nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2012‒06‒13
six papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Accountability and Bottom of the Pyramid projects: the two sides of the mirror By Claudine Grisard
  2. Financing small-scale infrastructure investments in developing countries By Daniel L. Bond; Daniel Platz; Magnus Magnusson
  3. Assessing the contribution of donor agencies to aid effectiveness: The impact of World Bank preparation on project outcomes By Kilby, Christopher
  4. The winner's curse: why is the cost of sports mega-events so often underestimated? By Wladimir Andreff
  5. Evaluation économique de projets de coopération atypiques. By Michel Vernières
  6. Rhetoric versus reality: the best and worst of aid agency practices By Easterly, William; Williamson, Claudia R.

  1. By: Claudine Grisard (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS : UMR7088 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine)
    Abstract: Cette communication étudie " l'accountability" face aux problématiques RSE. En effet, la société demande aux entreprises d'agir en faveur des grands problèmes sociétaux. Cependant, les entreprises rencontrent des difficultés pour satisfaire à la fois, les demandes sociétales et économiques. Cette relation est analysée par l'exemple des stratégies de la Base de la Pyramide (BoP). Des entretiens ont été menés auprès des managers BoP. Deux sortes " d'accountability " émergent. Elles se différencient sur quatre éléments: leurs rapports à l'objectif sociétal et économique, le niveau où elles prennent place, leur but et les perceptions des groupes qu'elles mettent en mouvement. Ce travail contribue à la théorie néo-institutionnelle, à " l'accountability " en RSE et à la littérature sur la BoP.
    Keywords: Accountability, théories néo- institutionnelle, Base de la Pyramid, RSE
    Date: 2012
  2. By: Daniel L. Bond; Daniel Platz; Magnus Magnusson
    Abstract: In most developing countries a shortage of long-term, local-currency financing for small-scale infrastructure projects impedes local economic development. Inadequate fiscal transfers, little own source revenue and low creditworthiness make it difficult for local governments to fully fund projects on their own. This paper proposes the use of project finance as a means to attract financing from domestic banks and institutional investors. Donors can play a catalytic role by providing technical assistance to develop projects and credit enhancement to attract commercial financing.
    Keywords: infrastructure finance, issuers, investors, financial sector, structured finance
    JEL: H54 H41 H81
    Date: 2012–05
  3. By: Kilby, Christopher (Department of Economics and Statistics, Villanova School of Business, Villanova University)
    Abstract: This paper assesses the impact of World Bank project preparation on project outcomes. Using a stochastic frontier model, I generate a measure of World Bank project preparation duration based on variation in political economy factors that are otherwise exogenous to project outcomes. Panel analysis of project data finds that projects with longer preparation periods are significantly more likely to have satisfactory outcome ratings. This result is robust across a range of specifications but the effects are conditional on the degree of economic vulnerability. The impact of World Bank preparation is greater in countries experiencing debt problems. The impact of donor preparation identifies a positive contribution of development aid that is not subject to the usual fungibility critique.
    Keywords: Aid Effectiveness; Fungibility; Project Preparation; Stochastic Frontier Analysis; World Bank.
    JEL: F35 F53 F55 O19
    Date: 2012–06
  4. By: Wladimir Andreff (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne)
    Abstract: Auction theory, when the bidders do not know the value of what is auctionned, is used to explain how the Olympic Games are allocated to competing bidding cities. It is a centralized allocation process with asymmetric information which usually comes out with a winner's curse. Various indicators of the latter are proposed and exemplified, the major one being the systematic ex ante underestimation of the Olympics costs.
    Keywords: auctions, bids, winner's curse, asymmetric information, cost underestimation, mega sporting events, Olympics
    Date: 2012
  5. By: Michel Vernières (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne)
    Abstract: Les financeurs de projets de coopération utilisent pour le choix de leurs projets des outils d'évaluation économique bien rodés pour les secteurs habituels de leurs interventions. Ils sont plus démunis devant des domaines pour eux atypiques tels que le patrimoine urbain. Cette communication repose sur un travail collectif réalisé pour l'Agence française de développement. La rapide présentation de la méthodologie d'évaluation proposée permettra surtout de mettre en évidence les limites rencontrées par ces évaluations et les conditions de leur opérationnalité. Cette présentation des quatre étapes d'analyse identifiées s'appuiera tout particulièrement sur la construction d'un diagramme de soutenabilité, notion issue de l'économie de l'environnement.
    Keywords: Coopération ; Evaluation économique ; Patrimoine urbain
    Date: 2012–05–23
  6. By: Easterly, William; Williamson, Claudia R.
    Abstract: Foreign aid critics, supporters, recipients, and donors have produced eloquent rhetoric on the need for better aid practices— has this translated into reality? This paper attempts to monitor the best and worst of aid practices among bilateral, multilateral, and UN agencies. We create aid practice measures based on aid transparency, specialization, selectivity, ineffective aid channels, and overhead costs. We rate donor agencies from best to worst on aid practices. We find that the UK does well among bilateral agencies, the US is below average, and Scandinavian donors do surprisingly poorly. The biggest difference is between the UN agencies, who mostly rank in the bottom half of donors, and everyone else. Average performance of all agencies on transparency, fragmentation, and selectivity is still very poor. The paper also assesses trends in best practices over time—we find modest improvement in transparency and more in moving away from ineffective channels. However, we find no evidence of improvements (and partial evidence of worsening) in specialization, fragmentation, and selectivity, despite escalating rhetoric to the contrary.
    Keywords: foreign aid; best practices; transparency; bureaucracy; incentives
    JEL: O1 F35
    Date: 2011

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