nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2012‒12‒06
seven papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Procurement and contract design in the construction industry: … not one size fits all By Nilsson, Jan-Eric
  2. Asset pricing with uncertain betas: A long-term perspective By Gollier, Christian
  3. Is the Clean Development Mechanism Effective for Emission Reductions? By Huang, Yongfu; He, Jingjing; yTarp, Finn
  4. Mind the gap: capturing value from basic research: boundary crossing inventors and partnerships By Arts, Sam; Cassiman, Bruno; Veugelers, Reinhilde
  5. Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts: An Experiment By J. Philipp Reiß; Irenaeus Wolff
  6. Building results frameworks for safety nets projects By Rubio, Gloria M.
  7. Escaping Capability Traps Through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) By Andrews, Matt; Pritchett, Lant; Woolcock, Michael

  1. By: Nilsson, Jan-Eric (VTI)
    Abstract: This paper considers the choice between different approaches to contract for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure projects. The need to control for user and third party costs over the life cycle of an asset is demonstrated to be a core aspect of welfare maximising contract design. The more likely it is that a certain problem in the current infrastructure could be solved by constructing assets in alternative ways, the more strongly should the tendering agency consider innovative design alternatives such as performance contracts of Public Private Partnerships. It is also demonstrated that contracts which cover both construction and subsequent maintenance must be accompanied by bonuses and penalties for remunerating or punishing the entrepreneur for delivering (or not) appropriate infrastructure quality.
    Keywords: Infrastructure investment and maintenance; Bundling; Welfare maximisation vs. minimisation of financial costs; Risk allocation
    JEL: D61 D82 D86 R42
    Date: 2012–11–22
  2. By: Gollier, Christian
    Abstract: How should one evaluate investment projects whose CCAPM betas are uncertain? This question is particularly crucial for projects yielding long-lasting impacts on the economy, as is the case for example for many green investment projects. We defined the notion of a certainty equivalent beta. We characterize it as a function of the characteristics of the uncertainties affecting the asset’s beta and the economy as a whole. We show that its term structure is not constant and that, for short maturities, it equals the expected beta. If the expected beta is larger than a threshold (which is negative and large in absolute value in all realistic calibrations), the term structure of the certainty equivalent beta is increasing and tends to its largest plausible value. In the benchmark case in which the asset’s beta is normally distributed, the certainty equivalent beta becomes infinite for finite maturities.
    Keywords: asset prices, term structure, risk premium, certainty equivalent beta.
    JEL: E43 G11 G12 Q54
    Date: 2012–11
  3. By: Huang, Yongfu; He, Jingjing; yTarp, Finn
    Abstract: This research studies whether the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol achieves its objective of emission reductions in the host countries. It empirically investigates the impacts of CDM projects on CO? emission reductions for 60 CDM ho
    Keywords: clean development mechanism, emission reductions, dynamic panel data model; X-differencing
    Date: 2012
  4. By: Arts, Sam; Cassiman, Bruno; Veugelers, Reinhilde
    Abstract: We study the process of how firms access basic research and translate this into applied research. Drawing on basic research firms develop higher quality technologies and develop these technologies more intensely internally. Critical in this process are boundary crossing inventors – inventors that access basic research by active involvement in basic research projects and subsequent involvement in the development of more applied technologies. Nevertheless, these boundary crossing inventors need to be embedded in a complementary institutional relation between the firm and the organization developing the basic research to have an effect. We examine this process through IMEC, an important basic research organization in nano-electronics, with the explicit mission to bridge the gap between basic research done at universities and applied research developed by industry.
    Keywords: basic researcher; industry-science links; inventor; partnership; patents
    JEL: O33
    Date: 2012–11
  5. By: J. Philipp Reiß (Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, The Netherlands); Irenaeus Wolff (Thurgau Institute of Economics at the University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Germany)
    Abstract: We examine the incentive effects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial effort decisions and allocative efficiency. We experiment with funding contracts that differ in the structure of investor repayment and, therefore, in the incentives for entrepreneurial effort provision. Theoretically the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contract reduces effort distortions and increases efficiency. Likewise the replacement of outside equity by a repayment-equivalent standard-debt contract mitigates distortions. We test both hypotheses in the laboratory. Our results reveal that the incentive effects of funding contracts need to be experienced before they reflect in observed behavior. With sufficient experience observed behavior is consistent with the theoretical predictions and supports both hypotheses. If we allow for entrepreneur-sided manipulations of the project outcome we find that non-monotonic contracts lose its appeal.
    Keywords: hidden information, funding contracts, incentives, experiment, standard debt contract, non-monotonic contract, state manipulation
    JEL: C91 D82 G21
    Date: 2012–09–30
  6. By: Rubio, Gloria M.
    Abstract: Results chains are useful tools to clarify safety nets programs'objectives, verify the program internal logic, and guide the selection of indicators. Although the recent trend has been to focus mostly on outcome indicators, indicators are needed at all levels of the results chain to better understand program performance. Ideally, safety nets performance monitoring systems should build upon reliable program records and be complemented with a combination of tailor?made data sources and national surveys. The latter should be considered not only for monitoring purposes but within a program evaluation agenda. In any case, it is very important that adequate resources and technical assistance are channeled to strengthen institutional capacity for safety nets results-based management.
    Keywords: Safety Nets and Transfers,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,E-Business,Poverty Impact Evaluation,Labor Policies
    Date: 2012–10–01
  7. By: Andrews, Matt; Pritchett, Lant; Woolcock, Michael
    Abstract: Many reform initiatives in developing countries fail to achieve sustained improvements in performance because they are merely isomorphic mimicry.that is, governments and organizations pretend to reform by changing what policies or organizations look like
    Keywords: experimentation, iteration, local knowledge, problem-solving, implementation
    Date: 2012

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