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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Michael Schwartz; Francois Peglow; Michael Fritsch; Jutta Günther |
| Abstract: | Systemic innovation theory emphasizes that innovations are the result of an interdependent exchange process between different organizations. This is reflected in the current paradigm in European innovation policy, which aims at the support of collaborative R&D and innovation projects bringing together science and industry. Building on a large data set using project-level evidence on 406 subsidized R&D cooperation projects, the present paper provides detailed insights on the relationship between the innovative success of R&D cooperation projects and project characteristics. Patent applications and publications are used as measures for direct outcomes of R&D projects. We also differentiate between academic-industry projects and pure inter-firm projects. Main results of negative binomial regressions are that large-firm involvement is positively related to pa-tent applications, but not to publications. Conversely, university involvement has positive effects on project outcomes in terms of publications but not in terms of patent applications. In general, projects’ funding is an important predictor of innovative success of R&D cooperation projects. No significant results are found for spatial proximity among cooperation partners and for the engagement of an applied research institute. Results are discussed with respect to the design of R&D cooperation support schemes. |
| Keywords: | R&D Cooperation; Innovation; Academic-Industry-Linkages; Innovation Policy |
| JEL: | O31 O32 O38 |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iwh:dispap:7-10&r=ppm |
| By: | Annalisa Luporini (Università degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche); Clara Graziano (Università degli Studi di Udine) |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes the optimal delegation and ownership structure in a setting where the owner of a firm hires a manager to run the firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Profits depend on both tasks and optimality would require different ownership stakes. A large stake is necessary for monitoring while a small stake is necessary for not interfering with incentives for project choice. Allocating control rights over project choice to the manager can alleviate this conflict. Delegation is optimal despite dissonant preferences, if managerial private benefits are not too small. By delegating authority over project choice and by using an optimal compensation scheme, the large shareholder is able to retain full ownership of the firm and, at the same time, to provide strong incentives to the manager. However, full ownership comes at the price of distorting monitoring and the resulting firing policy. Severance pay plays a key role in the optimal compensation scheme. We interpret delegation as the choice of a dual-board structure where the supervisory board is in charge of monitoring and management board is in charge of project selection. |
| Keywords: | Large Shareholder, Concentrated Ownership, Delegation, Monitoring, Board of directors, Corporate Governance. |
| JEL: | G34 L22 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2010_05.rdf&r=ppm |
| By: | Alicia GarcÃa-Herrero; K.C. Fung; Francis Ng |
| Abstract: | In this paper we critically review the relevant information and literature and that can enhance the feasibility and the successful implementation of cross-border infrastructure projects. We provide detailed information concerning FDI into the major emerging regions: East Asia/Pacific, Latin America and Eastern Europe. We also discuss the theoretical and empirical literature which sheds light on the characteristics of transnational infrastructure projects, who should conduct them and what determines their existence. The literature points to the importance of governments to be involved in transnational infrastructure projects as there are clear externalities which will otherwise not be reaped. It also points to the importance of coordination for the project to be successful. The ADB is well placed to perform that role. Lastly we provided a total of six cases of cross-border infrastructure projects, with two from East Asia, two from Latin America and two from Eastern Europe. These cases illustrate the critical need for smooth coordination over the diverse groups of team players, a top-level backing of the projects as well as a thorough Understanding of all the political and financial factors involved that can influence the success of these projects. |
| Date: | 2009–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bbv:wpaper:0917&r=ppm |
| By: | Juan Jose Barrios; Nestor Gandelman; Gustavo Michelin |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews and assesses some of the Productive Development Policies currently being implemented in Uruguay. Three horizontal and three vertical policies are considered in light of the market and public failures they attempt to address and minimize. Horizontal policies comprise Innovation, Industrial Promotion and Directives for Industrial and Technological Development. Vertical policies include the analysis of Forestry Law, Meat Traceability and the Sustainable Production Project in the agricultural sector. |
| Keywords: | Public economics, Regulation and industrial policy, Industrial policy |
| JEL: | H41 L50 O14 O25 |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:wpaper:4661&r=ppm |
| By: | Maria Gabriella Graziano (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF); Maria Romaniello (Seconda Università di Napoli) |
