nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2007‒09‒16
six papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. A heuristic solution framework for the resource constrained multi-project scheduling problem with sequence-dependent transfer times By Doreen Krüger; Armin Scholl
  2. Strategic and Operational Management of Supplier Involvement in New Product Development: a Contingency Perspective By Echtelt, F.E.A. van; Wynstra, J.Y.F.; Weele, A.J. van
  3. The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships By Eduardo Engel; Ronald Fischer; Alexander Galetovic
  4. Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions By Nicolás Figueroa; Gonzalo Cisternas
  5. Poor Household Participation in Payments for Environmental Services: Lessons from the Silvopastoral Project in Quindío, Colombia By Pagiola, Stefano; Rios, Ana R.; Arcenas, Agustin
  6. Testing Conditional Independence via Rosenblatt Transforms By Kyungchul Song

  1. By: Doreen Krüger (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftliche Entscheidungsanalyse); Armin Scholl (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftliche Entscheidungsanalyse)
    Abstract: We consider the problem of scheduling multiple projects subject to joint resource constraints. All approaches proposed in the literature so far are based on the assumption that resources can be transferred from one project to the other without any expense in time or cost. In many realworld settings this assumption is not realistic. For example, cranes have to be transported to another location and reinstalled there. In order to consider this additional aspect, we generalise the multi-project scheduling problem by additionally including transfer times which represent transportation, installation, adjustment, (re-) learning and other setup activities necessary when a resource is removed from one project and reassigned to another (or from one job to another within the same project). In this paper, we define the modified multi-project scheduling problem with transfer times (called RCMPSPTT), formulate it as an integer linear programme, propose heuristic solution procedures and present results of comprehensive computational experiments.
    Keywords: project scheduling, combinatorial optimisation, mathematical model, transfer times
    Date: 2007–09–10
  2. By: Echtelt, F.E.A. van; Wynstra, J.Y.F.; Weele, A.J. van (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University)
    Abstract: This paper examines how firms succeed to leverage supplier involvement in product development. The paper extends earlier work on managing supplier involvement by providing an integrated analysis of results, processes and conditions both at the level of individual development projects and the overall firm. Following a multiple-case study approach with theoretical sampling, the study is carried out by examining eight projects in which four manufacturers from different industries involve multiple suppliers. The findings suggest that successful supplier involvement is dependent on the coordinated design, execution and evaluation of strategic, long-term processes and operational, short-term management processes and the presence of enabling factors such as a cross-functional oriented organization. The required intensity of these processes and enablers depends on contingencies such as firm size and environmental uncertainty. In contrast with previous research, we find no indications that managing supplier involvement requires a different approach in highly innovative projects compared to less innovative projects.
    Keywords: new product development;innovation;R&D management;supplier relations;purchasing;
    Date: 2007–06–25
  3. By: Eduardo Engel; Ronald Fischer; Alexander Galetovic
    Abstract: Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm’s revenues. Yet income guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements observed in practice differ fundamentally from those suggested by the optimal contract. The optimal contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with realistic informational requirements; and risk allocation under the optimal contract suggests that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization. JEL classification: H21, H54, L51, R42.
    Date: 2007
  4. By: Nicolás Figueroa; Gonzalo Cisternas
    Abstract: In this paper we characterize the optimal procurement mechanism and the investment level for an environment where two projects must be adjudicated sequentially, and the winner of the first project has the opportunity to invest in a distributional upgrade for its costs in the second project. We study 4 cases, based on the commitment level of the seller and the observability of the investment decision. We find that with commitment, the second period mechanism gives an advantage to the first period winner, and induces an investment level that is greater than the efficient one. With non-commitment, the second period mechanism gives a disadvantage to the first period winner, and induces an investment level that is smaller than the efficient one. Observability is irrelevant in the commitment case, but makes the effects more pronounced in the non-commitment case.
    Date: 2007
  5. By: Pagiola, Stefano; Rios, Ana R.; Arcenas, Agustin
    Abstract: As the use of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) approaches in developing countries has grown, concern has arisen over the ability of poorer households to participate. This paper uses data from a PES project being implemented in Quindío, Colombia, to examine the extent to which poorer households that are eligible to participate are in fact able to do so. The project provides a strong test of the ability of poorer households to participate in a PES program as it requires participants to make substantial and complex land use changes. The results show that poorer households are in fact able to participate at levels that are broadly similar to those of better-off households. Moreover, their participation was not limited to the simpler, least expensive options. Transaction costs may be greater obstacles to the participation of poorer households than household-specific constraints.
    Keywords: Payments for Environmental Services (PES); poverty; silvopastoral; Colombia
    JEL: Q57 Q24 Q12
    Date: 2007–09–06
  6. By: Kyungchul Song (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
    Abstract: This paper investigates the problem of testing conditional independence of Y and Z given λθ(X) for some unknown θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rd, for a parametric function λθ(·). For instance, such a problem is relevant in recent literatures of heterogeneous treatment effects and contract theory. First, this paper finds that using Rosenblatt transforms in a certain way, we can construct a class of tests that are asymptotically pivotal and asymptotically unbiased against √n-converging Pitman local alternatives. The asymptotic pivotalness is convenient especially because the asymptotic critical values remain invariant over different estimators of the unknown parameter θ. Even when tests are asymptotically pivotal, however, it is often the case that simulation methods to obtain asymptotic critical values are yet unavailable or complicated, and hence this paper suggests a simple wild bootstrap procedure. A special case of the proposed testing framework is to test the presence of quantile treatment effects in a program evaluation data set. Using the JTPA training data set, we investigate the validity of nonexperimental procedures for inferences about quantile treatment effects of the job training program.
    Keywords: Conditional independence, asymptotic pivotal tests, Rosenblatt transforms, wild bootstrap
    JEL: C12 C14 C52
    Date: 2007–09–05

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