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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Simona Cicognani (School of Social Sciences, University of Trento, Italy); Aanna D'Ambrosio (School of Social Sciences, University of Trento, Italy); Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group); Simone Pfuderer (School of Social Sciences, University of Trento, Italy); Matteo Ploner (Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, University of Trento, Italy) |
| Abstract: | We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets three basic ethical requirements and allows community members to influence, via monetary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or negative. We provide either complete or only private information about others' personal values. This produces two distinct public provision games which are experimentally implemented and analysed for various projects. In spite of the complex experimental task, participants do not rely on truth-telling as an obvious and simple heuristic whose general acceptance would result in fair and efficient outcomes. Rather, they yield to strategic underbidding. Although underbidding is affected by projects' characteristics, the provision mechanism seems quite functional. |
| Keywords: | Public Provision, Procedural Fairness, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C72 D63 |
| Date: | 2012–04–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-015&r=ppm |
| By: | Iimi, Atsushi; Benamghar, Radia |
| Abstract: | Procurement packaging has important effects on not only the bidders'bidding behavior, but also contractors'performance. By changing the size of public contracts, procurers can encourage (or discourage) market competition and improve contract performance, avoiding unnecessary cost overruns and project delays. In practice, there is no single solution about how to package public contracts. With procurement data from road projects in Nepal, this paper examines the optimal size of road contracts in rural areas. The optimum varies depending on policy objectives. To maximize the bidder participation, the length of road should be about 11 kilometers. To minimize cost overruns and delays, the contracts should be much larger at 17 and 21 kilometers, respectively. Compared with the current procurement practices, the findings suggest that procurers take more advantage of enlarging road packages, although contracts that are too large may increase the risk of discouraging firms from participating in public tenders. |
| Keywords: | Government Procurement,Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Debt Markets,Post Conflict Reconstruction,Contract Law |
| Date: | 2012–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6028&r=ppm |
| By: | LOPES BENTO Cindy; CZARNITZKI Dirk |
| Abstract: | A significant amount of money is spent on programs to stimulate innovative activities. In this paper, we review the effects of a specific government-sponsored commercial R&D program from various angles. We start by evaluating whether we find positive effects of subsidies on R&D investment and R&D employment. Then, we analyze how the observed effects of subsidies on R&D intensity and employment vary over time, vary if the firm receives also support from other sources, vary depending on how many supported projects a single firm has at the same time or vary if a firm gets support consecutively. Finally, we estimate the macroeconomic impact of these grants in terms of R&D employment. We conclude that (i) the policies are not subject to full crowding out, (ii) the treatments effects are stable over time, (iii) receiving subsidies from other sources in addition to the program under evaluation does not decrease the estimated treatment effect, and (iv) receiving grants repeatedly does not decrease the magnitude of the treatment effects either. Using a back-of-the envelope calculation, we estimate that, on average, five R&D jobs are created (or maintained) per supported project in the Flemish economy. |
| Keywords: | Subsidies; Innovation; Policy Evaluation; Non-parametric estimation |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irs:cepswp:2012-19&r=ppm |
| By: | Nicolina Lamhauge; Elisa Lanzi; Shardul Agrawala |
| Abstract: | In the context of scaled up funding for climate change adaptation, it is more important than ever to ensure the effectiveness, equity and efficiency of adaptation interventions. Robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is an essential part of this, both to ensure that the prospective benefits of interventions are being realised and to help improve the design of future interventions. This paper is the first empirical assessment of M&E frameworks used by development co-operation agencies for projects and programmes with adaptation-specific or adaptation-related components. It has analysed 106 project documents across six bilateral development agencies. Based on this, it identifies the characteristics of M&E for adaptation and shares lessons learned on the choice and use of indicators for adaptation.<p> This analysis has found that Result Based Management, the Logical Framework Approach and the accompanying logframe are the most common M&E approaches used for adaptation. In applying these approaches, the long-term perspective of most adaptation initiatives means that it is particularly important to clearly differentiate between outcomes, outputs and activities. In addition, M&E frameworks for adaptation should combine qualitative, quantitative and binary indicators. The baselines for these indicators should include the effects of future climate change, particularly for projects with long-term implications, such as investments in infrastructure. Significant challenges remain in relation to dealing with shifting baselines, attribution and time lags between interventions and outcomes.<BR>De plus en plus de fonds étant alloués à l’adaptation au changement climatique, il est plus que jamais capital de veiller à l’efficacité, à l’équité et à l’efficience des actions menées dans ce cadre. Un système de suivi et d’évaluation rigoureux s’impose, à la fois pour garantir que les avantages attendus de ces actions se concrétiseront et pour mieux préparer les actions à mener dans l’avenir. Le présent document est la première étude empirique des cadres de suivi et d’évaluation appliqués par les agences de coopération pour le développement à des projets et des programmes portant intégralement ou partiellement sur l’adaptation. Cent-six documents de projets de six agences bilatérales de développement ont été analysés. Cela a permis d’identifier les caractéristiques des systèmes de suivi et d’évaluation appliqués à l’adaptation et d’en tirer des enseignements concernant le choix des indicateurs et leur utilisation.<p> D’après cette analyse, les deux approches de suivi et d’évaluation les plus employées sont en l’occurrence la gestion axée sur les résultats et la méthode du cadre logique et la matrice qui s’y rapporte. La plupart des initiatives d’adaptation s’inscrivant dans le long terme, il est particulièrement important de bien différencier les résultats, les produits et les activités lorsque l’on applique ces approches. En outre, les systèmes de suivi et d’évaluation appliqués à l’adaptation doivent associer des indicateurs qualitatifs, quantitatifs et binaires. Pour ces indicateurs, les références doivent intégrer les effets des changements climatiques futurs, notamment dans le cas des projets qui ont des implications à long terme (investissements dans les infrastructures, par exemple). La prise en charge des variations des références, de l’attribution des résultats et des décalages temporels entre actions et résultats pose encore des problèmes importants. |
| Keywords: | development co-operation, climate change adaptation, monitoring and evaluation, coopération pour le développement, adaptation au changement climatique, suivi et évaluation |
| JEL: | H43 O22 Q54 |
| Date: | 2012–04–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:envaaa:38-en&r=ppm |
| By: | Iimi, Atsushi; Benamghar, Radia |
| Abstract: | The world's climate is changing. It is well recognized that technical standards and project specifications of public infrastructure have to be adjusted, depending on the climate. However, it is less recognized that the public infrastructure procurement also needs to be adjusted. This paper examines a particular case of rural road procurement in Nepal. Severe weather conditions, such as heavy rains and storms, are likely to interrupt civil works and wash away unpaved or gravel roads. It is found that heavy precipitation causes delays, but not cost overruns. The paper also shows that budgetary efficiency and credibility could be improved by taking climate conditions into account. If future precipitation were anticipated by backward-looking expectations, many large project delays could be avoided. If the autoregressive precipitation model were used, the vast majority of the observed delays could be eliminated. |
| Keywords: | Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Roads&Highways,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Global Environment Facility,Rural Roads&Transport |
| Date: | 2012–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6029&r=ppm |