nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2009‒05‒23
five papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. A software for project management process By Banica, Logica; Rosca, Doina; Stefan, Cristian
  2. Mega projects in India Environmental and Land Acquisition Issues in the Road Sector By G. Raghuram
  3. Constitutional Design: Separation of Financing and Project Decision By Hans Gersbach; Volker Hahn; Stephan Imhof
  4. Infrastructure and economic geography: An overview of theory and evidence By I.P. Ottaviano, Gianmarco
  5. The Effects of Corporate Finance on Firm Risk-taking and Performance: Theory and Evidence By Toshihiro Okada; Kohei Daido

  1. By: Banica, Logica; Rosca, Doina; Stefan, Cristian
    Abstract: Research Project Management Process, implies the allocation of important human and financial resources to guarantee fulfilling of the goal by respecting the pre-defined schedule, under the conditions of expected quality. Considering that, informatics is looking for solutions to support the teams to develop complex projects. In this paper we propose a new software for project management, along with a new approach but at the same time complying to the requests formulated by the TenStep methodology. This application software, manages schedule, changes, quality control, risk and budget for the projects. Research Project Management - RPM software is our proposal for a complete integration of all project management processes in a unique application that offers procedures to coordinate people and activities in a project. It will help during the phase of design and supervise of a project, as well as changing the initial configuration when the project doesn’t develop as planned.
    Keywords: project management; TenStep methodology; software application; quality management; risk management; resources allocation.
    JEL: M11 C61
    Date: 2009–05–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:15237&r=ppm
  2. By: G. Raghuram
    Abstract: Mega projects (primarily infrastructure) receive a sizable investment (~10%) of the gross fixed capital formation in India. Environmental clearances and land acquisitions have been the two major reasons for delays in the projects. However, there has been a steady increase in the proportion of projects running on schedule and a sharp decline in the proportion of projects with cost overruns. These accomplishments have been achieved due to better financing, project management, and reform in the regulatory frameworks related to environmental and land acquisition aspects.With increasing private sector participation, delays due to project management are expected to reduce. The modifications in the regulatory framework on environmental and land acquisition issues are moves in the right direction. However, methods used for assessments related to environmental impact and land acquisition are still manual, making the whole process time consuming. Technology could be a good instrument in reducing the time required for these assessments as well as in bringing transparency in the system. Decentralization with capacity building at the state level would also help in the long run in reducing these delays.[IIMA- WP NO- 2009-03-07]
    Keywords: "infrastructure; fixed capital formation; Land acquisition; Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation; regulatory frameworks; Environmental Issues; Forest Conservation Act 1980; the Environment Protection Act 1986; State Pollution Control Board; Land Acquisition Issues; National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project-Affected Families of 2003; National Highways Act of 1956; Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor; Judicial Activism; Religious Sentiments
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1954&r=ppm
  3. By: Hans Gersbach (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Volker Hahn (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Stephan Imhof (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
    Abstract: We examine the provision of public projects under separate tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax rules separated from project cum subsidy decisions exhibit several advantages when incentive problems of the agenda-setter are taken into account. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal of inefficient projects which benefit only a small lobby group. We propose “redistribution efficiency” as a socially desirable property of proposals and find that tax rules always guarantee redistribution efficiency. We show that rules on subsidies combined with discretion regarding taxes always yield socially inferior proposals. Finally, tax rules induce the agenda-setter to look for potential improvements of public projects.
    Keywords: constitutional design, provision of public projects, voting, taxes and subsidies
    JEL: D72 H40
    Date: 2009–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:09-109&r=ppm
  4. By: I.P. Ottaviano, Gianmarco (Universita di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche)
    Abstract: This essay provides an overview of the role of infrastructure on economic geography in the light of both theoretical and empirical findings. Two main lessons stand out. First, infrastructural improvements affect the geographical distribution of economic activities. Second, even when localized, infrastructure investment generates externalities that may diffuse quite far across the economy. These two lessons have two far-reaching policy implications. First, effective infrastructure projects require knowledge on their impacts on the spatial distribution of economic activities. These impacts depend crucially on the specific details of the projects and the specific sources of agglomeration economies they affect. Second, regions need to coordinate not only in terms of interregional infrastructure projects but also in terms of intraregional ones if they want to avoid beggar-thyneighbour and self-defeating outcomes.
    Keywords: agglomeration; infrastructure; regional development; transport networks
    JEL: F12 F15 F21 R12
    Date: 2008–07–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:eibpap:2008_006&r=ppm
  5. By: Toshihiro Okada (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University); Kohei Daido (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)
    Abstract: Some firms may exhibit better operating performance than others because they undertake riskier projects: risk-return tradeoff. We develop a model to examine the effects of financial contracts on a firm's choice between safer (lower risk, lower return) and riskier (higher risk, higher return) projects. The model shows that, assuming a competitive capital market (i.e., financiers with no monopoly power), three types of financial contracts can each be an equilibrium contract, depending on conditions. We show that firms undertake ''safer'' projects when using rollover loans (i.e., short-term loans with a possible rollover), while firms undertake ''riskier'' projects when using non-rollover loans (i.e., long-term loans) or new share issues. The model emphasizes the role of rollover loans (with passive monitoring) as a potential disciplinary device to suppress a firm's risk-taking. The model generates several predictions about the determinants of a firm's risk-taking and its performance. One key prediction of the model is that (risk-neutral) firms with closer bank relationships are more likely to use rollover loans and undertake ''safer'' projects, even with a contestable capital market. We find novel empirical support for the model's predictions.
    Keywords: corporate finance, corporate governance, firm risk-taking, firm performance, loan rollover
    JEL: G32
    Date: 2009–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kgu:wpaper:45&r=ppm

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