|
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Francis Bloch (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X); Simona Fabrizi (Massey University - SIERC); Steffen Lippert (University of Otago - Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two firms to invest too early and analyze collusion schemes whereby one firm prevents the other firm from entering the market. We show that, in the efficient collusion scheme, the active firm must transfer a large part of the surplus to the inactive firm in order to limit preemption. |
| Keywords: | Learning; Preemption; Innovation; New Markets; Project Selection; Entry Costs; Collusion; Private Information; Market Uncertainty |
| Date: | 2011–11–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00639049&r=ppm |
| By: | Catherine Figuière (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - Université Pierre Mendès-France - Grenoble II : EA4625); Michel Rocca (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - Université Pierre Mendès-France - Grenoble II : EA4625) |
| Abstract: | Le thème de la gouvernance se caractérise autant par la multiplication des travaux en sciences sociales depuis les années 1990, que par la polysémie du terme. Ce recours immodéré au terme de gouvernance vient le plus souvent entériner, dans une démarche positive implicite, le constat d'une augmentation du pouvoir de nouveaux acteurs issus de la société civile. Il convient désormais de mener un questionnement plus normatif de ce type de "pratiques", en précisant quels sont les modes de coordination qui peuvent être qualifiés de "gouvernance" d'une part, et leur capacité à se substituer à des formes plus anciennes de coordination, d'autre part. Réunissant des acteurs issus des institutions, des marchés et de la société civile, la gouvernance ne sera pas considérée comme un nouveau paradigme ayant pour vocation à se substituer au gouvernement. |
| Keywords: | gouvernance ; développement durable ; gouvernement ; société civile |
| Date: | 2011–06–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00641219&r=ppm |
| By: | Claire Colomb; Francesc Morata |
| Abstract: | Whilst there has been a surge of interest in various disciplines in European territorial cooperation between sub-central levels of government at different scales (cross-border, transnational, inter-regional), researchers and practitioners have struggled to develop appropriate methodologies to analyse the outcomes and impacts of territorial cooperation programmes/projects. That transboundary cooperation leads to the dissemination of good practice, to policy change and to concrete territorial impacts has become accepted wisdom within European programmes, in spite of the often scarce evidence about such outcomes. This paper will build upon the notion of ‘social’ or ‘policy’ learning in order to propose a conceptual and methodological framework to investigate whether, and how, policy learning processes take place between sub-central governmental actors in the framework of European territorial cooperation networks and programmes, on the basis of sociological approaches to 'cognitive Europeanisation' and to organisational learning. The paper will then present the very preliminary results of two research projects on cross-border and transnational territorial cooperation in Southern Europe currently being carried out at the University Institute of European Studies, Barcelona, by proposing a brief reflection on the factors (in particular related to the notion of ‘institutional capacity’) which facilitate or impede processes of social and policy learning in transboundary cooperation projects – taking as an example the involvement of Catalan institutional actors in such projects. |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa11p1735&r=ppm |
| By: | Tomoyasu Tanaka; Takao Goto |
| Abstract: | In Japan, many local mixed enterprises owned and operated jointly by local governments and private sectors had been established from the late 1980’s to the early 1990’s in order to provide public services more efficiently. At present, in Japan, many local mixed enterprises are confronted with a serial fiscal crisis. In 2007, the national government enacted the Local Public Finance Reconstruction Law and started to lead local mixed enterprises and local governments to achieve fiscal soundness. In addition to local governments, mixed enterprises have to make an effort to operate more efficiently. However, we believe that local mixed enterprises lack the incentives to manage more efficiently because of the governance structure. Firstly, as local mixed enterprises are owned by local governments, they can procure government-guaranteed funds and are able to raise capital more easily. Also, if business conditions of enterprises worsen, local governments give subsidies to bail out ailing enterprises. Managers do not have to worry about going bankrupt and might continue to carry out inefficient projects. Secondly, if managers are from local governments, or if the majority of the board members are local government officials, they might supply services without putting stress on profit. Therefore, it is possible that the governance structure of local mixed enterprises is the important factor that determines their performance. In this paper, we study the link between the performance and the governance structure in local mixed enterprises. |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa11p539&r=ppm |