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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Pierre-Alexandre Balland; Raphael Suire; Jerome Vicente |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the empirical identification of geographical and structural properties of innovative networks, focusing on the particular case of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) at the European level. We show that knowledge bases of organizations and knowledge phases of the innovation process are the critical factors in determining the nature of the interplay between structural and geographical features of knowledge networks. Developing a database of R&D collaborative projects of the 5th and 6th European Framework Programs, we propose a methodology based on social network analysis. Its originality consists in starting from a bimodal network, in order to deduce two affiliation matrixes that allow us to study both the properties of the organization network and the properties of the project network. The results are discussed in the light of the mutual influence of the cognitive, structural and geographical dimensions on knowledge production and diffusion, and in the light of the knowledge drivers that give rise to the coexistence of a relational core-periphery structure with a geographical cluster and pipeline structure. |
| Keywords: | Economic Geography, Knowledge networks, Social network analysis, EU Framework Programs, GNSS |
| JEL: | O32 R12 |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:1008&r=ppm |
| By: | Blackman, Allen (Resources for the Future); Rivera, Jorge |
| Abstract: | Initiatives certifying that farms and firms adhere to predefined environmental and social welfare production standards are increasingly popular. According to proponents, they create financial incentives for farms and firms to improve their environmental and socioeconomic performance. This paper reviews the evidence on whether sustainable certification of agricultural commodities and tourism operations actually has such benefits. It identifies empirical ex post farm-level studies of certification, classifies them on the basis of whether they use methods likely to generate credible results, summarizes their findings, and considers the implications for future research. We conclude that empirical evidence that sustainable certification has significant benefits is limited. We identify just 37 relevant studies, only 14 of which use methods likely to generate credible results. Of these 14 studies, only 6 find that certification has environmental or socioeconomic benefits. This evidence can be expanded by incorporating rigorous, independent evaluation into the design and implementation of projects promoting sustainable certification. |
| Keywords: | sustainable, certification, eco-label, literature review |
| JEL: | Q2 Q56 |
| Date: | 2010–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-10-10-efd&r=ppm |
| By: | Marie Ferru (CRIEF - Centre de Recherche sur l'Intégration Economique et Financière - Université de Poitiers) |
| Abstract: | This paper tries to elicit elements which explain the geography of science-industry collaborations by focusing on their construction process which is rarely studied regarding the existing literature. Constraints linked to the search of resources, on the one hand, and constraints linked to the logics of contact, on the other, weigh on actors when choosing their partner and could influence the geography of collaborations. An empirical study on collaborations established between Poitiers University's laboratories and firms confirms this hypothesis. Cognitive constraints lead to the spatial dissemination of collaborations. An econometric model shed light on the impact of logics of contact and shows that whereas most of these logics enable the construction of local and non local partnerships, non professional ties favor significantly local ones. |
| Keywords: | Collaborations; geography; social networks; institutions; resources |
| Date: | 2010–10–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00461262_v1&r=ppm |
| By: | Patrick Bolton (Finance and Economics Division, Columbia University Business School); Christopher Harris (Department of Economics, University of Cambridge) |
| Abstract: | We study a dynamic-contracting problem involving risk sharing between two parties – the Proposer and the Responder – who invest in a risky asset until an exogenous but random termination time. In any time period they must invest all their wealth in the risky asset, but they can share the underlying investment and termination risk. When the project ends they consume their final accumulated wealth. The Proposer and the Responder have constant relative risk aversion R and r respectively, with R > r > 0. We show that the optimal contract has three components: a non-contingent flow payment, a share in investment risk and a termination payment. We derive approximations for the optimal share in investment risk and the optimal termination payment, and we use numerical simulations to show that these approximations offer a close fit to the exact rules. The approximations take the form of a myopic benchmark plus a dynamic correction. In the case of the approximation for the optimal share in investment risk, the myopic benchmark is simply the classical formula for optimal risk sharing. This benchmark is endogenous because it depends on the wealths of the two parties. The dynamic correction is driven by counterparty risk. If both parties are fairly risk tolerant, in the sense that 2 > R > r, then the Proposer takes on more risk than she would under the myopic benchmark. If both parties are fairly risk averse, in the sense that R > r > 2, then the Proposer takes on less risk than she would under the myopic benchmark. In the mixed case, in which R > 2 > r, the Proposer takes on more risk when the Responder’s share in total wealth is low and less risk when the Responder’s share in total wealth is high. In the case of the approximation for the optimal termination payment, the myopic benchmark is zero. The dynamic correction tells us, among other things, that: (i) if the asset has a high return then, following termination, the Responder compensates the Proposer for the loss of a valuable investment opportunity; and (ii) if the asset has a low return then, prior to termination, the Responder compensates the Proposer for the low returns obtained. Finally, we exploit our representation of the optimal contract to derive simple and easily interpretable sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal contract. |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ads:wpaper:0092&r=ppm |