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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Reside Renato E |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes the determinats of stress in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure investment. The empirical analysis in this study yields a number of surprising results: 1.Strong growth and rigid currency regimes heighten risk by leading to adverse selection of proponents and moral hazard in project design 2.Many of the World Bank's indices of governance quality lead to perverse outcomes, suggesting that new governance standards must be used to judge PPPs 3.Except for political risk guarantees, loans and equity from multilateral institutions have no effects on outcomes ;however, political risk guarantees are rarely utilized ,suggesting that they may need to be redesigned or marketed better to be more useful. [WP 133] |
| Keywords: | Stress;Risk;Political Risk;Infrastructure;Public-Private Partnership Investments;Public-Private Partnership Outcomes;Governance;Macroeconomic Channels;Adverse Selection;Moral Hazard;Project Design |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1956&r=ppm |
| By: | Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Strand, Jon |
| Abstract: | The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an offset mechanism designed to reduce the overall cost of implementing a given global target for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in industrialized"Annex B"countries of the Kyoto Protocol. This paper discusses various ways in which CDM projects do not imply full offset of emissions, thus leading to an overall increase in global GHG emissions when considering the Annex-B emissions increase allowed by the offsets. The authors focus on two ways in which this may occur: baseline manipulation; and leakage. Baseline manipulation may result when agents that carry out CDM projects have incentives to increase their initial (or baseline) emissions in order to optimize the value of CDM credits. Leakage occurs because reductions in emissions under a CDM project may affect market equilibrium in local and/or global energy and product markets, and thereby increase emissions elsewhere. Remedies against these problems are discussed. Such remedies are more obvious for the baseline problem (where one is simply to choose an exogenous baseline independent of the project) than for the leakage problem (which is difficult to prevent, and where a prediction of the effect must rely on information about overall market equilibrium effects). |
| Keywords: | Energy Production and Transportation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Environment and Energy Efficiency,Energy and Environment,Transport Economics Policy&Planning |
| Date: | 2009–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4931&r=ppm |
| By: | John P. Walsh; Sadao Nagaoka |
| Abstract: | While individual inventors are key to technological progress, it is becoming increasingly necessary for inventors and their firms to exploit information and capabilities outside the firm in order to combine onefs own resources with resources from the external environment. To better understand the collaborative process in inventions, we collected detailed information on a sample of triadic patents, focusing on the invention process, sources of ideas, and collaboration (the RIETI-Georgia Tech inventor survey), with over 1900 responses from the US and over 3600 responses from Japan. Our results suggest that in both countries, just over 10% of inventions involved an external co-inventor and about 30% involved external (non-co-inventor) collaborators (with the rate of collaboration somewhat higher in Japan). Cross-organizational co-inventions increase as firm size declines, especially in Japan. In both countries, vertical collaborations (both co-inventions and other collaborations) with users and suppliers were the most common. The most important knowledge sources were similar in the two countries: patents, customers, publications, and information from other parts of the firm, although their relative rankings varied somewhat. In particular, patent literature is a relatively more important information source in Japan and scientific literature is relatively more important in the US. Since our evidence suggest that inventors see literature globally, such difference does not seem to be driven by the difference of the disclosed literature (for an example, more early patent disclosure in Japan) as suggested by earlier literature but by that of the incentive and capability of the inventors. While in both countries most R&D funding is provided internally, venture capital and government funding play a greater role in the US than in Japan, with venture capital funds especially important for the smallest US firms. On the other hand, industry funding plays a greater role for university researchersf inventions in Japan. There is some evidence that gopen innovationh through collaborations enhances not only the technical significance of the invention, but also the probability of its commercialization through, for an example, vertical collaboration facilitating better matches between the needs of customers or the capabilities of suppliers. |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:09022&r=ppm |
| By: | Prüfer, J. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | The process of innovation is driven by two main factors: new inventions and institutions supporting the transformation of inventions into marketable innovations. This paper proposes a new institution, called a semi- public contest, that has been neglected by the economic literature but exists frequently in practice. I show how semi-public contests can mitigate a dilemma that arises at a very early stage of innovative activity and specify the general requirements for situations in which a semi-public contest can increase welfare. This paper's results suggest that governments promote knowledge about the semi-public contest mechanism but refrain from direct public funding of contests. |
