nep-ppm 2009-05-02 papers

on Project, Program and Portfolio Management

Issue of 2009‒05‒02
two papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

e-Participation in Austria: Trends and Public Policies By Aichholzer, Georg; Allhutter, Doris
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments By Claudio Ferraz; Frederico Finan

e-Participation in Austria: Trends and Public Policies

By:	Aichholzer, Georg; Allhutter, Doris
Abstract:	The paper is a first step to assess the status of e-participation within the political system in Austria. It takes a top-down perspective focusing on the policy framework related to citizens’ rights in the digital environment, the role of public participation and public policies on e-participation in Austria. The analysis of the development of e-participation in Austria as well as of social and political trends regarding civic participation in general and its electronic embedding, show a remarkable recent increase of e-participation projects and related initiatives. The paper identifies main institutional actors actively dealing with or promoting e-participation and reviews government initiatives as well as relevant policy documents specifically addressing and relating to e-participation or e-democracy. Finally, it takes a look at the state of the evaluation of e-participation. A major conclusion is that e-participation has become a subject of public policies in Austria; however, the recent upswing of supportive initiatives for public participation and e-participation goes together with ambivalent attitudes among politicians and administration towards e-participation.
Keywords:	e-participation, e-democracy, citizens’ rights, institutional actors, public policies, government initiatives, evaluation
Date:	2009–02–15
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ita:itaman:09_01&r=ppm

Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments

By:	Claudio Ferraz; Frederico Finan
Abstract:	Political institutions can affect corruption. We use audit reports from an anti-corruption program in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with re-election incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without re-election incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politicianâ€™s corrupt behavior.
JEL:	D72 D78 H41 O17
Date:	2009–04
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14937&r=ppm

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