nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2008‒06‒27
six papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Dynamic Moral Hazard and Project Completion By Mason, Robin; Välimäki, Juuso
  2. Removing Some Dissonance From the Social Discount Rate Debate By David Burgess
  3. Do Reputational Concerns Lead to Reliable Ratings? By Beatriz Mariano
  4. THE CHANGE CLIMATE QUESTIONNAIRE : SCALE DEVELOPMENT By D. BOUCKENOOGHE; G. DEVOS; H. VAN DEN BROECK
  5. Show me the code: Spatial analysis and open source By Rey, S.J.
  6. Energy Tax Incentives and the Alternative Minimum Tax By Curtis Carlson; Gilbert E. Metcalf

  1. By: Mason, Robin; Välimäki, Juuso
    Abstract: We analyse a simple model of dynamic moral hazard in which there is a clear and tractable trade-off; between static and dynamic incentives. In our model, a principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that the project is completed. The principal pays only on completion of the project. We characterise the contracts that the principal sets, with and without commitment. We show that with full commitment, the contract involves the agent’s value and wage declining over time, in order to give the agent incentives to exert effort.
    Keywords: continuous time; moral hazard; Principal-agent model; project completion
    JEL: C73 D82 J31
    Date: 2008–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6857&r=ppm
  2. By: David Burgess (University of Western Ontario)
    Abstract: In an economy with a capital income tax distortion, the social discount rate (SDR) should reflect the social opportunity cost of capital rather than the social rate of time preference (consumption rate of interest) to ensure that public investments can produce Pareto improvements. The marginal cost of funds may exceed unity for a lump sum tax, but it is irrelevant for project evaluation. Even if a social welfare improvement is judged to be possible without passing the compensation test, the SDR should still reflect the social opportunity cost of capital to ensure that the project is the most efficient use of public funds.
    Date: 2008
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uwo:epuwoc:20082&r=ppm
  3. By: Beatriz Mariano
    Abstract: This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incentives to reveal information. It demonstrates that, in a simple model in which a rating agency has public and private information about a project, it may ignore private information and even contradict public information in an attempt to minimize reputational costs. A monopolistic agency can act conservatively by issuing too many bad ratings when a project is expected to be good based on private and public information. In a competitive setting, an agency becomes bolder and can issue too many good ratings when a project is expected to be bad based on private and public information. The paper provides a reason for why competition in the ratings industry might lead to overly optimistic ratings even in the absence of conflicts of interest.
    Date: 2008–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp613&r=ppm
  4. By: D. BOUCKENOOGHE; G. DEVOS; H. VAN DEN BROECK
    Abstract: On the basis of a step-by-step procedure (see Hinkin, 1998), this article discusses the design and evaluation of a self-report questionnaire (Change Climate Questionnaire) that can be used to gauge the internal context of change, the process factors of change, and readiness for change. The authors describe four studies used to develop a psychometric sound 42-item assessment tool that can be administered in organizational settings. In all, more than 3,000 organizational members from public and private sector companies participated in the validation procedure of the CCQ. The information obtained from the analyses yielded five internal context dimensions, three change process dimensions, and three facets of readiness for change.
    Keywords: change climate assessment, scale development, readiness for change
    Date: 2008–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:08/511&r=ppm
  5. By: Rey, S.J.
    Abstract: This paper considers the intersection of academic spatial analysis with the open source revolution. Its basic premise is that the potential for cross-fertilization between the two is rich, yet some misperceptions about these two communities pose challenges to realizing these opportunities. The paper provides a primer on the open source movement for academicians with an eye towards correcting these misperceptions. It identifies a number of ways in which increased adoption of open source practices in spatial analysis can enhance the development of the next generation of tools and the wider practice of scientific research and education.
    Keywords: open source; spatial analysis
    JEL: C21 C60
    Date: 2008–06–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:9260&r=ppm
  6. By: Curtis Carlson; Gilbert E. Metcalf
    Abstract: We take a first look at limitations on the use of energy-related tax credits contained in the General Business Credit (GBC) due to limitations within the regular corporate income tax as well as the AMT. Between 2000 and 2005, firms were unable to use all energy-related tax credits due to GBC limitations in the regular tax. The AMT has a smaller but still pronounced impact on the ability of firms to use these credits. Finally, we provide some illustrative calculations to demonstrate how the AMT can lead to very different levelized costs of producing electricity from a wind power project.
    JEL: H20 H23 Q48
    Date: 2008–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14110&r=ppm

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