cooperation; public goods experiment
    JEL: C91 D63 H41 M54
    Date: 2013–01–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0551&r=ppm
  5. By: Jeffrey, Scott R.; Pannell, David J.
    Abstract: Significant public funds are spent on projects designed to improve environmental quality. Design and implementation of these initiatives is contingent on knowledge generated from environmental research. Funding agencies have many demands for research dollars while having limited research budgets. A prioritisation process is required for efficient and effective allocation of research funds. A review of research prioritisation literature suggests that ad hoc approaches are often used for ex ante analyses examining the value of environmental research (e.g., Delphi techniques, information gaps from literature reviews). This paper characterises environmental research prioritisation in the form of an economic decision problem, formulated using expected value of information concepts. An implicitly Bayesian modelling approach is developed with research priorities being made based on estimates of expected value of partial perfect information (EVPPI). Considerations and challenges associated with empirical implementation of EVPPI are discussed and a hypothetical example is provided to illustrate use of this approach in informing environmental research funding decisions.
    Keywords: Environmental Research, Research Prioritisation, Value of Information, Expected Value of Partial Perfect Information, Environmental Economics and Policy, Q50, Q51, Q57,
    Date: 2013–02–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:uwauwp:144944&r=ppm
  6. By: Ernst, Christof; Richter, Katharina; Riedel, Nadine
    Abstract: This paper examines the impact of tax incentives on corporate research and development (R&D) activity. Traditionally, R&D tax incentives have been provided in the form of special tax allowances and tax credits. In recent years, several countries moreover reduced their income tax rates on R&D output. Previous papers have shown that all three tax instruments are effective in raising the quantity of R&D related activity. We provide evidence that, beyond this quantity effect, corporate taxation also distorts the quality of R&D projects, i.e. their innovativeness and revenue potential. Using rich data on corporate patent applications to the European patent office, we find that a low tax rate on patent income is instrumental in attracting innovative projects with a high earnings potential and innovation level. The effect is statistically significant and economically relevant and prevails in a number of sensitivity checks. R&D tax credits and tax allowances are in turn not found to exert a statistically significant impact on project quality. --
    Keywords: corporate taxation,research and development,micro data
    JEL: H3 H7 J5
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fziddp:662013&r=ppm
  7. By: Cameron, Lisa; Shah, Manisha; Olivia, Susan
    Abstract: Lack of sanitation and poor hygiene behavior cause a tremendous disease burden among the poor. This paper evaluates the impact of the Total Sanitation and Sanitation Marketing project in Indonesia, where about 11 percent of children have diarrhea in any two-week period and more than 33,000 children die each year from diarrhea. The evaluation utilizes a randomized controlled trial but is unusual in that the program was evaluated when implemented at scale across the province of rural East Java in a way that was designed to strengthen the enabling environment and so be sustainable. One hundred and sixty communities across eight rural districts participated, and approximately 2,100 households were interviewed before and after the intervention. The authors found that the project increased toilet construction by approximately 3 percentage points (a 31 percent increase in the rate of toilet construction). The changes were primarily among non-poor households that did not have access to sanitation at baseline. Open defecation among these households decreased by 6 percentage points (or 17 percent). Diarrhea prevalence was 30 percent lower in treatment communities than in control communities at endline (3.3 versus 4.6 percent). The analysis cannot rule out that the differences in drinking water and handwashing behavior drove the decline in diarrhea. Reductions in parasitic infestations and improvements in height and weight were found for the non-poor sample with no sanitation at baseline.
    Keywords: Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Hygiene Promotion and Social Marketing,Housing&Human Habitats,Disease Control&Prevention,Early Child and Children's Health
    Date: 2013–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6360&r=ppm
  8. By: Porath, Amiram (CREST Expert Group)
    Abstract: Collaborative Research (CR) is usually regarded as a way to overcome several R&D barriers: the limitations of specific R&D projects resulting from lack of finance required for research infrastructure investment; the lack of expertise in industry (while it exists in academic institutes); and successful knowledge transfer. CR can be regarded as a strategic Open Innovation tool. In a book published in 2010 (Porath, 2010) I discussed CR on various aspects, analyzing it from the academic point of view and in the later part of the book on the practical aspects of participants and policy makers. Two recent books have been published, in which I have one chapter each. In the first one I presented a model (Porath, 2012a); and in the second a case study (Porath 2012b) regarding Open Innovation. These chapters have not dealt with CR as Open Innovation but rather presented another tool that has made Open Innovation a strategy for companies with little other choice. In this chapter I will combine the three sources into a more comprehensive picture.
    Keywords: Collaborative research; Open innovation; Knowledge management
    JEL: L14 L17 O32
    Date: 2013–02–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:cieodp:2013_001&r=ppm

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