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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Stefanescu, Laura; Stefanescu, Andy |
| Abstract: | This paper want to shown that current knowledge management approaches do not emphasise enough on knowledge sharing from reengineering project perspective. To achieve success with reengineering project, an organisation must possess and share knowledge about many different facets of this process. While many reengineering projects have resulted in improve performance, we believe that higher levels of performance improvement are possible by coupling IT capabilities with KM strategy. To explain these results it was assumed that the key to implementing with success reengineering project is having a wide knowledge management strategy. Our objective for the paper reported here was to understand the factors that motivate to share knowledge before implementing any knowledge management strategy to sustain the successfully implementation of reengineering projects. |
| Keywords: | Information Technologies; knowledge; knowledge management; strategy; reengineering; project |
| JEL: | M21 |
| Date: | 2008–03–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:7794&r=ppm |
| By: | Stefanescu, Andy |
| Abstract: | Traditional competitive intelligence solutions are typically one-sided. Intelligence firms deliver either technology tools to facilitate the intelligence process, independent research deliverables that supplement internal analysis or general consulting to guide the process. Once the solution or report is delivered, the firm is on his own, to piece together these cookie-cutter components into an effective, integrated business intelligence function. The task of reengineering project is to produce intelligence - a unique combination of hardware, software, communications, information and human - and process facts and judgements, opinions and evidence through the complex calculus of human reasoning. It make the chaotic intelligible, the inchoate coherent and the disorganised clear-cut. In the course of a year, it will gather and evaluate millions of different pieces of information, improving reengineering project. They will organise each information element into one or more of more than 3,000 distinct categories and select the most salient items for distribution to the consumers who depend upon their work. The specific information may vary from day to day, but the results always have the impeccable, clock-like precision and reliability. |
| Keywords: | intelligence; business intelligence tools; organisational change; reengineering |
| JEL: | M00 L21 M21 |
| Date: | 2008–03–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:7793&r=ppm |
| By: | Eilhard, Jan |
| Abstract: | This paper explores empirically what factors influence a firm’s decision to contribute and to take leadership in open source projects. Increasing firms’ participation in the development of open source software (OSS) is generally perceived as a puzzle. Assuming that firms face a ”Make-or-Buy” decision before using OSS, we argue that contribution is in fact the best way for them to keep control of their supplier in a context where incomplete open source licenses govern transactions. Building on this proposition, we derive predictions on the drivers of firms’ contribution and leadership in open source projects, and test them on a unique dataset of 4,808 open source projects extracted from Sourceforge. Our empirical findings confirm the predictions and lend support to our hypotheses. |
| Keywords: | Open source; transaction cost; governance; firm boundaries; software |
| JEL: | D23 L17 |
| Date: | 2008–01–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:7809&r=ppm |
| By: | Bard Harstad |
| Abstract: | I investigate when a exible bargaining agenda, where side payments are possible, facilitates cooperation in a context with strategic delegation. On the one hand, allowing side payments may be necessary when one partys participation constraint otherwise would be violated. On the other, with side payments each principal appoints a delegate that values the project less, since this increases her bargaining power. Reluctant agents, in turn, implement too few projects. I show that side payments are bad if the heterogeneity is small while the uncertainty and the typical value of the project are large. With a larger number of parties there may be a stalemate without side payments, but delegation becomes more strategic as well, and cooperation decreases in either case. |
| Keywords: | Collective action, side transfers, bargaining agenda, strategic delegation, issue linkages |
| JEL: | C78 D78 F53 H77 |
| Date: | 2007–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1452&r=ppm |
| By: | Spielman,David J.; Hartwich,Frank; von Grebmer, Klaus |
| Abstract: | "This study, which examines the role of public–private partnerships in international agricultural research, is intended to provide policymakers, research managers, and business decisionmakers with an understanding of how such partnerships operate and how they potentially contribute to food security and poverty reduction in developing countries. The study examines public–private partnerships in light of persistent market failure, institutional constraints, and systemic weaknesses, which impede the exchange of potentially pro-poor knowledge and technology. The study focuses on three key issues: whether public–private partnerships contribute to reducing the cost of research, whether they add value to research by facilitating innovation, and whether they enhance the impact of research on smallholders and other marginalized groups in developing-country agriculture. The study examines 75 projects undertaken by the research centers and programs of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in partnership with various types of private firms. Data and information were obtained through document analysis, semi-structured interviews with key informants, and an email survey of CGIAR centers. The resulting analysis provides a characterization of public–private partnerships in the CGIAR and describes the factors that contribute to their success. These finding are important to improving both public policy and organizational practices in the international agricultural research system." - from authors' abstract. |
| Keywords: | Agricultural R&D, CGIAR, Innovation, Public-private partnerships, |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:708&r=ppm |
| By: | Rocco Macchiavello |
| Abstract: | The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by: i) pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small firms, ii) "missing middle" in the firm size distribution, and iii) financially constrained firms. This paper studies an incomplete contract model in which the integration decision is chosen to maximize the returns of two vertically related projects to an external investor. The model jointly determines the financing, size and organization of firms. Vertical integration trades-off the benefits of joint liability against the cost of rendering the supply chain more opaque from the point of view of investors. The model shows that vertical integration is more likely to arise for intermediate levels of investor protection and that better contract enforcement reduces vertical integration only if financial markets are sufficiently developed. Moreover, the firm size distribution is more likely to display a missing middle in industries which favor vertical integration. The model sheds light on the industrial organization of developing countries showing that the motives for vertical integration are not necessarily higher in those countries. |
| Keywords: | Vertical Integration, Missing Middle, Industrial Development, Financial Constraints, Joint Liability, Trade Credit, Community Based Idustries |
| JEL: | O12 O16 D23 G30 L22 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:373&r=ppm |