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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Sandra Phlippen (Erasmus University Rotterdam); An Vermeersch (McKinsey and Company) |
| Abstract: | This study analyses 1400 research projects of the top 20 R&D-spending pharmaceuticals to identify the determinants of successful research projects. We provide clear evidence that externally sourced projects and projects involving biotechnologies perform better than internal projects and chemical projects, respectively. Controlling for these effects, we find that big pharma should either build a critical mass of disease area knowledge or diversify projects over different DA’s in order to obtain higher success probabilities. Projects in which a firm has built a critical mass of disease knowledge (through at least 10 projects per DA) are significantly more likely to reach clinical testing. Moreover, within large disease areas, the success probabilities of internal projects increases when a few (less than 20%) externally sourced projects are involved. We interpret this finding as knowledge spillovers from external to internal projects, as the limited number of external projects enables the same people to be involved in both external and internal research projects and apply externally generated knowledge internally. |
| Keywords: | research strategies; pharmaceutical industry; innovation; external collaborations; make-or-buy |
| JEL: | L65 L25 L21 D21 D83 |
| Date: | 2008–03–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080022&r=ppm |
| By: | Olivier Dagnelie |
| Abstract: | Agents voluntarily contribute to an infinitely repeated joint project. We investigate the conditions for cooperation to be a renegotiation-proof and coalition-proof equilibrium before examining the influence of output share inequality on the sustainability of cooperation. When shares are not equally distributed, cooperation requires agents to be more patient than under perfect equality. Beyond a certain degree of share inequality, full efficiency cannot be reached without redistribution. This model also explains the coexistence of one cooperating and one free-riding coalition. In this case, increasing inequality can have a positive or negative impact on the aggregate level of effort. |
| Date: | 2008–05–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:740.08&r=ppm |
| By: | David Hoyos Ramos (Unidad de Economía Ambiental - Instituto de Economía Pública); Pere Riera Micaló (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona); Javier Fernández Macho (Departamento de Economía Aplicada III); Carmen Gallastegui (Institute for Public Economics. University of the Basque Country); Dolores García (Departament d’Economia Aplicada. Universitat de les Illes Balears) |
| Abstract: | Developmental monetary benefits of coast artificialisation projects are rarely confronted with the environmental benefits that its conservation may entail. As a consequence, policy-makers often face decision making processes in which monetary benefits have to be balanced with physical impacts ending up in undervaluation or overvaluation of environmental aspects. Non-market valuation of coastal and marine resources is thus a growing concern in the assessment of cost-benefit analysis of coastal developmental projects. This paper attempts to estimate the effects on people’s utility of the potential environmental impacts of a new seaport in Pasaia, Spain. A choice modelling technique is proposed as a means of estimating marginal impacts for different environmental attributes of mount Jaizkibel, namely its landscape, flora, avifauna and seabed. The results from a multinomial logit model reveal that, on average, individuals would pay 1.39 euros for a one percentage protection of its landscape; 0.87 euros for protecting its flora; 0.68 euros for protecting its avifauna; and 0.63 euros for protecting its seabed. |
| Keywords: | choice modelling; environmental valuation; social welfare |
| JEL: | Q51 |
| Date: | 2008–05–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:biltok:200802&r=ppm |
| By: | Nicolò Bellanca (Università degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche) |
| Abstract: | The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are analyzed through nine dilemmas that they face in their ordinary functioning. These dilemmas rise from typical difficulties of collective action. When aid and emergency activities are carried out, they get even harder because of further difficulties which are due to the principal-agent relationship and the reduction of transaction costs. In the last section of the paper, the work of NGOs is examined in contexts of humanitarian emergencies and the new “democratic” aid conditionality which followed to the end of the Cold War. |
| Keywords: | Non-Governmental Organization; Collective Action; Agency Dilemma; Transaction Cost; Incentive. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2008_06&r=ppm |