|
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Filippetti, Andrea |
| Abstract: | A central factor which characterizes design-related innovative activities is that a major source of knowledge – that is designers – is very often located outside the firm. This raises a central management issue for the firm and unavoidably generates a tension between designer consultants and the firm which I name the essential tension. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on this complex relationship on the ground of the evidence provided by a multiple case study. The findings confirm that designer consultants can make a substantial contribution in enhancing firms’ innovation capabilities. We show that a better understanding of the types of knowledge that designers need for their activity is key. This affects the way designer consultants are integrated within the organizational structure of the firm, and it also impinges on the strategies put forward by firms to manage this relationship in order to gain a competitive advantage driven by innovation. Implications include the crucial role played by the product manager, the strategies to foster trust and to coordinate designers. |
| Keywords: | industrial design; innovation; product development; case study |
| JEL: | M11 O32 |
| Date: | 2010–04–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:22002&r=ppm |
| By: | Francesconi, Marco (Department of Economics, University of Essex); Muthoo, Abhinay (Department of Economics, University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a “complex” partnership, that is, a partnership which produces impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties’ valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given to the main investor, irrespective of preference considerations. There are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party’s investment is more important than the other party’s. If the parties’ investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low-valuation party. If the importance of the parties’ investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, the low-valuation party should receive sole authority. We analyze two important extensions, one in which side payments are infeasible and the other in which parties can make repeated investments. We check for robustness of our results in several dimensions, such as allowing for multiple parties or for joint authority, apply our results to interpret a number of complex partnerships, including those involving schools and child custody. JEL Codes: D02 ; D23 ; H41 ; L31 |
| Keywords: | Impure Public Goods ; Contractual Incompleteness ; Allocation of Authority ; Investment Incentives |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:933&r=ppm |
| By: | Giovanni Villani |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a real option methodology for evaluating R&D investment opportunities assuming that potential competitors can en- ter in the market. As it is well known, R&D investments are made often in a phased manner and so each stage creates an opportunity (option) for subsequent investment. Therefore, R&D projects can be consid- ered as ‘Compound Exchange Options' in which investments present uncertainty both in the gross project value and in costs. According to Majd and Pindyck (1987), in a real options context, “div- idends” are the opportunity costs inherent in the decision to defer an investment project and so deferment implies the loss of project's cash flows. Moreover, Trigeorgis (1996) incorporates the preemption effect through the “competitive dividends” which are the cash flows that can be eroded by anticipated competitive arrivals. In this paper we propose to value, using Montecarlo simulation, the R&D investments of a pioneer firm assuming that the Development cost can be spent in two moments: t2 or t3. If the Develpment cost is realized in t2 no firms enters in the market since the rivals' R&D plan is not yet concluded otherwise, if the investment D is delayed at time t3 waiting better market conditions, other rivals can enter in the market and so the opportunity costs (“dividends”) increase. |
| Keywords: | Real options; R&D; Monte Carlo methods; Competitive dividends. |
| JEL: | G13 O32 C15 D40 |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ufg:qdsems:21-2009&r=ppm |
| By: | Solga, Heike; Kohlrausch, Bettina; Kretschmann, Claudia; Fromm, Sabine |
| Abstract: | "The present research report is based on the evaluation of the project 'increasing graduation quota - enhancing occupational capacities'. The model project is an attempt to increase chances on a successful transition from school to occupational training of low qualified young people. The project seeks to increase the occupational orientation, the learning motivation and practical relevance of education by establishing so called 'career starting classes', in which the students are tough separately, supervised by 'career start tutors' and attend two days of practical training a week. With regard to the two main objectives of the project - a successful graduation and transition into occupational training - the project in general has been successful. 92 per cent of the students, who have been attending the whole project have graduated from school successfully. Focusing on young people who left school after the 9th grade - which means after the project period has ended - 47 per cent of the project's participants (compared to 38 per cent of students attending a control class) have started with occupational training, which is a great success. However, the success of the project is limited by a high turn over rate. An even more important limitation results from the fact that the project has not been successful for particular groups of students: for students with good school achievements and for female students the participation in the project has been negative with respect of their chances to obtain an apprenticeship place after leaving school." (author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en)) |
