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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Leon Oerlemans; René Bakker; Joris Knoben; Nardo de Vries |
| Abstract: | There has recently been noted a rapid increase in research attention to projects that involve outside project partners. Our knowledge of such inter-organizational projects, however, is limited. This paper reports large scale data from a repeated trend survey amongst 2,000 SMEs in 2006 and 2009 that focused on inter-organizational project ventures. Our major findings indicate that the overall prevalence of inter-organizational project ventures remained significant and stable over time, even despite the economic crisis. Moreover, we find that these ventures predominantly solve repetitive rather than unique tasks and are embedded in prior relations between the partnering organizations. These findings provide empirical support for the recent claims that project management should pay more attention to inter-organizational forms of project organization, and suggest that the archetypical view of projects as being unique in every respect should be reconsidered. Both have important implications for project management, especially in the area of project-based learning. |
| Date: | 2010–04–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eim:papers:h201016&r=ppm |
| By: | Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Jens Robert Schöndube (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze the value of delegation in a two-period agency. A central management hires an agent to perform a personal effort in each period. Due to time constraints or lack of ability this effort can not be performed by central management. Besides personal effort firm value is influenced by the decision to launch a project which has to be made at the beginning of period two. The project decision can either be delegated to the agent (decentralization) or it can be made by central management (centralization). Under decentralization the agent observes the project’s contribution before its decision. While this captures the benefit of delegation its cost is that the project decision is unobservable and must be motivated together with personal effort via the same incentive contract. In the centralized regime, in contrast, no incentives for the project decision are necessary, however, the project’s actual contribution will not be observed such that the project decision has to be made based on expectations. We analyze optimal performance measurement for both regimes in a linear contracting setting and analyze the variables that affect the value of delegation. We do this for two different contracting regimes: long-term commitment and long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. Trade-offs under both contracting environments differ substantially. In particular, under renegotiation-proof contracts, decentralization might become optimal even if its direct benefit in terms of acquiring specific knowledge about the project vanishes. The reason is that with delegation of the project decision central management implicitly commits to a higher second period incentive rate as personal effort and the project decision must be controlled via the same incentive contract. This is beneficial if renegotiation-proofness requires central management to set too low second-period incentives compared to long-term commitment. A necessary condition for that is, that intertemporal correlation is negative. Contrary to the classical view this result implies that the incentive problem under centralization may become more severe than under decentralization. |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mag:wpaper:09039&r=ppm |
| By: | Roger Vickerman; Emil Evenhuis |
| Abstract: | Public-Private Partnerships have become a favoured way of introducing private capital into transport projects whilst maintaining an element of public interest. This paper considers the potential conflicts that might arise between the freedom of the private operator within a PPP and other elements of the public sector’s transport policy. Specifically it tackles the question of the problems that might arise when the public sector wishes to implement a type of price regulation, for example SMC Pricing, which might appear to limit the freedom of the private interest to maximise its value from the PPP according to the contract. The paper demonstrates theoretically the potential inconsistencies between such policies and suggest ways in which they may be overcome. We first briefly discuss Public-Private Partnerships in transport: what are the defining characteristics and what are the main types that exist in the different modes of transport? Next we consider the economics of Public-Private Partnerships, in particular from the viewpoint of incentives. Subsequently we identify and examine the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in PPPs as a regulation with regard to pricing in the transport sector. Lastly, we investigate the possibilities of resolving these issues. |
| Keywords: | Public-private partnerships; Social Marginal Cost Pricing; Incentives; Contracts; EU Transport Policy |
| JEL: | L14 L33 L51 L91 R48 |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1004&r=ppm |
| By: | Martin Koning (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Rémy Prud'Homme (Université Paris XII - Université Paris XII Val de Marne); Pierre Kopp (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | On the southern part of the Parisian Maréchaux' boulevards, the old bus line Petite Ceinture has been replaced by a modern tramway (T3). Simultaneously, the road-space has been narrowed by about a third. A survey conducted on 1,000 users of the T3 shows that the tramway hardly generated any modal report from the private cars (PC) towards the public transit (PT). However, it did generate important intra-modal transfers: from bus and subways towards tramway concerning the PT, surely from Maréchaux' boulevards towards the Parisian Ring-Road (boulevard périphérique, PRR) and/or adjacent streets for the PC. The various benefits and costs of these changes are evaluated in this research. The welfare gains made by PT users are more than compensated by the time losses of the motorists, and in particular, by the additional cost of road congestion on the PRR. The same conclusion applies with regard to CO2 emissions: the reductions saved with the replacement of the busses and some (few) PC are less important than the increased pollution induced by the lengthening of the automobile trips and the increased congestion on the PRR. Even if one ignores the initial investment of 350 M€, the social impact of the T3 project, illustrated by its Clear Discount Value (CDV), is strongly negative. This is especially true for suburbanites. Concerning the lonely inhabitants (electors) of Paris, our analysis shows that they pocket the main part of the benefits while supporting a weak fraction of the costs. |
| Keywords: | Tramway, Costs-Benefits Analysis, Road Congestion, CO2 Emissions |
| Date: | 2010–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00467896_v1&r=ppm |
| By: | Mark Hayden; Paul J.J. Veenendaal; Žiga Žarnić |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a model-based analysis of the potential macro-economic impacts of different options for international financing of climate change mitigation in developing countries. The model used is the multi-region and multi-sector climate change version of the WorldScan model. Following the outcome of the UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen, it makes no specific assumptions about the future international climate regime. The analysis shows that the environmental prospects systematically improve in a transition from the Clean Development Mechanism projects towards a global carbon market, while the opposite is foreseen for the economic costs. The more of a carbon market we have when moving from the project-based CDM to sectoral crediting mechanisms and internationally linked cap-and-trade, the more finance the carbon market will channel to developing countries. |
| Keywords: | european union eu annex I non-annex I climate conference in Copenhagen climate change mitigation clean development mechanism emission trading system the US brazil china india own participation of developing countries sectoral crediting mechanisms hayden Veenendaal Zarnic |
| JEL: | D58 Q40 Q50 Q51 |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:euf:ecopap:0406&r=ppm |