nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2009‒04‒13
six papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. What does really matter? Determinants of the Decision to Participate in IT-Standardization Project Groups By Bernd Riefler
  2. Procurement Contracting with Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence By Patrick Bajari; Gregory Lewis
  3. GUIDE FOR PROGRAM EVALUATIO?? By Maud Roucan-Kane,; Joseph Suttles
  4. Residents' Benefits Evaluation of Urban Development Plans - A Willingnes-To-Accept Model for a Multi-functional Land Use Project in Amsterdam By Caroline A. Rodenburg; Peter Nijkamp; Henri L.F. de Groot; Erik T. Verhoef
  5. The motivations, organisation and outcomes of university-industry interaction in the Netherlands By Bodas Freitas, Isabel Maria; Verspagen, Bart

  1. By: Bernd Riefler (Institute of Economics and Law, Department of Microeconomics and Spatial Economics, University of Stuttgart)
    Abstract: Why do members of IT-standardization organizations participate in project groups? So far participation decisions have found little interest in research, even though IT-standardization and the membership decision are well discussed. The focus of this paper will be on product data standardization (PDS) organization. Two main factor groups can be identified that influence the participation decisions: (a) member-specific factors as R&D intensity or company size and (b) project-specific factors as liaison-orientation, life-cycle stage or influence of project leaders. The theory will be tested on decisions made in the automotive product data standardization organization ProSTEP iViP. The results show evidence of both member-specific and project-specific coefficients as significant predicting factors of the participation decision.
    Keywords: Standard Setting Organization, IT-standardization, Product Data Standardization
    JEL: D71 L15
    Date: 2009–04–01
  2. By: Patrick Bajari; Gregory Lewis
    Abstract: In public sector procurement, social welfare often depends on the time taken to complete the contract. A leading example is highway construction, where slow completion times inflict a negative externality on commuters. Recently, highway departments have introduced innovative contracting methods that give contractors explicit time in­centives. We characterize equilibrium bidding and efficient design of these contracts. We then gather a unique data set of highway repair projects awarded by the Minnesota Department of Transportation that includes both innovative and standard contracts. Descriptive analysis shows that for both contract types, contractors respond to the incentives as the theory predicts, both at the bidding stage and after the contract is awarded. Next we build a structural econometric model that endogenizes project completion times, and perform counterfactual policy analysis. Our estimates suggest that switching from standard contracts to designs with socially efficient time incentives would raise commuter surplus relative to the contractor’s costs by 19% of the contract value; or in terms of the 2009 Mn/DOT budget, $290 million.
    JEL: D02 D21 D44 H57 L0 L74 L78
    Date: 2009–04
  3. By: Maud Roucan-Kane, (Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University); Joseph Suttles (Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University)
    Abstract: Extension programs must be evaluated in order to assess their value to participants, institutions, funders, and all other stakeholders. Evaluations can be especially useful when the program has specific objectives that are measurable, either qualitatively and quantitatively. There are many different methods and formats for evaluation, and choosing the correct evaluation can be critical to ensuring the accuracy and relevance of the evaluation results. Considerable thought must be put into determining the correct method for an evaluation, and they must always be focused on the specific objectives of the extension program. After administering an evaluation, the results should be communicated back to the stakeholders of the program in an effective manner and, after some deliberation, the program should be considered for alteration if deemed necessary. This paper aims to be a ‘how-to’ guide for development, administration, and appraisal of evaluations and evaluation results for a broad spectrum of extension programs.
    Keywords: extension program, evaluation, LOGIC
    JEL: Q16 I21 I23
    Date: 2009
  4. By: Caroline A. Rodenburg (VU University Amsterdam); Peter Nijkamp (VU University Amsterdam); Henri L.F. de Groot (VU University Amsterdam); Erik T. Verhoef (VU University Amsterdam)
    Abstract: Urban re-development projects may generate various positive as well as negative spatial externalities to the existing population in a given area. This study aims to assess the order of magnitude of the expected net benefits for incumbent residents from a large scale project in the Southern part of Amsterdam (the Netherlands), which is planned to transform the area into a large multi-functional urban centre. We employ a specific stated preference method (viz. a willingness-to-accept method) to assess the net socio-economic benefits for the population in the area concerned. Our approach explicitly considers perceived costs and benefits in the foreseen „end-states‟ as well as those incurred during the transitional (construction) phase towards such end-states. It is concluded that the multi-functional urban re-development project under consideration is not supported by the residents in the area, as the long-run benefits are perceived to be overshadowed by the short-run environmental nuisances.
    Keywords: multi-functional land use; stated preference; urban development
    JEL: Q15 R52 O18
    Date: 2009–03–18
  5. By: Bodas Freitas, Isabel Maria (Ecole de Management Grenoble, DISPEA Politecnico di Torino); Verspagen, Bart (UNU-MERIT, University of Maastricht)
    Abstract: This paper aims at analysing the impact of institutional and organizational factors on bridging industrial and university motivations for collaboration, as well as on the content, management and outcome of this relationship, in the Netherlands. In particular, we explore which type of projects, set up under specific industrial and university motivations, are more likely to face institutional barriers related to technology, market and organisational incentives frameworks. Moreover, we analyse the impact of technology transfer offices, research sponsoring, part-time professorships, and patenting on aligning university and industry motivations towards collaboration. To proceed empirically, thirty in-depth cases of successful university-industry knowledge transfer are analysed.
    Keywords: university-industry interaction, innovation cooperation
    JEL: O31 O32
    Date: 2009
  6. By: Maude Roucan-Kane (Iñaki Pena; Michael Boehlje; Jay Akridge)
    Abstract: The objective of this study is to identify factors determining a business investment strategy (i.e., the choice of investment commitment and form of organizational structure) in the food manufacturing, chemical, agricultural wholesaling and biotechnology industries. Propositions regarding strategic alliance theories are tested on over 400 inter-firm collaborative agreements using secondary data from major US and European companies for the 1994-97 period. Results suggest that transactions with lower technological and resource uncertainty levels are more likely to result in investments with a higher commitment level (i.e., acquisitions or majority equity-based controlling investments). The investment commitment level embedded in a single business transaction seems to be affected not only by a goal of cost minimization, but also by strategic motives and firm and industry factors.
    Keywords: Transaction costs, strategic alliances, food manufacturing, chemical, agricultural wholesaling, ag-biotechnology, investment strategy, innovation
    JEL: L10
    Date: 2009

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