| Keywords: | Innovation;Contests;Entrepreneurs;Institutional Design;Business Plan Competitions;Auctions |
| JEL: | D02 D86 L10 O31 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200933&r=ppm |
| By: | Ghazi Zouari (ISG Université de Gabès (Tunisie)) |
| Abstract: | (VF)L'objet de cette recherche est de tenter d’expliquer les systèmes de décision et de contrôle lors des projets d’investissement. Pour cela, cette recherche met en évidence le rôle de l'architecture organisationnelle (répartition des droits sur la gestion de décision et sur le contrôle de décision) en tant que facteur explicatif de l'efficacité de la gestion des investissements. Nous testons nos hypothèses sur un échantillon de 63 firmes tunisiennes en recourant à la méthode de corrélation canonique. (VA)The object of this research is to explain the decision and control systems, relatif to projects of investments. Otherwise, we will analyze the Tunisia firm behavior about investment decision and bring light organizational architecture (rights allocation on decision management and on decision control) influence on investment decision to get effective management of the investments. We test our hypothesis on a sample of 63 Tunisian firms using the canonical correlation method. |
| Keywords: | décision d'investissement;architecture organisationnelle;investment decision;organizational architecture |
| JEL: | G31 |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1090401&r=ppm |
| By: | Ghazi Zouari (ISG Université de Gabès (Tunisie)) |
| Abstract: | (VF)Plusieurs théoriciens et praticiens montrent que l’évaluation semble jouer un rôle relativement secondaire dans le processus d’investissement dans la mesure où elle intervient à titre de contrôle ex ante lors d'une phase de ratification. De ce fait, si on admet que l'efficience de l'organisation résulte d'une imbrication de mécanisme organisationnel, les démarches qui étudient les mécanismes de façon isolée semble des voies sans issue. Ainsi, l'objectif de cette recherche est de tenter d’expliquer les systèmes de décision et de contrôle lors des projets d’investissement. Pour ce faire, nous mettons en évidence le rôle de la nature de l’investissement, des systèmes d’évaluation et d’incitation en tant que facteurs explicatifs de l’allocation des droits décisionnels. Nous testons nos hypothèses sur un échantillon de 63 firmes tunisiennes en recourant à une approche quantitative.(VA)Several academics and experts show that evaluation seems to play a relatively secondary role in the investment process as much as it intervenes only as control ex ante of a ratification phase. So if it is admitted that the efficiency of the organization results from an overlap of organizational mechanism, the steps which study the mechanisms in an isolated way seem dead end. Thus, the objective of this research is to build an explanatory theory of the decision and control systems, relating to the investment projects. For this, we highlighted the role of the investment’s nature, the evaluation and incentive systems as explanatory factors of the decisional rights assignment. We test our hypothesis on a sample of 63 Tunisian firms using the quantitative method. |
| Keywords: | investissement;droits décisionnels;systèmes de contrôle;investment;decision rights;systems of control. |
| JEL: | G31 |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1090402&r=ppm |
| By: | Tata Institue of Social Sciences TISS |
| Abstract: | The study was undertaken with the objective to review and analyse the costs and benefits of the Sardar Sarovar Dam at this stage, when efforts are being made to complete the last leg of the dam, raising height from 121.92 m to 138.68 m (and 141.21 m when the water is overflowing). |
| Keywords: | dams, sardar sarovar, financial, social, livelihoods, costs, benefits, displacements of people, India, Narmada, drining water, |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1983&r=ppm |
| By: | Axel Dreher; Peter Nunnenkamp |
| Abstract: | NGO aid is still widely believed to be superior to official aid (ODA). However, the incentives of NGOs to excel and target aid to the poor and deserving are increasingly disputed. We contribute to the emerging literature on the allocation of NGO aid by performing panel Tobit estimations for Swiss NGOs. The analysis offers new insights in two major regards: First, we cover the allocation of both self-financed and officially co-financed aid for a large panel of NGOs and recipient countries. Second, by classifying each NGO according to its financing structure, we address the unresolved question of whether financial dependence on the government impairs the targeting of NGO aid. It turns out that NGOs mimic the state as well as NGO peers. Officially refinanced NGOs are more inclined to imitate the allocation of ODA. However, the degree of financial dependence does not affect the poverty orientation of NGO aid and the incentives of NGOs to engage in easier environments. The allocation of self-financed aid differs in several respects from the allocation of officially co-financed aid, including the role of financial dependence for imitating the state and herding among NGOs. |
| Keywords: | NGO aid; aid allocation; official co-financing; financial dependence |
| JEL: | F35 |
| Date: | 2009–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:got:gotcrc:1&r=ppm |
| By: | Edgar Morgenroth (ESRI) |
| Abstract: | In the past the first expenditure to be cut during an economic downturn was capital expenditure. However, the cuts in capital expenditure of the late 1980?s and 90?s had left Ireland with an infrastructure deficit. This note highlights a number of important issues, which should be considered before decisions to spend tax payer?s money to support the construction sector are taken. Overall the paper concludes that in the context of a relatively high cost per job created via public investment, public capital projects should be undertaken on the basis that they have a long-run return to the whole economy. |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp298&r=ppm |