nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2007‒09‒02
eight papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Harmful monitoring By Haan, Marco A.; Los, Bart; Riyanto, Yohanes E.
  2. Strategic R&D with Knowledge Spillovers and Endogenous Time to Complete By Lukach, R.; Kort, P.M.; Plasmans, J.E.J.
  3. New Zealand Working For Families programme: Methodological considerations for evaluating MSD programmes By Alex Bryson; Sandra Vegeris; Genevieve Knight
  4. Cooperation among Overlapping Generations for a Public Project By MAHENC Philippe; ;
  5. Firm-Specific Characteristics and the Timing of Foreign Direct Investment Projects By Raff, Horst; Ryan, Michael
  6. Which Program for Whom? Evidence on the Comparative Effectiveness of Public Sponsored Training Programs in Germany By Biewen, Martin; Fitzenberger, Bernd; Osikominu, Aderonke; Waller, Marie
  7. Irreversible Investment in Competitive Projects: A New Motive for Waiting to Invest By BOBTCHEFF Catherine; VILLENEUVE Stephane;
  8. Resource Allocation when Projects Have Ranges of Increasing Returns By BOBTCHEFF Catherine; GOLLIER Christian; ZECKHAUSER Richard

  1. By: Haan, Marco A.; Los, Bart; Riyanto, Yohanes E. (Groningen University)
    Abstract: Abstract We show that there may be circumstances in which a principal prefers not to observe the project choice of an agent that acts on her behalf. The ability of the agent is private information. Projects differ with respect to the amount of risk. If the principal can observe the project choice of the agent, the latter will use that choice as a signal. In the separating equilibrium, an agent with high ability then chooses a project that is too risky. If more difficult projects require more effort, there are two opposite effects. The shirking effect implies that the agent chooses a project that is too safe. The signaling effect implies that he chooses a project that is too risky. The net effect is ambiguous. We also discuss the implications of our model for promotion policies.
    Date: 2007
  2. By: Lukach, R.; Kort, P.M.; Plasmans, J.E.J. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: It is shown that asymmetry in R&D efficiency between firms is an important factor determining feasibility of the preemption and attrition scenarios in competitive R&D with time to build. Scenarios of attrition and preemption games are most likely to occur when competitors have similar R&D efficiencies. In case of largely asymmetric firms the games of attrition and preemption are very unlikely, thus the R&D duration choices of firms are determined by the actual trade-off between the benefits of earlier innovation and the costs of faster R&D project completion.
    Keywords: R&D Investment;Competition;Preemption;Attrition.
    JEL: C72 D21 O31
    Date: 2007
  3. By: Alex Bryson; Sandra Vegeris; Genevieve Knight
    Abstract: The methodological review is the second part of the evaluation research commissioned by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) in 2005 to help in the preparation of the evaluation of the Working for Families (WFF) programme. This review enumerates the key evaluation questions identified by MSD as central to their policy concerns and considers how the features of WFF could affect evaluation. It details the methodological and data requirements that must be addressed in order to meet the four key evaluation objectives, namely: (1) tracking and evaluating the implementation and delivery of WFF (2) identifying changes in entitlement take-up and reasons for it (3) establishing the impact of WFF on employment-related outcomes (4) assessing WFF’s effect on net income and quality of life more generally. The methodological review complements the literature review by reviewing evaluations from around the world that are pertinent to WFF. An overview of evaluation methods is provided, concentrating on particular issues that arise within the WFF context. Section 2 focuses on implementation and delivery. Section 3 covers the issues related to take-up and entitlement and their evaluation. Section 4 discusses the evaluation methodologies that can be used in evaluating programmes such as WFF and introduces the data requirements they entail. Making work pay is the focus of section 5. Finally, section 6 examines hardship and poverty, living standards and wellbeing.
    Date: 2007
  4. By: MAHENC Philippe (LERNA, TSE); ;
    Date: 2007–08
  5. By: Raff, Horst; Ryan, Michael
    Abstract: This paper uses a proportional hazard model to study foreign direct investment by Japanese manufacturers in Europe between 1970 and 1994. We divide each firm’s investment total into a sequence of individual investment decisions and analyze how firm-specific characteristics affect each decision. We find that total factor productivity is a significant determinant of a firm’s initial and subsequent investments. Parent-firm size does not have a significant influence on the initial decision to invest. Large firms simply have more investments than smaller firms. Other firm-specific characteristics, such as the R&D intensity, export share and keiretsu membership, also play a role in the investment process.
    Keywords: Foreign direct investment, productivity, hazard model, Japan, keiretsu
    JEL: F23 L20
    Date: 2007
  6. By: Biewen, Martin; Fitzenberger, Bernd; Osikominu, Aderonke; Waller, Marie
    Abstract: We use a new and exceptionally rich administrative data set for Germany to evaluate the employment effects of a variety of public sponsored training programs in the early 2000s. Building on the work of Sianesi (2003, 2004), we employ propensity score matching methods in a dynamic, multiple treatment framework in order to address program heterogeneity and dynamic selection into programs. Our results suggest that in West Germany both short-term and medium-term programs show considerable employment effects for certain population subgroups but in some cases the effects are zero in the medium run. Short-term programs are surprisingly effective when compared to the traditional and more expensive longer-term programs. With a few exceptions, we find little evidence for significant positive treatment effects in East Germany. There is some evidence that the employment effects decline for older workers and for low– skilled workers.
    Keywords: evaluation, multiple treatments, dynamic treatment effects, local linear matching, active labor market programs, administrative data
    JEL: C14 H43 J68
    Date: 2007
  7. By: BOBTCHEFF Catherine (LERNA, University of Toulouse); VILLENEUVE Stephane;
    Date: 2006–08
  8. By: BOBTCHEFF Catherine (LERNA, TSE); GOLLIER Christian (LERNA, TSE); ZECKHAUSER Richard
    Date: 2007–08

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