nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2012‒02‒08
five papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. External Benefits of Brownfield Redevelopment: An Applied Urban General Equilbirum Analysis By Niels Vermeer; Wouter Vermeulen
  2. An Economic Assessment of Competing Technologies for Coastal Restoration By Wang, Hua; Caffey, Rex H.; Petrolia, Daniel R.
  3. WP 115 - More flexibility for more innovation? Evidence from the Netherlands By Eva Wachsen; Blind, K.
  4. Economic Feasibility of Sustainable High Oilseed-Based Biofuel Production: The Case for Biodiesel in North Carolina By Yeboah, Anthony; Naanwaab, Cephas; Yeboah, Osei; Owens, John; Bynum, Jarvetta
  5. Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment By Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran

  1. By: Niels Vermeer; Wouter Vermeulen
    Abstract: Does brownfield redevelopment warrant government support? We explore several external benefits in an urban general equilibrium framework. Preferences are modelled such that demand for housing units in the city is downward sloping, which yields a more general setup than the extreme open and closed city cases. We shed light on the relative importance of general equilibrium effects of nonmarginal redevelopment projects and we isolate the external benefits of the removal of a local nuisance, the exploitation of agglomeration economies and the preservation of open space at the urban fringe. A numerical application indicates that local nuisance and agglomeration effects may push social returns significantly beyond the value of redeveloped land that accrues to its owner. However, depending on the price elasticity of urban housing demand and the strength of agglomeration economies, the amount of preserved greenfield land may be small and it only generates additional benefits to the extent that direct land use policies fail to internalize its value as open space.
    Keywords: brownfield redevelopment, land use externalities, urban general equilibrium,benefit-cost analysis
    JEL: R13 R21 R52
    Date: 2012–01
  2. By: Wang, Hua; Caffey, Rex H.; Petrolia, Daniel R.
    Abstract: In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) was established to integrate programs for habitat restoration and infrastructure protection. The Authority has begun aligning the stateâs coastal spending to reflect increasing public interest in the restoration of surface acreage. Concurrent with these changes, programmatic emphasis has been placed on rapid land building (RLB) techniques that rely on mechanical dredges and sediment conveyance pipelines to build new land. The apparent costs and benefits of this approach are increasingly compared in the scientific community to more traditional and natural methods of restoration, such as freshwater diversions (DIV). Given limited state and federal budgets for coastal restoration, advocates of these competing approaches have disagreed on a number of levels related to project efficacy. Petrolia et al. (2009) explored measures of cost-efficacy for RLB technologies and focused on sediment dredging costs associated with varying project scales. This research extends that analysis by developing a series of detailed generic models that incorporate time and risk considerations within a benefit-cost construct.
    Keywords: Coastal Restoration, Wetland, Economics, Benefit-Cost, Marsh Creation, Freshwater Diversion, Environmental Economics and Policy,
    Date: 2012
  3. By: Eva Wachsen (Faculty of Economics and Management, Innovation Economics, Berlin University of Technology); Blind, K.
    Abstract: Labor market flexibility continues to be one of economics, politics and society highly debated topic. In recent years, the impact of increased labor market flexibility on research and innovation has gained more and more attention. Previous studies have shown, depending on the measurement of flexibility as well as on the data that both positive and negative influences can be found. However, the financial flexibility in terms of wage rigidities has hardly been explored empirically. With the use of a unique dataset combining comprehensive information from both employers and employees we can accomplish variables not only to numerical and functional, but also to financial wage flexibility. In a panel probit model, we show that the influences of most of the indicators of wage flexibility are positive and vary by type of innovation. While the variables of wage bargaining has a higher impact on process innovations, information about specific wage levels, however, affects in particular the development of new products. The same applies to a separate consideration of wage bargaining levels. Aspects of numerical and functional labor market flexibility, in contrast, act negative on all types of innovation. Thereby, part time employees affect particularly processes, while flexible employment contracts have a stronger influence on product innovations. It seems that new products depend more on employment status and the resulting motivation of the employees.
    Keywords: Labor market flexibility, innovation, wages, collective bargaining
    Date: 2011–12
  4. By: Yeboah, Anthony; Naanwaab, Cephas; Yeboah, Osei; Owens, John; Bynum, Jarvetta
    Abstract: We assess the economic feasibility of a 10 MMGY biodiesel plant using a Monte Carlo Cash Flow model programmed in Excel using @Risk, a simulation and risk analysis software. The model incorporates stochastic components to capture uncertainty in the analysis. The stochastic components are mainly variables that may exhibit risk, such as input prices, output prices, and expected revenues, and these are assigned probability distributions in the model. The model is programmed with three output variables: stream of revenues, profits/loss, and the resulting net present value (NPV) over ten year forecast period. Results from the cash flow analysis show that average expected revenues from the sale of biodiesel and co-products will be $48.5 million and total operating costs of $42.05 million per year. The economic feasibility of this biodiesel production plant is determined from the model calibration and sensitivity analysis. Using a discount rate of 7.5%, the simulated average NPV is $16.8 million and since this is positive, it indicates the project may be economically feasible subject to model assumptions. We find that the likelihood of the NPV greater than zero is 61% on average. Sensitivity and scenario analysis show that the NPV is most affected by fluctuations in biodiesel price, canola seed price, and the price of seed meal.
    Keywords: Economic feasibility, biodiesel, monte carlo simulations, risk analysis, sensitivity analysis., Agribusiness, Production Economics, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2012–02–04
  5. By: Bandiera, Oriana (London School of Economics); Barankay, Iwan (University of Pennsylvania); Rasul, Imran (University College London)
    Abstract: Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team-based incentives remains scarce. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers' effort and team composition. We present evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends. Introducing rank incentives however reduces average productivity by 14%, whereas introducing a tournament increases it by 24%. Both effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments only increase the productivity of teams at the top. We interpret these results through a theoretical framework that makes precise when the provision of team-based incentives crowds out the productivity enhancing effect of social connections under team production.
    Keywords: rank incentives, team-based incentives, teams, tournaments
    JEL: D23 J33 M52
    Date: 2012–01

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