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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | V. VAN PETEGHEM; M. VANHOUCKE |
| Abstract: | In this paper, an Artificial Immune System (AIS) for the multi-mode resource-constrained project scheduling problem (MRCPSP), in which multiple execution modes are available for each of the activities of the project, is presented. The AIS algorithm makes use of mechanisms which are inspired on the vertebrate immune system performed on an initial population set. This population set is generated with a controlled search method, based on experimental results which revealed a link between predefined profit values of a mode assignment and its makespan. The impact of the algorithmic parameters and the initial population generation method is observed and detailed comparative computational results for the MRCPSP are presented. |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:09/555&r=ppm |
| By: | Hurbean, Luminita |
| Abstract: | Successful implementation of an ERP system is the result of knowledgeable and dedicated people working together. It entails company-wide commitment, openness to change, good planning and experienced guidance. These primary criteria determine the probability of gaining significant return on investment (ROI) from an ERP system. Using these criteria as guidelines during the system selection process and subsequent implementation can ensure that the chosen system will support and enable the business improvements envisioned. Among the numerous critical success factors (CSFs) in the implementation of ERP systems, identified and demonstrated by practitioners and academic researchers in the last few years, we will synthesize and analyze the vendor selection issues, in connection to the implementation aspects, as we consider implementation the essential “ingredient” of the ERP success. |
| Keywords: | ERP implementation; ERP vendor selection process; critical success factors; ROI; ERP success |
| JEL: | O30 |
| Date: | 2009–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:14430&r=ppm |
| By: | Broström, Anders (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the role of geographic proximity for interaction on R&D, by exploring the special case of university-industry contacts. While numerous studies find that geographic proximity facilitates spillover effects between university and industry by utilising evidence from e.g. patenting and publishing activities, the geographical dimension is largely understudied in studies that report evidence from direct interaction. To explore when geographical proximity matters for university-industry interaction, a series of interviews with R&D managers in Swedish engineering firms is conducted. These interviews suggest that linkages in geographical proximity are more likely to generate impulses to innovation and create significant learning effects at the firm. Similarly, geographic proximate interaction is more likely to successfully contribute to R&D projects with short time to market. For long-term R&D projects, geographic proximity is generally seen as a less critical factor. A survey to 425 R&D managers in Swedish engineering firms provides evidence that supports these hypotheses. |
| Keywords: | R&D collaboration; innovation collaboration; university; technology transfer |
| JEL: | L21 L23 O32 |
| Date: | 2009–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0173&r=ppm |
| By: | ELENA REVILLA (Instituto de Empresa) |
| Abstract: | In today´s more complex multinational and technologically sophisticated environment, the group has re-emerged in importance as the project team. Work teams are important to organizations in general, but are especially critical in product development because they span many functional areas including engineering, marketing, manufacturing, finance, etc, and new product teams must frequently be composed of individuals from different backgrounds and perspectives. In these circumstances, this paper addresses the contingency role that knowledge strategy plays in explaining the relationship between team vision and product development performance. After studying the team vision on 78 new product deve |
| Keywords: | Product development , Team vision, Knowledge strategy |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emp:wpaper:wp09-02&r=ppm |
| By: | Guido Imbens (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Harvard University); Jeffrey Wooldridge |
| Abstract: | <p>Many empirical questions in economics and other social sciences depend on causal effects of programs or policies. In the last two decades much research has been done on the econometric and statistical analysis of the effects of such programs or treatments. This recent theoretical literature has built on, and combined features of, earlier work in both the statistics and econometrics literatures. It has by now reached a level of maturity that makes it an important tool in many areas of empirical research in economics, including labor economics, public finance, development economics, industrial organization and other areas of empirical micro-economics. In this review we discuss some of the recent developments. We focus primarily on practical issues for empirical researchers, as well as provide a historical overview of the area and give references to more technical research. </p> |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:cemmap:24/08&r=ppm |
| By: | Martin Gregor (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic); Dalibor Roháč (University of Oxford) |
| Abstract: | We extend a model of wasteful state aid in Dewatripont and Seabright (2006, Journal of the European Economic Association 4, 513--522) by a supranational controlling authority. The model combines moral hazard and adverse selection to show that politicians fund wasteful projects to signal their effort. Voters, unable to observe project benefits or effort, reward funding with a reelection premium that separates a high-effort politician from a low-effort politician. We examine state aid control by a benevolent authority which receives extra signals about the state of the world. We find that signals on the politician type are worthless. For signals on the project type, we derive a sufficient condition for aid control to unambiguously decrease welfare. We also prove that politicians do not respond to marginal changes in incentives. In this setup, the optimal state aid control is fairly often no control. |
| Keywords: | state aid, signaling, career concerns, aid control |
| JEL: | D72 D78 D82 H25 |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2009_14&r=ppm |