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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | International Rivers Network IRN |
| Abstract: | This new report discusses the experience with environmental standards and how it can be useful for new financiers. It contains ten papers written by experts from civil society, financial institutions and academia. The authors present case studies of overseas projects funded by Chinese, Indian and Thai financiers, and analyze the experience with environmental standards which could be applied by these financiers. |
| Keywords: | financiers, financial instituions, academia, china, india, chinese, indian, Thai, environmental standards, civil society, hydropower development, dams, Social, Socially Responsible Investment, Thailand, Environmental |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2228&r=ppm |
| By: | Shalizi, Zmarak; Lecocq, Franck |
| Abstract: | Mitigation investments in long-lived capital stock (LLKS) differ from other types of mitigation investments in that, once established, LLKS can lock-in a stream of emissions for extended periods of time. Moreover, historical examples from industrial countries suggest that investments in LLKS projects or networks tend to be lumpy, and tend to generate significant indirect and induced emissions besides direct emissions. Looking forward, urbanization and rapid economic growth suggest that similar decisions about LLKS are being or will soon be made in many developing countries. In their current form, carbon markets do not provide correct incentives for mitigation investments in LLKS because the constraint on carbon extends only to 2012, and does not extend to many developing countries. Targeted mitigation programs in regions and sectors in which LLKS is being built at rapid rate are thus necessary to avoid getting locked into highly carbon-intensive LLKS. Even if the carbon markets were extended (geographically, sectorally, and over time), public intervention would still be required, for three main reasons. First, to ensure that indirect and induced emissions associated with LLKS are taken into account in investor’s financial cost-benefit analysis. Second, to facilitate project or network financing to bridge the gap between carbon revenues that accrue over time as the project/network unfolds and the capital needed upfront to finance lumpy investments. Third, to internalize other non-carbon externalities (e.g., local pollution) and/or to lift barriers (e.g., lack of capacity to handle new technologies) that penalize the low-carbon alternatives relative to the high-carbon ones. |
| Keywords: | Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Energy Production and Transportation,Energy and Environment,Environment and Energy Efficiency,Carbon Policy and Trading |
| Date: | 2009–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5063&r=ppm |
| By: | Kentaro Hatsumi; |
| Abstract: | If potential donors for a charity project possess the warm-glow properties in their preferences, we can represent their behavior with a coordination game. Accordingly, we construct a simultaneous incomplete information game model of charitable giving based on a simple global coordination game. We demonstrate that merely by the effect of seed money to shift the threshold requirement of the donations for project success downwards, the proportion of donors and the total amount of donations strictly and continuously increase with the amount of seed money. This result is compatible with the field experimental evidence in List and Lucking-Reiley [List, J. A., Lucking-Reiley, D., 2002. The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign. Journal of Political Economy 110 (1), 215-233]. |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0736r&r=ppm |
| By: | Theresa Fahrenberger (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland) |
| Abstract: | I discuss instances where a committee wants to deviate from the simple majority rule by adopting an alternative voting scheme for two consecutive binary ballots. The alternative voting rule, called Minority Voting as an Exception (MVE), works as follows: In the first ballot a b-majority rule is used, where b < 1/2 is equal to the minority fraction that favors some project, say project 1. This allows the minority to induce the adoption of project 1. After the first ballot all voting winners, i.e. the minority of project winners, lose their voting rights for the upcoming second ballot, where the simple majority rule is used. Hence, MVE may benefit both project losers and winners and may thus be unanimously accepted. The analysis of this short-term deviation is presented with a potential application in the sphere of communal politics. |
| Keywords: | voting, minority, communal politics |
| JEL: | D7 |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:09-115&r=ppm |
| By: | K P Kannan |
| Abstract: | This paper is an attempt to apply the technique of social cost - benefit analysis to the problem of choice of technology in building construction in Kerala. [WP No. 30]. |
| Keywords: | technique, social cost-benefit analysis, technology, building construction, Kerala, construction, industrial, agricultural projects, irrigation, transport, health, housing, India, goods, resources, |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2215&r=ppm |