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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Michael J. Barber; Manfred M. Fischer; Thomas Scherngell |
| Abstract: | The focus of this paper is on pre-competitive R&D cooperation across Europe, as captured by R&D joint ventures funded by the European Commission in the time period 2002-2006, within the 5th Framework Program. The cooperations in this Framework Program give rise to a collaborative network, with network nodes representing actors (i.e. organizations including firms, universities, research organizations and public agencies) and network edges representing R&D projects. With this construction, participating actors are linked only through joint projects. We formally describe and analyze the network from a social networks perspective that shifts attention to the detection and analysis of the community structure within the network. Distinct communities within networks may be loosely defined as groups of actors such that there is a higher density of relations within groups than between them. In this study, we attempt to detect communities of actors solely on the basis of the relational structure within the network, and to characterize and differentiate the identified network communities by means of information-theoretic methods, community-specific profiles and the location of their major actors. We expect the results to enrich our picture of the European research area by providing new insights into the global and local structures of R&D cooperation across Europe. |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa10p615&r=ppm |
| By: | Schuett, F. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center) |
| Abstract: | Abstract: I present a model in which firms differing in R&D productivity choose between ambitious research projects, which are socially desirable, and unambitious ones, which are socially undesirable. The patent office must decide how rigorously to examine applications, which affects the probability of weeding out bad applications but also how firms self-select into more or less ambitious projects. Both the ex post and ex ante welfare effects need to be taken into account in determining the optimal examination intensity. The model allows me to assess the impact of various policy changes on examination and welfare, including the creation of specialized patent courts, post-grant opposition, and the delegation of fee-setting authority to the patent office. It generates a number of predictions that are consistent with empirical evidence on the patent system. |
| Keywords: | innovation;patent office;optimal patent policy. |
| JEL: | O31 O38 D73 D82 L50 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012026&r=ppm |
| By: | Benjamin Kickhöfer; Dominik Grether; Kai Nagel |
| Abstract: | Public acceptance has often been named as a key factor for the successful realization of transport projects and policies. One reason, why even economically efficient projects might not be accepted by the major part of the population, could be the unequal distribution of benefits. For instance, individuals with higher Values of Time are expected to benefit more from user-financed improvements in the quality of service (e.g. speed) of any transportation mode. Beyond that, the implementation of road pricing schemes is actually discussed to have a regressive effect on the welfare distribution under certain conditions. In order to address these issues, microscopic multi-agent simulation presented in this paper can be used. Policy makers are directly able to compare the impacts of different policy schemes on the welfare distribution and can thus identify alternatives with higher public acceptance. Generally, by using the multi-agent approach, any segregation of individuals among any socio-demographic attribute is possible what allows a more detailed view on the effects of a policy measure. Furthermore, in contrast to applied economic policy analysis, this framework allows choice modeling and economic evaluation to be realised in a consistent way. This paper shows that (i) the inclusion of individual income in the users' preferences leads to a better understanding of problems that are linked to acceptability, (ii) benefits of transport projects are likely to rise disproportionally with increasing income - both, in terms of utility change and in terms of money -, and (iii) the simulation is already feasible for a real-world large-scale scenario with almost two million individuals. |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa10p1022&r=ppm |
| By: | Daniel Danau (UFR de sciences économiques et de gestion, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM-CNRS, UMR 6211); Annalisa Vinella (Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy) |
