nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2010‒02‒27
three papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Railway scheduling reduces the expected project makespan. By Tian, Wendi; Demeulemeester, Erik
  2. Do the selected Trans European transport investments pass the cost benefit test?. By Proost, Stefan; Dunkerley, Fay; van der Loo, Saskia; Adler, Nicole; Bröcker, Johannes; Korzhenevych, Artem
  3. Access to Justice for the Private Sector in Joint Implementation Projects under the Kyoto Protocol: A Brief Study of Possible Disputes and Remedies Available to Private Participants in International Carbon Emission Reduction Projects By Sander Simonetti

  1. By: Tian, Wendi; Demeulemeester, Erik
    Abstract: The Critical Chain Scheduling and Buffer Management (CC/BM) methodology, proposed by Goldratt (1997), introduced the concepts of feeding buffers, project buffers and resource buffers as well as the roadrunner mentality. This last concept, in which activities are started as soon as possible, was introduced in order to speed up projects by taking advantage of predecessors finishing early. Later on, the railway scheduling concept of never starting activities earlier than planned was introduced as a way to increase the stability of the project, typically at the cost of an increase in the expected project makespan. In this paper, we will indicate a realistic situation in which railway scheduling improves both the stability and the expected project makespan over roadrunner scheduling.
    Keywords: Railway scheduling; Roadrunner scheduling; Feeding buffer; Priority list; Resource availability;
    Date: 2010–01
  2. By: Proost, Stefan; Dunkerley, Fay; van der Loo, Saskia; Adler, Nicole; Bröcker, Johannes; Korzhenevych, Artem
    Abstract: This paper assesses the economic justification for the selection of priority projects defined under the auspices of the Trans-European transport network. In analyzing the current list of 30 priority projects, we apply three different transport models to undertake a cost-benefit comparison. We find that many projects do not pass the cost-benefit test and only a few of the economically justifiable projects would need European subsidies to make them happen. Two remedies are proposed to minimize the inefficiencies in future project selection. The first remedy obliges each member state or group of states to perform a cost-benefit analysis (followed by a peer review) and to make the results public prior to ranking priority projects. The second remedy would require federal funding to be available only for projects with important spillovers to other countries, in order to avoid pork barrel behaviour.
    Date: 2010
  3. By: Sander Simonetti
    Abstract: The Kyoto Protocol has not only created carbon emission reduction obligations for industrialized countries, but also opportunities for the private sector to participate in its 'flexible mechanisms'. One of these mechanisms is Joint Implementation, which allows private legal entities to engage in international emission reduction projects that generate tradable emission rights. Private parties can act as verifiers of the emission reductions achieved by such projects, or as buyers of the generated emission rights (which can be used, e.g., for compliance under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme). During the Joint Implementation project cycle, these private parties can become involved in several types of disputes with various counterparties. This paper explores the legal remedies available to such private parties. Long-term private sector investment and contribution to the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol are more likely to occur in a stable regulatory environment, which requires a certain degree of legal protection. This includes proper access to justice in case disputes arise.
    Date: 2010–01–15

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