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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
By: | Antonio Estache; Atsushi Iimi |
Abstract: | Infrastructure projects are often technically complicated and highly customized. Therefore, procurement competition tends to be limited. Competition is the single most important factor toward auction efficiency and anti-corruption. However, the degree of competition realized is closely related to bidders’ entry decision and auctioneer’s decision on how to assess technical attributes in the bid evaluation process. The paper estimates the interactive effects among quality, entry and competition. With data on procurement auctions for electricity projects in developing countries, it is found that large electricity works are by nature costly and can attract only a few participants. The limited competition would raise government procurement costs. In addition, high technical requirements are likely to be imposed for these large-scale projects, which will in turn add extra costs for the better quality of works and limit bidder participation furthermore. The evidence suggests that the quality is of particular importance in large infrastructure projects and auctioneers cannot easily substitute prices for quality. |
Keywords: | Public procurement, auction theory, infrastructure development, governance |
JEL: | D44 H54 H57 C21 |
Date: | 2009 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2009_006&r=ppm |
By: | Kannan, Srinivasan |
Abstract: | Program Management is an important step in Social Development. There are variety of uses of the term "program" in organizations. In general use, a program is a collection of organizational resources that is geared to accomplish a certain major goal or set of goals. This definition of a program is similar to that of an organization and a system. A program is also an organization and a system. It is created for a purpose for a time period. Program is a time bound set of activities having larger scope than a project. Otherwise the steps of Program Management is similar to that of Project Management. |
Keywords: | Program Management; Planning; Health; Situation Analysis; LFA; Programming; Evaluation; Monitoring |
JEL: | P41 I18 O2 H5 O21 |
Date: | 2009 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:14178&r=ppm |
By: | Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Ulrich Hege (Dept of Finance and Economics, HEC School of Management); Liang Peng (Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado) |
Abstract: | We present a dynamic model of venture capital financing, described as a sequential investment problem with uncertain outcome. Each venture has a critical, but unknown threshold beyond which it cannot progress. If the threshold is reached before the completion of the project, then the project fails, otherwise it succeeds. The investors decide sequentially about the speed of the investment and the optimal path of staged investments. We derive the dynamically optimal funding policy in response to the arrival of information during the development of the venture. We develop three types of predictions from our theoretical model and test these predictions in a large sample of venture capital investments in the U.S. for the period of 1987-2002. First, the investment flow starts low if the failure risk is high and accelerates as the projects mature. Second, the investment flow reacts positively to information that arrives while the project is developed. We find that the investment decisions are more sensitive to the information received during the development than to the information held prior to the project launch. Third, investors distribute their investments over more funding rounds if the failure risk is larger. |
Keywords: | Venture Capital, Sequential investment, Stage financing, Intertemporal returns |
JEL: | D83 D92 G11 G24 |
Date: | 2008–10 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1682r&r=ppm |
By: | Antonio Estache; Atsushi Iimi |
Abstract: | Competition in public procurement auctions in the water supply and sanitation sector is largely limited. This is partly because of high technical complexity and partly because of auction design flaws. The division of lot contracts is an important policy choice for auctioneers to achieve efficiency. In general, there is a tradeoff between competition in auctions and size of contracts. Larger works could benefit from economies of scale and scope, but, large contracts might undermine competition. With the data on public procurement auctions for water and sewage projects in developing countries, it is shown that the bidder entry is crucially endogenous, especially determined by the auctioneer’s bundling and unbundling strategy. If water treatment plant and distribution network works are bundled in a single lot package, competition would be significantly reduced, and this adverse entry effect would in turn raise public procurement costs of infrastructure. There is no evidence of positive scope economies in the bidder cost structure. It is important to account for the underlying cost structure for designing efficient auction mechanisms. |
Keywords: | Public procurement, auction theory, infrastructure development, governance |
JEL: | D44 H54 H57 C21 |
Date: | 2009 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2009_007&r=ppm |
By: | Antonio Estache; Atsushi Iimi |
Abstract: | Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the process at the beginning of the tendering or may be technically disqualified at any point of the selection process. The paper applies the double selection model to procurement data from road development projects in developing countries and examines why competition ends up restricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective and auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on the size of contracts. Then, limited competition would likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs. |
Keywords: | Public procurement, auction theory, endogenous bidder entry, infrastructure development |
JEL: | D44 H54 H57 C21 D21 |
Date: | 2009 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2009_008&r=ppm |
By: | Wilson, Trevor; Chudleigh, Fred; Carrigan, Gretchen |
Abstract: | Since 2004, the Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries has embarked on a rigorous evaluation of its R&D Programs, with Benefit Cost Analysis being a cornerstone of this work. The analyses conducted to date have proved to be powerful tools in internal resource re-allocation. However, the process used has been time consuming, partly because there needs to be adequate time allowed for consultation both with scientists and with senior staff. Experience has highlighted the need for strong organisational support to the analysts carrying out the work. |
Keywords: | Benefit Cost Analysis, management, research and development, |
Date: | 2009 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aare09:47639&r=ppm |
By: | Lindner, Bob; McLeod, Paul |
Abstract: | Fruit flies are recognised as one of the major pests of fruit and vegetable crops worldwide. Potential benefits from fruit fly research include biosecurity benefits from better quarantine surveillance that reduces the costs of an incursion by a damaging exotic pest fruit fly; market access benefits by enabling new fruit exports; and field control benefits from better crop management. The Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR)’s investment in fruitfly research goes back some 25 years to an initial project in Malaysia. Since that time, ACIAR’s continued investment has funded a total of 18 projects ranging across several areas of fruit-fly research, and covering Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Fiji Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Papua New Guinea, Bhutan, Vietnam, Laos, and Indonesia. In an impact assessment study of all 18 ACIAR projects, Lindner and McLeod (2008) calculated that the present value (PV) of the total direct investment in these projects by ACIAR and its partners has been A$50.76 million. The PV of total quantifiable realised and prospective benefits that can be attributed to the direct investment by ACIAR and its partners was estimated to exceed A$258.84 million. Of this total PV of quantifiable benefits, A$212.63 million was calculated to accrue to partner-countries. In this paper, the question of why many potential benefits to partnercountries have not been realised to date, and why some future prospective benefits are problematic is examined. While the total value of benefits generated from the investment by ACIAR and its partners is impressive, the pattern of benefits is variable by type of benefit and by country. One of the most important general lessons, widely known but reinforced by the results from this study, is that while successful research project outcomes may be necessary to enable potential benefits, they rarely are sufficient for benefits to be realised. In particular, potential benefits will only be realised if there is uptake of project outputs. While it is recognized that the conditions for uptake are typically well beyond the influence of the researchers both in time and scope, at the time of project formulation, the necessary conditions for adoption of project outputs often seem to receive insufficient attention. Notwithstanding some 20 years of research on the development of low-cost protein bait sprays from brewery waste, the benefits are still essentially prospective and it has not been conclusively demonstrated that the use of these sprays will be widely adopted as a cost-effective alternative to existing practices in developing countries. |
Keywords: | ACIAR, fruit-fly, research, impact, assessment, |
Date: | 2009 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aare09:47617&r=ppm |