| Abstract: | A government delegates construction and operation of an essential facility to a private firm. When parties sit at the contracting table, they are uncertain about the operating cost. At the construction stage, the firm can improve its distribution by exerting some non-contractible effort. As soon as the facility is in place, the firm learns the realized cost privately. In case any of the parties breaks down the relationship and the firm is replaced during the operation phase, the government bears a cost that is more important the earlier the interruption, relative to the stipulated duration. We show that, under limited commitment, the optimal full-commitment allocation is implementable if and only if the firm holds some minimum amount of own funds that can be destined to the project, it is able to borrow funds for that specific project, and the replacement cost is sufficiently high. Implementation is made by instructing the firm to invest some intermediate amount of own and borrowed funds, by conditioning the loan guarantee (provided under the aegis of a third party not suffering from commitment problems) on the outcome of the potential renegotiation process between the government and the firm, and by setting duration neither too short nor too long. Making duration contingent on the realized operating cost helps the government lessen the more concerning between moral-hazard and commitment problems. |
| Keywords: | public-private contracting; limited commitment; duration; private funds; debt; guarantees; replacement cost |
| JEL: | D82 H57 H81 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201227&r=ppm |
| By: | Edward Bergman |
| Abstract: | Difficulty in extracting scientific and research findings from EU universities and placing such knowledge at the commercial disposal of innovation-dependent firms and industries is a cause for grave concern by the European Commission and many of its member states and regions, particularly when contrasted with the notable success enjoyed by U.S. universities. A review of literature from the perspective of EU knowledge-seeking firms and knowledge-generating universities reveals a striking asymmetry: firms presently seek mainly public science outputs, while universities pursue proprietary science opportunities more heavily in their dealings with business and industry. At the same time knowledge flows are being promoted far more aggressively, universities are being totally restructured, harmonised in many respects and decentralized regarding governance and accountability. Results from a web-survey of 1798 EU academics posted in Europe’s universities listed in the Shanghai TOP 500 reveal several important findings of interest. First, EU and U.S. respondents have quite similar views of what is considered reasonable with regard to public vs. private science. The exceptions reveal a generally stronger approval by EU academicians for their universities to be more proactive regarding commercialization, particularly university support of research-based start-up firms, with some differences based on respondents’ discipline [(1) biological sciences, 2) physics, 3) computer science, 4) chemical engineering, 5) economics and 6) history]. Further investigation shows those who have already undertaken or investigated commercialization opportunities tend to approve a battery of commercialization measures taken by their universities, and those who: a. have worked on externally-funded research projects with colleagues from industry, b. see regional business leaders influencing university commercialization policies, c. are heavily engaged in public service activities, and have collaborated with industry colleagues on research projects. (submitted to Uddevalla) |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa10p363&r=ppm |
| By: | Hoogendoorn, Sander M. (University of Amsterdam); van Praag, Mirjam (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | One of the most salient and relevant dimensions of team heterogeneity is ethnicity. We measure the causal impact of ethnic diversity on the performance of business teams using a randomized field experiment. We follow 550 students who set up 45 real companies as part of their curriculum in an international business program in the Netherlands. We exploit the fact that companies are set up in realistic though similar circumstances and that we, as outside researchers, had the unique opportunity to exogenously vary the ethnic composition of otherwise randomly composed teams. The student population consists of 55% students with a non-Dutch ethnicity from 53 different countries of origin. We find that a moderate level of ethnic diversity has no effect on team performance in terms of business outcomes (sales, profits and profits per share). However, if at least the majority of team members is ethnically diverse, then more ethnic diversity has a positive impact on the performance of teams. In line with theoretical predictions, our data suggest that this positive effect could be related to the more diverse pool of relevant knowledge facilitating (mutual) learning within ethnically diverse teams. |
| Keywords: | ethnic diversity, team performance, field experiment, entrepreneurship, (mutual) learning |
| JEL: | J15 L25 C93 L26 M13 D83 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6731&r=ppm |
| By: | Wit, J.W. de; Luong Viet Sang; Le Van Chien; Luong Thu Hien; Ha Viet Hung; Dang Thi Anh Tuyet; Dao Ngoc Bau; Quang Hoa; Mai Thi Thanh Tam |
