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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Estrada Vaquero, Isabel (Departamento de Organización de Empresas y Comercialización e Investigación de Mercados, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Valladolid); Martín Cruz, Natalia (Departamento de Organización de Empresas y Comercialización e Investigación de Mercados, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Valladolid); Pérez Santana, Pilar (Departamento de Organización de Empresas y Comercialización e Investigación de Mercados, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Valladolid) |
| Abstract: | We explore the innovation dynamics in multipartner-alliance teams (MA teams), a particularly complex type of teams. MA teams are temporary project teams composed of members from different partners and are in charge of attaining innovation. In particular, we focus on the potential contributions of human resource management (HRM) fit on the creation of a proper MA team climate for innovation. We address the necessity of reconceptualizing the notion of HRM fit from a holistic view, offering a new multi-level conceptualization. At the partner-level, we include the two traditional dimensions of HRM fit (vertical fit and horizontal fit); at the alliance-level, we include a new dimension (‘relational fit’). Our arguments allow us to conclude that the power of the HRM fit at the partner-level is reinforced/undermined depending on the synergistic effects of the combination of the partners’ sets of alliance-specific HRM practices for a particular MA team. Some directions for further work are suggested. |
| Keywords: | Multipartner alliances, team, fit, Human Resources Management, innovation |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ntd:wpaper:2008-05&r=ppm |
| By: | M. Raimondi; A. Arrighetti |
| Abstract: | There are many different reasons behind cooperation between firms and many possible interpretations are assumed to be based on an assessment of endogenous benefits of collective action directly generated by taking part in a joint project. This paper attempts at verifying the interpretative capacity of models analysing the cooperation between firms using not only technological or organisational factors and rivalry between firms, but also some proxy variables of social capital, of experience accumulation in collective action and of institutional capacity for initiative. The specific aim of our work is hence that of providing an interpretation of Italian inter-province differentials in the propensity of inter-firm cooperation. |
| Keywords: | 35 |
| JEL: | C21 D23 L14 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:par:dipeco:2009-ep03&r=ppm |
| By: | Isabel Maria Bodas Freitas (Grenoble Ecole de Management); Bart Verspagen (Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture, University of Oslo) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at analysing the impact of institutional and organizational factors on bridging industrial and university motivations for collaboration, as well as on the content, management and outcome of this relationship, in the Netherlands. In particular, we explore which type of projects, set up under specific industrial and university motivations, are more likely to face institutional barriers related to technology, market and organisational incentives frameworks. Moreover, we analyse the impact of technology transfer offices, research sponsoring, part-time professorships, and patenting on aligning university and industry motivations towards collaboration. To proceed empirically, thirty in-depth cases of successful university-industry knowledge transfer are analysed. |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tik:inowpp:20090304&r=ppm |
| By: | Rodolfo Apreda |
| Abstract: | This paper sets forth a pair of distinctive contributions to the subject. In the first place, it provides a unified approach to capital investment decisions, by means of a two-tiered framework of analysis. Such approach consists in working out the net present value of the project by discounting its cash flows with a temporal structure of rates of return adjusted for country and credit risk; this procedure accounts for the first tier. It is for the second tier to bring about both the internal and external rates of return. Afterwards, we broaden the streamlined viewpoint in valuation by introducing the Corporate Governance risk rate. As a byproduct, the paper also attempts to furnish analysts as well graduate students taking core courses on Corporate Finance with a friendly and easier road to valuation. |
| Keywords: | investment valuation, net present value, investment projects, internal rate of return, external rate of return, governance risk, cost of capital. |
| JEL: | G30 G31 G34 |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cem:doctra:392&r=ppm |
| By: | Peter Nunnenkamp; Rainer Thiele |
| Abstract: | Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are widely expected to provide better targeted aid than state agencies with a hidden agenda of commercial and political self-interest. However, principal-agent models question that NGOs decide autonomously on aid allocation. Indeed, we show empirically that NGO aid offers no panacea: The focus of NGOs on the neediest recipients turns out to be surprisingly weak. NGOs hardly make use of the perceived comparative advantage of working in “difficult environments.” Rather, they are strongly inclined to follow the herd of other NGOs and mimic the allocation behaviour of state agencies, especially if they depend on public co-financing |
| Keywords: | Non-governmental organizations, Aid allocation |
| JEL: | F35 |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kie:kieliw:1484&r=ppm |
| By: | Estache, Antonio; Iimi, Atsushi |
| Abstract: | Infrastructure projects are often technically complicated and highly customized. Therefore, procurement competition tends to be limited. Competition is the single most important factor toward auction efficiency and anti-corruption. However, the degree of competition realized is closely related to bidders'entry decision and the auctioneer's decision on how to assess technical attributes in the bid evaluation process. This paper estimates the interactive effects among quality, entry, and competition. With data on procurement auctions for electricity projects in developing countries, it is found that large electricity works are by nature costly and can attract only a few participants. The limited competition would raise government procurement costs. In addition, high technical requirements are likely to be imposed for these large-scale projects, which will in turn add extra costs for the better quality of works and further limit bidder participation. The evidence suggests that quality is of particular importance in large infrastructure projects and auctioneers cannot easily substitute price for quality. |
| Keywords: | Government Procurement,Investment and Investment Climate,E-Business,Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research |
| Date: | 2009–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4853&r=ppm |