nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2008‒02‒16
two papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Accountability in Complex Organizations: World Bank Responses to Civil Society By Alnoor Ebrahim; Steve Herz
  2. Signaling Commitment by Excessive Spending By Amihai Glazer; Stef Proost

  1. By: Alnoor Ebrahim (Harvard Business School, General Management Unit); Steve Herz (Lotus Global Advocacy)
    Abstract: Civil society actors have been pushing for greater accountability of the World Bank for at least three decades. This paper outlines the range of accountability mechanisms currently in place at the World Bank along four basic levels: (1) staff, (2) project, (3) policy, and (4) board governance. We argue that civil society organizations have been influential in pushing for greater accountability at the project and policy levels, particularly through the establishment and enforcement of social and environmental safeguards and complaint and response mechanisms. But they have been much less successful in changing staff incentives for accountability to affected communities, or in improving board accountability through greater transparency in decision making, more representative vote allocation, or better parliamentary scrutiny. In other words, although civil society efforts have led to some gains in accountability with respect to Bank policies and projects, the deeper structural features of the institution - the incentives staff face and how the institution is governed- remain largely unchanged.
    Date: 2007–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:08-027&r=ppm
  2. By: Amihai Glazer (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine); Stef Proost (Center for Economic Studies, KULeuven)
    Abstract: A policy is often more effective the more confident are economic agents that the current leader (or principal) will adopt the policy. This paper considers uncertainty about the principal's type, interpreted as uncertainty about the probability that he would adopt a project or policy. We show how a principal who highly values the project can signal that valuation by committing to spend a minimum on the project, even if canceling the program would entail waste, Indeed, the amount committed to spend may exceed the project's cost.
    Keywords: Government spending; Signaling; Commitment
    JEL: D82 H43
    Date: 2008–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irv:wpaper:070811&r=ppm

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