| Abstract: | We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods involving the choice of a public project. We discuss core-equivalence results in the general framework of non-Euclidean representation of the collective goods. We define a contribution scheme to capture the fraction of the total cost of providing the project that each blocking coalition is expected to cover. We show that for each given contribution scheme defined over the wider class of Aubin coalitions, the resulting core is equivalent to the corresponding linear cost share equilibria. We also characterize linear cost share equilibria in terms of the veto power of the grand coalition. It turns out that linear cost share equilibria are exactly those allocations that cannot be blocked by the grand coalition with reference to auxiliary economies with the same space of agents and modified initial endowments and cost functions. Unlike the Aubin-type equivalence, this characterization does not depend on a particular contribution scheme. |
| Keywords: | Public project, cost share equilibrium, core, non-dominated allocation, grand coalition |
| JEL: | D51 D60 H41 |
| Date: | 2010–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:248&r=ppm |
| By: | Sophia Bildhaeuser (United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security) |
| Abstract: | Under pressure from the European Union and other donors, many efforts are undertaken by the Dam Authorities in Lesotho (Lesotho Highlands Development Authority) and the Lesotho government to put increasing responsibility on the dam-affected communities in regards to water management and maintenance of water systems as well as to create better channels of communication for conflict resolution. Although these efforts seem to be well intended, they often fail in their actual implementation. Therefore, there are several discontents on the side of the resettlees and the relocatees, which are the subject of (so far) non-violent conflicts on a local level. The changed situation where resettlees suddenly have to pay for water and other basic needs is a second area of non-violent conflict. According to the people interviewed, the conflicts are basically between the authorities and the displacees, in rare cases between host communities and the displaced people. The third potential area of conflict is the fragmentation of the water sector within the government, which is tried to be overcome by the creation of the Water Commission to coordinate all efforts in the water sector. This fragmentation has of course implications for the communities on the local level. The report strongly argues for an implementation of an approach to increasingly involve the local communities not only in the implementation phase but also in the decision-making process in order to achieve greater effectiveness and sustainability of the water management in Lesotho. It finally suggests the introduction of a so called “Dam Council for Basotho Participation” (DCBP). |
| Keywords: | Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Water Management, Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Local Level, Institutions, Relocation |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcn:rwpapr:22&r=ppm |
| By: | Martin Koning (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Rémy Prud'Homme (Université Paris XII - Université Paris XII Val de Marne); Pierre Kopp (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | On the southern part of the Parisian Maréchaux' boulevards, the old bus line Petite Ceinture has been replaced by a modern tramway (T3). Simultaneously, the road-space has been narrowed by about a third. A survey conducted on 1,000 users of the T3 shows that the tramway hardly generated any modal report from the private cars (PC) towards the public transit (PT). However, it did generate important intra-modal transfers: from bus and subways towards tramway concerning the PT, surely from Maréchaux' boulevards towards the Parisian Ring-Road (boulevard périphérique, PRR) and/or adjacent streets for the PC. The various benefits and costs of these changes are evaluated in this research. The welfare gains made by PT users are more than compensated by the time losses of the motorists, and in particular, by the additional cost of road congestion on the PRR. The same conclusion applies with regard to CO2 emissions: the reductions saved with the replacement of the busses and some (few) PC are less important than the increased pollution induced by the lengthening of the automobile trips and the increased congestion on the PRR. Even if one ignores the initial investment of 350 M€, the social impact of the T3 project, illustrated by its Clear Discount Value (CDV), is strongly negative. This is especially true for suburbanites. Concerning the lonely inhabitants (electors) of Paris, our analysis shows that they pocket the main part of the benefits while supporting a weak fraction of the costs. |
| Keywords: | Tramway, Costs-Benefits Analysis, Road Congestion, CO2 Emissions |
| Date: | 2010–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00467896_v1&r=ppm |
| By: | Blackman, Allen (Resources for the Future); Rivera, Jorge |
| Abstract: | Initiatives certifying that farms and firms adhere to predefined environmental and social welfare production standards are increasingly popular. According to proponents, they create financial incentives for farms and firms to improve their environmental and socioeconomic performance. This paper reviews the evidence on whether sustainable certification of agricultural commodities and tourism operations actually has such benefits. It identifies empirical ex post farm-level studies of certification, classifies them on the basis of whether they use methods likely to generate credible results, summarizes their findings, and considers the implications for future research. We conclude that empirical evidence that sustainable certification has significant benefits is limited. We identify just 37 relevant studies, only 14 of which use methods likely to generate credible results. Of these 14 studies, only 6 find that certification has environmental or socioeconomic benefits. This evidence can be expanded by incorporating rigorous, independent evaluation into the design and implementation of projects promoting sustainable certification. |
| Keywords: | sustainable, certification, eco-label, literature review |
| JEL: | Q2 Q56 |
| Date: | 2010–03–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-10-17&r=ppm |