nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2009‒05‒09
four papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Collaborating By Alessandro Bonatti; Johannes Horner
  2. Choosing and Sharing By Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy; Leroux, Justin
  3. Projects, careers and resistances in hotels By Nathalie Bosse; Christine Guégnard
  4. New challenges in competitiveness: knowledge development and coopetition By Ana Villar; César Camisón Zornoza; Montserrat Boronat

  1. By: Alessandro Bonatti (Dept. of Economics, Yale University); Johannes Horner (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
    Abstract: This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as long as the project has not succeeded. In fact, the delay until the project succeeds, if it ever does, increases with the number of agents. We show why deadlines, but not necessarily better monitoring, help to mitigate moral hazard.
    Keywords: Moral hazard, Teams, Experimentation, Collaboration, Public goods, Learning
    JEL: C72 C73 D83
    Date: 2009–04
  2. By: Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy; Leroux, Justin
    Abstract: Implementing a project, like a nationwide nuclear waste disposal, which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to the host is often problematic. In practice, revelation issues and redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable agreements. We address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to implement the efficient site (the host with the lowest cost) and share the exact cost while retaining total control over realized transfers. Our mechanism is simple and in the vein of the well-known Divide and Choose procedure. The unique Nash equilibrium outcome of our mechanism coincides with truthtelling, is budget-balanced, individually rational and immune to coalitional deviations. More generally, our mechanism can also handle the symmetric case of positive local externalities (e.g., Olympic Games) and even more complex situations where the usefulness of the project---regardless of its location---is not unanimous.
    Keywords: Public goods; local externalities; NIMBY; implementation; mechanism design; VCG mechanisms.
    JEL: H41 D61 C70
    Date: 2009–04
  3. By: Nathalie Bosse (LEPII - Laboratoire d'Économie de la Production et de l'Intégration Internationale - CNRS : UMR5252 - Université Pierre Mendès-France - Grenoble II); Christine Guégnard (IREDU - Institut de recherche sur l'éducation : Sociologie et Economie de l'Education - CNRS : UMR5225 - Université de Bourgogne)
    Abstract: The hotel industry rhythms appear as a hindrance to staff loyalty and female careers development. However, two hotel networks of the Accor group, Etap Hotel and Formule 1 stand out from this general pattern with a presence of female managers (38% of managers). This case incites to wonder about career ladders within these budget hotel chains. Are the assets and the obstacles combined in the same way for men and for women? Which views have the employees and managers about their jobs, their working conditions and their plans for the future ?
    Keywords: career ; female career ; hotel industry ; France
    Date: 2009–04–06
  4. By: Ana Villar (Universitat Jaume I); César Camisón Zornoza (Universitat Jaume I); Montserrat Boronat (Universitat Jaume I)
    Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to suggest how collaboration with competitors -coopetition - established for the joint creation of knowledge, could be a new opportunity that managers must evaluate as a strategic option. The literature on strategic alliances and knowledge creation is considered, together with the specific trend of alliances with competitors. Then, the process continues with the discussion of circumstances and characteristics in which coopetition could be a superior option, making it possible to develop new knowledge. Our research shows that in the case of coopetition, the two sides of the behaviour -competitive and cooperative- provide greater incentives to improve knowledge development. As this is a theoretical paper, deeper analysis is required to prove whether the advantages of strategic alliances with competitors over other alternatives are superior forms of organizing the process of knowledge creation in high-technology industries. With regard to practical implications, managers must consider the option of this kind of inter-organizational agreement with competitors as an alternative and an opportunity for integrating knowledge faster than they would in isolation. The originality of this paper lies in showing that the objective of coopetition must be the joint creation of new knowledge by partners, and in differentiating this type of cooperation from another in which the aim is to absorb knowledge from one of the partners. We present this kind of coopetition as a new strategic option that managers must evaluate, and this is the first attempt to discuss and differentiate the two types of alliances in a coopetition environment. El principal objetivo de este trabajo es sugerir cómo la colaboración con competidores, conocida con el término coopetición, establecida para la creación conjunta de conocimiento, puede suponer una nueva oportunidad que los directivos deben evaluar como una opción estratégica. Para el desarrollo del trabajo se tiene en cuenta la literatura relacionada con la creación de conocimiento y con alianzas estratégicas, junto con las especificidades de las alianzas con competidores. El trabajo continúa con la discusión de las circunstancias y características en las que la coopetición puede ser una opción superior, haciendo posible el desarrollo de nuevo conocimiento. Nuestra investigación muestra que en el caso de la cooperación con competidores, las dos características de esta relación ¿ competitiva y cooperativa -, proveen mayores incentivos para mejorar el desarrollo de conocimiento. Al tratarse de un trabajo teórico, en futuras investigaciones se debería realizar un análisis más profundo para contrastar si las ventajas de las alianzas estratégicas con competidores son superiores efectivamente a otras formas de organizar el proceso de creación de conocimiento en industrias de alta tecnología. Con respecto a las implicaciones prácticas, los directivos deberían considerar esta opción de acuerdos inter-empresariales con los competidores como una alternativa y una oportunidad para integrar conocimiento más rápido que el desarrollo de manera aislada por una sola empresa. La originalidad de este trabajo residen en mostrar que el objetivo de la coopetición puede ser la creación conjunta de conocimiento por los socios, y en diferenciar este tipo de cooperación de otros en el que el objetivo es únicamente absorber conocimiento de los socios. Presentamos esta opción de coopetición como una nueva opción estratégica que los directivos deben evaluar, y esto supone el primer intento en diferenciar estos dos tipos de alianzas en un entorno de coopetición.
    Keywords: Coopetición, creación de conocimiento, alianzas estratégicas Coopetition, knowledge creation, strategic alliances,
    Date: 2009–03

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