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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Broström, Anders (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | Since the contribution of Cohen et al. (2002), it is well established that linkages between firms and public research organisations (PROs) serve purposes of both suggesting new R&D projects and completing existing projects. However, the extant literature has little to say about whether these two types of outcomes are linked or independent effects. This paper examines how a firm’s ability to absorb useful impulses to new R&D projects from interaction with public research organisations depends on how and how well the firm is able to utilise such linkages in project completion. An analysis of Swedish firms suggests that interaction provides impulses to further R&D primarily when it is successfully linked to achieving objectives in ongoing R&D projects of the firm. However, linkages which are focused on contributions to short-term projects are less likely to generate useful impulses. Moreover, not only are linkages which support both long-term and short-term objectives better than linkages which solely serve short-term objectives; firm-PRO linkages in which short-term objectives play a less accented role are most likely to facilitate valuable impulses to further R&D and innovation. |
| Keywords: | university-industry; externalities from public research; impulses to innovation |
| JEL: | O32 O33 O38 |
| Date: | 2011–06–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0252&r=ppm |
| By: | Barreto Nieto, Carlos Alberto |
| Abstract: | In the adjudication of several stages of an infrastructure project to develop a public service, when there is only private participation, there are strong incentives to reduce costs over the life of the project, which may affect the quality of service. In this paper, after a model extension to Hart (2003), is evaluated in more detail the advantages of the concession model, considering different classes of property in its implementation and introducing a simple mechanism to renegotiate, concluding that participation government is not justified for their ability to make innovations in quality, but because it is a mechanism to internalize the costs and benefits that may result in investment to reduce cost by the private party. |
| Keywords: | Teoría de contratos; Unión Público Privado; Privatización |
| JEL: | L14 R42 O31 L24 L33 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:32038&r=ppm |
| By: | Thomas Åstebro; Carlos J. Serrano |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effect of business partners on the commercialization of nvention based ventures, and it assesses the relative importance of partners’ human and social capital on commercialization outcomes. Projects run by partnerships were five times more likely to reach commercialization, and they had mean revenues approximately ten times greater than projects run by solo-entrepreneurs. These gross differences may be due both to business partners’ value added and to selection. After controlling for selection effects and observed/unobserved heterogeneity, our smallest estimate of partner value added approximately doubles the probability of commercialization and increases expected revenues by 29% at the sample mean. |
| JEL: | G24 J24 M13 O31 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17181&r=ppm |
| By: | Karel Janda |
| Abstract: | Credit contracting between a lender with monopoly market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to the rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs. This inefficiency may be eliminated by government support in the form of credit guarantees or interest rate subsidies. This paper compares different forms of government support and concludes that credit guarantees and interest rate subsidies have a nonambiguous positive effect on social efficiency since they enable the financing of socially efficient projects which would not be financed otherwise. The comparison of government budget costs for these two types of government interventions depends on the institutional details and parametrization of the credit problem. |
| Keywords: | credit; subsidy; guarantee; |
| JEL: | D82 G18 H25 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp436&r=ppm |
| By: | Carfì, David; Patané, Giusy; Pellegrino, Samantha |
| Abstract: | The paper provides a Game Theory model of coopetition which addresses the Project Financing problem of supporting the production of energy via sustainable renewable sources. In our analysis we consider two banks that may decide to invest in renewable and non-renewable energy sources. Several solutions of our coopetitive game are considered and determined explicitly. |
| Keywords: | Sustainability; coopetition; Differentiable Pareto Analysis; Project Financing |
| JEL: | G2 C71 C7 C72 G21 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:32039&r=ppm |