| Abstract: | From 2006 plans were implemented to create a deep-sea water port linked to an Economic Zone in the coastal Province of Ha Tinh, located in north central Vietnam. The multi-purpose Zone entitled ‘Vung Ang’, was to attract foreign investors, while the port would provide a link to nearby Laos and Thailand. The project obviously had large implications for the administrations at various levels of governance from Hanoi to the coastal communes and villages, but even more serious impacts on the people living in the affected areas. A large area of about 23,000 hectares was to be cleared, affecting the people of 9 communes, in some of which all inhabitants had to leave their houses and homesteads, to be relocated to completely new settlements about 10 miles inland. These tightly knit communities were not too happy with the prospect to leave their homes and land, the burial places of their ancestors, and the long term comforts of community support networks. While initial decision making process started at the highest levels of Vietnam Governance, the implementation of port and industrial park construction and the related relocation policy was delegated to Ha Tinh province, which is consistent with current decentralisation policies in Vietnam. Actual implementation was carried out by the affected District and Commune level officials – with support from the Communist Party led Mass Organisations – who were in charge of the planning and implementation of the relocation process. This entailed a complex and sensitive series of steps to inform affected households, prepare relocation areas and allocate compensation and alternative housing. This paper describes the implementation dynamics of relocation by depicting and assessing the roles of all stakeholders involved, including the impacts - for better or for worse – of the relocated households. It brings out the way local authorities dealt with affected people, including efforts linked to the ideal of grass-roots democracy. Key areas of contestation are uncovered, such as inadequate infrastructure and low compensation rates. The paper has a second objective to assess the degree to which decentralisation in Vietnam has been actually implemented, and how this affects policy making processes such as the Vung Ang port/industrial zone project. The paper concludes that the relocation policy was implemented in a fairly efficient and harmonious way – with a very intensive engagement of the entire provincial administrative machinery, but that it is too early to assess the livelihood opportunities of the relocated households. |
| Keywords: | Vietnam;livelihoods;decentralisation;land acquisition and compensation policy |
| Date: | 2012–07–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:euriss:546&r=ppm |
| By: | Mehrmann, Annika; Schneider, Georg; Sureth, Caren |
| Abstract: | Applying a time-discrete investment model and a setting with an entry and an exit option and cash flow uncertainty we present a dynamic analysis of the impact of various loss offset regimes on risky investment timing decisions. We find that a tax system with loss offset restrictions will not distort timing decisions if the investor can exit the project. By contrast, in a setting without exit flexibility a tax discrimination against losses can cause paradoxical effects. In that respect, we analytically identify conditions for higher taxes to increase investors' propensity to choose early investment and hence accelerate entrepreneurial investment. -- |
| Keywords: | asymmetric taxation,loss offset restrictions,timing flexibility,investment decisions,uncertainty,tax effects |
| JEL: | H21 H25 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:arqudp:134&r=ppm |
| By: | Marie Delaplace |
| Abstract: | There are a lot of High-Speed Rail projects in a lot of countries (Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Portugal, USA, etc.). In 2009, 13469 km of High-Speed Lines are under construction and 17579 km are planned all around the world by 2025 (Barroni I, 2009). In the past and in some territories, some local economic dynamics linked to this kind of infrastructure have emerged. The aim of this communication is to present the conditions in which a HSR contributes to a local economic development. By using service innovation theories (Gallouj, 2003, Gallouj et Weinstein 1997), we propose a theoretical analysis of the arrival of a High-Speed Rail Service in a territory as a set of innovations (ameliorative innovation, incremental innovation, relational innovation). But these innovations must be appropriated. This appropriation that modifies the actions of actors can be individual: an actor will integrate it in its strategy by individually offering innovations of product/service. But it can be collective. From this collective appropriation can emerge complementary innovations of products/services based on relational innovations in the territory. They can give birth to the definition of a project of territory which will lead the actors to innovate in the relationships with the other actors of the territory and to create a new organization with a specific goal. In such a case, the private and public actors, beyond their individual interest, are coordinating their actions in order to promote a development of the territory which is linked to their own development by producing coherent and collective policies likely to valorize resources (economic, cultural, human and land) of the territory . Using Schumpeterian analysis (Schumpeter, 1939), we argue that the emergence of several relational innovations between private and public actors associated with innovations of products/services, that we consider as a cluster of services innovations are the central elements in the link between HSRS and local economic development. Thus if the HSRS opens up potentialities, their fulfillment depends on the way playing agents, likely to profit from it, i.e. how they will integrate the various innovations in their behaviors, and eventually produce new ones. |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa10p169&r=ppm |