nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2011‒01‒03
seven papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Les 3 P d'une Project-Based View : Projet, Pérennité, Profit By Jean-Pierre Bréchet
  2. Projet, Pérennité, Profit : les 3 P de la gouvernance By Jean-Pierre Bréchet
  3. Risk allocation and incentives for private contractors: an analysis of Italian project financing contracts By Rosalba Cori; Cristina Giorgiantonio; Ilaria Paradisi
  4. LGU Access to Official Development Assistance (ODA): Status, Issues, and Concerns By Alex B. Brillantes Jr.; Gilberto M. Llanto; Ruperto P. Alonzo
  5. Innovation in cultural industries: The role of university links By Zukauskaite, Elena
  6. The Structure of Enterprise Law: Interrelationships among contracts, markets, and laws in the bargaining structure of the firm By SHISHIDO Zenichi
  7. Ownership Structure and Productivity of Vertical Research Collaboration By NAGAOKA Sadao

  1. By: Jean-Pierre Bréchet (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - Université de Nantes : EA4272)
    Abstract: L'article entre dans la réflexion par la question de la pérennité de l'entreprise. Cette question, largement délaissée dans les lectures théoriques dominantes de la gouvernance et de la stratégie, est instruite en considérant le rôle du pouvoir managérial comme médiation entre l'entreprise réelle et l'institution financière. A partir de trois cas contrastés de médiation, l'article revient sur les ingrédients d'une Project-Based View pour affirmer les trois P d'une politique générale, d'une gouvernance ou d'une stratégie exigeantes et soucieuses de la pérennité de l'entreprise : la centralité du Projet d'entreprise, la Pérennité de l'entreprise réelle, le Profit comme moyen.
    Keywords: Politique générale; Pérennité; Projet; Gouvernance; Dirigeant; Régulation
    Date: 2010–12–14
  2. By: Jean-Pierre Bréchet (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - Université de Nantes : EA4272)
    Abstract: Partant des ingrédients d'une gouvernance exigeante dans le cas d'une entreprise patrimoniale cotée, l'article défend trois dimensions constitutives, dans cet ordre, d'une lecture de la gouvernance : P comme centralité du Projet d'entreprise, P comme Pérennité, P comme Profit. Une telle théorie est indissociable d'une théorie de l'entreprise fondée sur le projet ou Project-Based View. Le premier P trouve ses fondements dans cet effort de théorisation d'une PBV. Le deuxième prend en compte que l'entreprise réelle, en tant que réalité contractuelle ou d'apprentissage, engage un rapport au temps. Enfin, le profit se comprend comme une épreuve et un moyen dans la perspective de maintien de l'entreprise réelle avant que d'être un objet de répartition. La gouvernance et les médiations du pouvoir managérial qu'elle recouvre, trouvent, dans ces 3 P, leurs fondements théoriques et pratiques.
    Keywords: dirigeant, projet, pérennité, médiation, régulation, gouvernance
    Date: 2010–12–14
  3. By: Rosalba Cori (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri); Cristina Giorgiantonio (Bank of Italy); Ilaria Paradisi (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri)
    Abstract: Based on the economic literature and international comparison, the paper examines the adequacy of the terms of Italian project financing contracts to build and operate public works, and identifies potential areas for improvement. We analyze the main contractual content of the public works construction and management concessions submitted to the Project Financing Technical Unit with a view to monitoring public-private contract partnerships. Overall, the analysis reveals the backwardness of the Italian system and the existence of not insignificant problem areas. The survey supports the need to foster adequate standardization of contracts in Italy aimed, in particular, at ensuring: i) the provision of more appropriate mechanisms for the employment of penalties for breach of contract by the concessionaire, especially in the management phase, and – conversely – of reward mechanisms; ii) the inclusion of clauses relative to the sharing of financing documents by the contracting authorities; iii) appropriate attention to the quantitative elements of the business plan; and iv) the strengthening of supervisory activity of the grantor during the various phases of the contract.
    Keywords: project financing, regulation, risk allocation
    JEL: K12 D86 H83
    Date: 2010–12
  4. By: Alex B. Brillantes Jr.; Gilberto M. Llanto; Ruperto P. Alonzo (Philippine Institute for Development Studies)
    Abstract: Statistics on the distribution of ODA loans show that the local government sector is the smallest direct recipient of this funding source. While it has been observed that the amount of ODA grants and the number of ODA grant projects have been declining over the years, several factors could explain why LGUs have not been able to have a substantial share in ODA funds. The study discusses barriers to the greater of LGUs to ODA funds and provides specific recommendations for action by policy makers.
    Keywords: Official development assistance, local government units, ODA programming, grant financing framework, cost-sharing, foreign borrowing act, Philippine Development Forum
    JEL: I38 O10
    Date: 2010
  5. By: Zukauskaite, Elena (CIRCLE, Lund University)
    Abstract: This paper analyses the role of university knowledge in innovation processes of cultural industries. Most of the previous studies on cultural industries highlighted the importance of locally clustered firms in innovation processes. Studies, analyzing university-industry collaboration focused on technological development or industrial R&D, neglecting cultural industries as object of analysis. The paper addresses this gap in the literature while analyzing collaboration with university patterns and innovation processes of new media firms in Scania, Southern Sweden. The findings reveal that innovation, influenced by industry-academia collaboration, takes place not only in technology based industries. Collaborative aspects of innovation process go beyond R&D transfer and include joint competence building, changes in market concepts and new social corporate responsibility actions. This paper adds to the understanding of innovation processes in cultural industries by introducing university as one more important actor in the knowledge exchange networks.
    Keywords: University-industry collaboration; innovation; cultural industries; new media; knowledge exchange
    JEL: O30
    Date: 2010–11–01
  6. By: SHISHIDO Zenichi
    Abstract: The firm is an ongoing joint project requiring both financial and human capital. Like other joint projects, the firm cannot maximize added value without achieving an efficient incentive bargain among the indispensable capital providers, i.e., shareholders and creditors as the monetary capital providers, and management and employees as the human capital providers. To stimulate efficient incentive bargaining at the firm level and, consequently, to enhance the efficiency of the whole economy, I will propose a new concept, the “enterprise law,” and define it as any law which will affect the incentive bargaining of the firm. We will draw the whole picture of incentive bargaining at the firm by focusing on the interrelationships and complementarities among contracts, markets, and laws; thereafter we will present some legislative policy implications.
    Date: 2010–12
  7. By: NAGAOKA Sadao
    Abstract: This paper analyzes empirically how significantly the existence of non-contractible research effort by a vertical partner (as measured by a provision of a co-inventor) affects the ownership structure of vertical collaborative research and whether such effort also significantly enhances research productivity, exploiting rich information at the project level provided by a large scale inventor survey in Japan. Participation of a supplier co-inventor significantly enhances research productivity and is also a very significant determinant of the ownership structure, controlling for the initial knowledge contribution and the financial contribution by a supplier. On the other hand, while a user co-inventor affects the ownership structure even more predominantly, it contributes much less to the productivity of joint research. Such a gap may be partly explained by the necessity of a user to combine relevant patents. Finally, the willingness to license is not lower for a vertically co-owned patent, even if co-ownership partly substitutes a license. This suggests that co-ownership does not significantly constrain licensing, even if ex-post agreement for a license becomes necessary.
    Date: 2010–12

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