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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Christian Kalhoefer (Faculty of Management Technology, The German University in Cairo) |
| Abstract: | The discussion about the best method to be used in capital budgeting has been long and intensive. Differences between Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return seem to cause everlasting problems, while especially the Internal Rate of Return often is neglected as an appropriate measure. A famous example of the problems caused by the different approaches is the ranking of mutually exclusive projects. The following paper is presenting an easy explanation, without introducing new and more complicated measures, but by simply explaining the nature of and differences between Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return. |
| Keywords: | Capital budgeting, internal rate of return, net present value, ranking problem, incremental approach, reinvestment rate |
| JEL: | G31 G11 |
| Date: | 2007–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:guc:wpaper:3&r=ppm |
| By: | Anke S. Kessler (Simon Fraser University); Christoph Luelfesmann (Simon Fraser University); Gordon M. Myers (Simon Fraser University) |
| Abstract: | The paper studies a world where a region provides essential inputs for the successful implementation of a local public policy project with spill-overs, and where bargaining between different levels of government may ensure efficient decision making ex post. We ask whether the authority over the public policy measure should rest with the local government or be centralized, allowing financial relationships within the federation to be designed optimally. We show that centralization is always dominant when governments are benevolent, and that both governance structures are otherwise inefficient as long as political bargaining is disregarded. With bargaining, however, the first best can often be achieved under decentralization, but not under centralization. At the root of the result is the alignment of decision making over both essential inputs and final project size under decentralization. |
| Keywords: | Federalism, Constitutions, Decentralization, Grants, Political Bargaining. |
| JEL: | D23 D78 H21 H77 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp07-19&r=ppm |
| By: | Cavalcanti, Carlos |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether the structure of the Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) in Ghana evolved over time to minimize transaction costs commonly found in accessing and delivering development assistance in multi-donor settings. While the MDBS was expected to reduce the transaction costs involved in dealing with multiple development agencies, it created three additional sources of transaction costs: coordination failures, the costs of collective action, and measurement costs. The answer that emerges from this paper is that the structure of the MDBS evolved to mitigate these transaction costs. The problems associated with coordination was addressed by delegating the policy dialogue to sector-specific groups aimed at reaching agreements over a narrower set of issues and a mongst a smaller group of participants. Also, the MDBS reduced the cost of collective action by devising rules that allowed all the participating agencies to have a role in the decision-making process, and, in doing so, encouraged these agencies to increase the share of their contribution coming through the MDBS, rather than through large projects and off-budget disbursements. There was less success in reaching a settled view on how to reduce so-called measurement costs, however. While the group of development agencies made several attempts to overcome the difficulties in measuring progress in the program supported by the MDBS, it was not able to reach consensus on the extent to which the monitoring of the program should rely on outcome indicators. The Government did not favor the use of outcome indicators, and some development agencies placed greater emphasis on maintaining a dialogue around policy actions aimed at reaching the desired outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Economic Theory & Research,Debt Markets,Public Sector Expenditure Analysis & Management,,Development Economics & Aid Effectiveness |
| Date: | 2007–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4409&r=ppm |
| By: | Roediger-Schluga, Thomas (Oesterreichische Kontrollbank); Barber, Michael J. (Department of Technology Policy, Austrian Research Centers) |
| Abstract: | We describe the construction of a large and novel data set on R&D collaboration networks in the first five EU Framework Programmes (FPs), examine key features and provide economic interpretations for our findings. The data set is based on publicly available raw data that pre-sents numerous challenges. We critically examine the different problems and detail how we have dealt with them. We describe how we construct networks from the processed data. The resulting networks display properties typical for large complex networks, including scale-free degree distributions and the small-world property. The former indicates the presence of net-work hubs, which we identify. Theoretical work shows the latter to be beneficial for knowl-edge creation and diffusion. Structural features are remarkably similar across FPs, indicating similar network formation mechanisms despite changes in governance rules. Several findings point towards the existence of a stable core of interlinked actors since the early FPs with inte-gration increasing over time. This core consists mainly of universities and research organisa-tions. The paper concludes with an agenda for future research. |
| Keywords: | R&D collaboration, EU Framework Programmes, complex networks, small world effect, knowledge creation, knowledge diffusion, European Research Area |
| JEL: | L14 O38 Z13 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2007032&r=ppm |
| By: | Dănuleţiu, Dan-Constantin; Teiuşan, Sorin-Ciprian |
| Abstract: | The environment protection is considered to be a legitimate domain of the national policies in Romania since 1990, when the former Ministry of Environment appeared. Later on, the Environment Security National Strategy had been elaborated, being considered the first official document establishing the national objectives of that specific field. But the environment policies will be highly developed starting with 2000, when Romania’s preparation to join the European Union started; and this flourishing flow will take place according to European Union’s elaborated strategy regarding the candidate states within Agenda 2000. Due to the complexity of concerns on the EU acquis in the environment security field, Romania obtained a series of transition steps necessary for the high costs. Therefore, our country created the Environment Funds, namely an economic-financial tool designated to sustain and develop the environment protection projects. The present paper aims to present and analyze the way of creating, managing and using this fund from the perspective of the accomplished goals. So, there are brought into play the modalities and income sources of the Romanian Environmental Fund, the contributions paid to the fund and their payers. The environment protection projects financed by this fund, the norms required and the rewarded fields of this domain are also taken into consideration. In the end, there are exposed some measures that should be taken in order to determine a more active involvement of the potential beneficiaries in accessing grants financed by the Environmental Fund. |
| Keywords: | environmental fund; polluter pays principle; financing sources; environment protection projects |
| JEL: | Q50 K32 G38 H23 Q58 |
| Date: | 2007–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:5983&r=ppm |