nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2008‒07‒14
four papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Partnership contracts, project finance and information asymmetries: from competition for the contract to competition within the contract? By Frederic Marty; Arnaud Voisin
  2. How should donors give foreign aid? Project aid versus budget support By Izabela Jelovac; Frieda Vandeninden
  3. Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures? By Karel Janda
  4. The Impact of Agricultural Extension Services: The Case of Grape Production in Argentina By Pedro Cerdán-Infantes; Alessandro Maffioli; Diego Ubfal

  1. By: Frederic Marty (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques); Arnaud Voisin (University of Nice)
    Date: 2008
  2. By: Izabela Jelovac (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines); Frieda Vandeninden (MGSoG - Maastricht Graduate School of Governance - Universiteit Maastricht)
    Abstract: We develop a theoretical model to compare the two major foreign aid modalities: project aid and budget support. These two modalities have a different impact on the production of ‘developmental goods’. Firstly, conditionality can be associated with budget support, but only a subset of the developmental expenses – the observable ones – can be subject to conditionality. Secondly, when using project aid, the donors control the overall allocation of the aid resources. However, we consider that, because of limited harmonisation and coordination, project aid can be associated with a cost of imperfect fit. We develop a unified framework to compare these two modalities where we allow the simultaneous utilisation of both instruments. We show that all the aid should be given via budget support, no matter whether conditionality is used or not. Furthermore, we show that the optimal use of conditionality depends on the recipient’s developmental preferences, the productivity of the inputs and the level of aid compared to the recipient’s budget: when these parameters are relatively high, conditionality should be enforced. Otherwise, the optimal aid allocation is such that all the aid is given through unconditional budget support. We conclude that conditionality does not always improve the aid effectiveness.
    Keywords: conditionality - foreign aid - optimal contract
    Date: 2008
  3. By: Karel Janda (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic; University of Economics, Prague; Transgas-RWE Chair in Economics)
    Abstract: Credit contracting between a lender with a market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to a rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when an adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by a government support in the form of credit guarantees or subsidies. The principal-agent model of this paper compares different forms of government support and concludes that a guarantee defined as a proportion of a gross interest rate is not a sufficiently robust policy instrument. Lump-sum guarantees and interest rate subsidies are evaluated as better instruments because they have a nonambiguous positive effect on a social efficiency since they enable funding of socially efficient projects which would not be financed otherwise.
    Keywords: information asymmetry, credit, guarantees, subsidies
    JEL: D82 G18 H25
    Date: 2008–07
  4. By: Pedro Cerdán-Infantes (Office of Evaluation and Oversight at the Interamerican Development Bank.); Alessandro Maffioli (Office of Evaluation and Oversight at the Interamerican Development Bank.); Diego Ubfal (Department of Economics, University of California at Los Angeles.)
    Abstract: In this paper we evaluate the impact of the provision of agricultural extension services to grape producers in Mendoza, Argentina, on yield and grape quality. Using fixed effects and matching techniques, we show that despite non-significant average treatment effects on yield, the program has large positive effects on productivity for producers who were in the bottom of the productivity distribution before launching of the program. There is also evidence of increased quality of their grapes, especially for large producers and those in the middle of the yield distribution ex-ante. However, large groups of producers did not see impact on yields or quality. Consistent with a previous qualitative evaluation of the program, these results point to the need to balance flexibility of the program with effective targeting mechanisms. Producers with different characteristics, such as land size, productivity or structure of production seek different objectives and have different needs, so that targeting these types of programs effectively to the different needs of producers would increase their effectiveness.
    Keywords: Technology Adoption, Productivity, Agriculture Sector, Policy Evaluation
    JEL: Q12 Q16 H43
    Date: 2008–06

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