| Keywords: | Berufseinmündung, benachteiligte Jugendliche, Hauptschüler, Berufsorientierung, Lernmotivation, Hauptschulabschluss, betriebliche Berufsausbildung, Wirkungsforschung |
| Date: | 2010–04–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iab:iabfob:201005&r=ppm |
| By: | Guszt v Nemes (Institute of Economics - Hungarian Academy of Sciences) |
| Abstract: | The Rural Development Regulation (RDR) within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as an exemplary manifestation of the New Rural Development Paradigm, has achieved significant results. Nevertheless, it has increasingly become liable to institutional complexity and central control in an emerging system - discussed as 'the project state' or 'projectified world' in recent literature. The intersection of different institutional realities (European, domestic, regional, local, sectoral, spatial, etc.) and the resulting institutional bricolage is inevitably contested. The dispute is even more apparent in CEE countries, where multi-level governance is problematic and the New Paradigm has good possibilities, but little tradition. This case study of the implementation of the Hungarian Agri-Environmental Programme (HAEP) intends to illustrate how a disfunctioning project state (clientalism, insufficient bureaucracy, direct political influence) can distort the implementation of rural development policies. We found that the design and the implementation of the programme (HAEP) was subjected to ongoing political influence and the power struggle of three main mindsets, representing different lobbies: the agriculturalists, the green-minded and the accountability-minded actors. As a consequence, the main emphasis remains on the distribution of financial resources, thus original objectives (environmental protection and effective social learning) are not fulfilled. The case study is part of my ongoing research "Local Development Policies in a European Project State - A Systemic Analysis of Institutional Bricolage" supported by an NFM-OTKA grant. |
| Keywords: | social learning, environmental governance, agri-environmental policies, CAP, EU policies, environmental protection, project state, evaluation |
| JEL: | D73 D74 D78 H83 J18 Q00 Q01 Q18 Q19 Q51 Q56 Q58 Y80 |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:1008&r=ppm |
| By: | Gilbert, John (Asian Development Bank Institute); Banik, Nilanjan (Asian Development Bank Institute) |
| Abstract: | Although the overall economic performance of economies in South Asia in recent years has been impressive, there is concern that an aging and increasingly inadequate infrastructure may limit the potential for further growth and economic development. A critical infrastructure component is the transportation network, and there are currently several transportation infrastructure projects in the South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) region, connecting Nepal, eastern India, Bangladesh, and Bhutan. This paper uses computable general equilibrium (CGE) methods to address how these infrastructure developments might affect the broader economy in SASEC, and in particular impact on income distribution and poverty. The paper describes a new CGE model for South Asia, covering India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan, which incorporates modifications to household structure in order to capture the implications of reform for changes in intra-household income. The scenarios that are considered reflect proposed investments in land transport infrastructure in the SASEC region. These should result in reductions in the land transport component of international transport margins, which vary bilaterally by commodity. We found that all SASEC economies would benefit from the reductions in terms of aggregate welfare, with the largest gains accruing to India in absolute terms, but the largest relative gains to Nepal, followed by Bangladesh and Sri Lanka when the margin reduction is prorated to intra-South Asian trade rather than just SASEC. In terms of household level distribution, the picture was mixed, with clearly pro-poor outcomes in some countries, such as Nepal, but more ambiguous impacts in others. In terms of potential adjustment costs, examination of the extent of predicted structural changes suggests that these would be minor, although somewhat more significant for the smaller economies in the region. |
| Keywords: | cge method; infrastructure development; sasec; income distribution poverty reduction |
| JEL: | D58 F14 F17 O53 |
| Date: | 2010–04–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbiwp:0211&r=ppm |